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Abstract
My thesis is comprised of essays that study urban and environmental economic
topics in developing countries. Three of the four essays study causal drivers be-
hind the phenomenal urbanization and local economic growth in China. Its rapid
growth in the recent decades provides an illustrative case for understanding how the
spatial distribution of economic activities is aﬀected by policies regulating factors
of production. The fourth essay extends to another developing country, Tanzania,
where the challenges posed by climate change faced by populations agglomerating in
fast growing urban centers are substantial. This thesis strives to contribute to cur-
rent research with my understanding of the contexts, utilization of new yet publicly
available data, and novel methodology.
The ﬁrst chapter, Political favoritism in China's capital markets and its eﬀect
on city sizes, examines political favoritism of cities and the eﬀect of that favoritism
on city sizes. To study favoritism we focus on capital markets, where deﬁning
favoritism is more clear-cut and not confounded with issues of city scale economies.
Eﬃciency in capital markets requires equalized marginal returns to capital across
cities, regardless of size. We estimate the city-by-city variation in the prices of capital
across cities in China from 1998 to 2007. It shows how the prices facing the highest
order political units and overall cross-city price dispersion change with changes in
national policy and leadership. Next, the eﬀect of capital market favoritism on city
growth after the national relaxation of migration restrictions in the early 2000's is
investigated. We develop a simple model to show that those cities facing a lower
price of capital respond with larger population increases over the next decade, with
the change labor mobility. The elasticity of the city growth rate with respect to the
price of capital is estimated to be - 0.07 in the OLS approach and -0.12 in the IV
approach.
The second chapter, Early Chinese development zones: ﬁrst-mover advantage
and persistency, studies the heterogeneous eﬀects of China's special economic zone
program by their level of government support and timing of designation. Using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID) approach, I observe that the early national develop-
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ment zones in China have substantially greater and persistent success in attracting
FDI compared to national zones established later, or those at the provincial level.
Early national zones persistently attract higher levels of FDI inﬂows, attract more
internal migration and are of signiﬁcantly larger city sizes. To investigate whether
the persistent success of early national zones is driven by their ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage or their unobservable high growth potential, I use their stronger ties to overseas
Chinese investors in past waves of political instability as instrumental variable. The
IV estimates are comparable to DID, suggesting the success of early national zones
relative to newer and provincial zones can be attributed to their ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage. This conclusion also suggest that the large positive impacts found in China
in the existing literature of evaluating place-based policies can potentially be driven
by a small group of ﬁrst-movers.
In the third chapter, Air pollution, regulations, and labor mobility in China, I
study the local economic impacts of pollution regulation in China at the time when
migration costs fall. On the one hand, environmental regulations impose costs on
ﬁrms, which tend to reduce local employment. On the other hand, lower pollution
levels are an appealing amenity that attracts human capital to the region, possibly
providing a boost to economic activity. The overall net eﬀect of these two oppos-
ing forces is ambiguous. To investigate this, I study how local economies in China
between 2000 and 2010 are aﬀected by two signiﬁcant reforms in environmental
regulations and internal migration. Following the environmental reform, Chinese
prefectures face new national air quality standards whose enforcement intensity can
be proxied by their existing air quality at the time of the policy introduction. Mean-
while, the migration reform reduces migration costs and allows workers to relocate
based on their preferences for air quality across prefectures. To formalize how air
quality regulation aﬀects local employment and city sizes by skill types following the
two reforms, I ﬁrst develop a spatial equilibrium model to guide the empirical analy-
sis. To address the non-random spatial distribution of local air quality, I construct a
novel instrumental variable of power plant suitability to capture a prefecture's like-
lihood to pollute heavily. Thermal power plants are major contributors to China's
emissions, while electricity distribution and pricing are centralized. Therefore, lo-
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cations with comparable economic characteristics may diﬀer substantially in their
air pollution levels simply because that some host thermal power plants and some
do not. The estimation results show that air pollution regulations have an overall
adverse impact on local manufacturing employment, with modest reallocation from
heavy to non-polluting industries locally. There is little reallocation across space of
low-skilled workers, whose employment prospects are more vulnerable under pollu-
tion regulation. However, the population of high-skilled workers in heavily polluted
prefectures declines, showing their strong preference for air quality as migration
costs fall.
The last chapter, Cholera in times of ﬂoods: weather shocks and health in Dar
es Salaam, takes a slightly diﬀerent perspective on urban and environmental issues
in developing countries. We examine the challenges faced by urban population in
Tanzania as the result of growing urban density and increasing extreme weather
occurrences. Urban residents in developing countries have become more vulnerable
to health shocks due to poor sanitation and infrastructure. This paper is the ﬁrst
to empirically measure the relationship between weather and health shocks in the
urban context of a developing country. Using unique high-frequency datasets of
weekly cholera cases and accumulated precipitation for wards in Dar es Salaam, we
ﬁnd robust evidence that extreme rainfall has a signiﬁcant positive impact on weekly
cholera incidences. The eﬀect is larger in wards that are more prone to ﬂooding,
have higher shares of informal housing and unpaved roads. We identify limited
spatial spillovers. Time-dynamic eﬀects suggest cumulated rainfall increases cholera
occurrence immediately and with a lag of up to 5 weeks.
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Chapter 1
Political favoritism in China's capital
markets and its eﬀect on city sizes
14
1.1 Introduction
Policy bias towards politically favored cities in developing countries is a major
policy issue (e.g., Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Henderson 2003) in general as
well as in speciﬁc countries such as China (World Bank 2014). Simple theoretical
models suggest that cities which are favored in national capital markets, in export
or import markets or with enhanced transport infrastructure, will attain larger sizes
than non-favored cities, increasing inequality in size distributions (Henderson, 1988;
Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Duranton, 2007). The empirical work to date has focused
on special cases such as favoritism of national capitals (e.g., Ades and Glaeser, 1999;
Davis and Henderson 2003) or favoritism of a national leader's birthplace (Holder
and Raschky, 2015). For national capital's the idea is either that national leaders
favor the place they live and their relatives may work or that they garner key political
support from the national capital population. Favoritism of one type or another
will shift up returns to living or producing in favored cities, potentially drawing in
workers and ﬁrms, with the advantages of favoritism being dissipated by increased
disamenities from increased populations. This literature suggests that if migration
is unrestrained, that can lead to gross over-population of favored cities and the
specter of poor living conditions such as congestion and urban slums. Alternatively,
countries can try to restrict in-migration to favored cities, as is China in the 1990's
and even continuing today.
In these analyses, a better articulation, let alone a political economy model of
diﬀerent aspects of favoritism is lacking, beyond just favoritism or not of the national
capital. And empirical evidence on political favoritism is limited and indirect. In the
literature which focuses on national capitals in Ades and Glaeser (1995) and David
and Henderson (2003), one must worry that capital cities are, for example, often
located in prime geographies and have transport links which make the capital the
main hub of the country (as opposed to some other city), in potentially an eﬃcient
hub and spoke system. Both factors draw in high numbers of people themselves and
separately identifying the eﬀect of political bias on size is a challenge. A second
challenge is to identify degrees of bias. For example, evidence that per capita public
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expenditures is higher in a capital city is not evidence of bias per se; higher per
capita expenditures in larger cities may be eﬃcient if there are greater relative
beneﬁts of such expenditures. Or evidence that capital to labor ratios are higher in
larger capital cities is not necessarily evidence of bias, since nominal labor costs are
higher.
Keeping in mind the above challenges, we utilize the speciﬁc institutional and
political setting in China to quantify political favoritism directly, and examine its
causal relationship to city sizes comprehensively and carefully. While the context
is particular, it will inform us about analysis of other contexts. We ﬁrst articulate
a basis for widespread favoritism in China where it is not just favoritism of one
or two political cities versus all others, but shifting favoritism of a wide variety of
cities at the expense of the rest, based on the speciﬁc and shifting national and
local leadership structures, and incentives inherent in that. Second, we use data on
Chinese capital markets to study political favoritism. This has two key advantages.
In general, deﬁning bias in capital markets is more clear-cut and not confounded with
issues of city scale, unlike for analysis of diﬀerential per capita public expenditures
or capital to labor ratios. Eﬃciency in capital markets requires equalized marginal
returns to capital across cities, regardless of size. The second advantage in looking
at capital markets in China is that they can be the key mechanism of political
favoritism: banks are still de facto state owned. The state intervenes in capital
markets in response to policy initiatives and political pressures, to potentially favor
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms and cities.
The ﬁnal step is to look at the eﬀects of bias on city sizes. There is a cross-
section, or long run equilibrium model, where cities with lower costs of capital, ceteris
paribus will be larger. While we will examine such a model, estimation is challenged
by all the unobservables which might drive diﬀerences in city sizes and might be
related to the degree of bias, either incidentally or by design. However again, China
provides a context where we can construct an empirical framework where inferring
the eﬀects of bias is better grounded. We examine the eﬀects of bias on population
growth from 2000 to 2010, or how more favored cities grow diﬀerentially faster.
Looking at growth in a speciﬁc context arguably allows us to diﬀerence out other
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fundamentals which aﬀect city sizes. China's internal migration policies provide
variation helpful to identiﬁcation of eﬀects. Prior to 2000, migration in China was
legally and sharply limited (Chan, 2010), curtailing the ability of migrants to move
to locations with better wages and job opportunities (Au and Henderson, 2006a and
2006b). Around 2000, legal constraints on migration1 disappear, although migration
still faces impediments. This context allows us to argue that there is a regime shift
with all cities facing more elastic supply curves of population after 2000, in terms of
drawing upon the national reserve of under-employed rural populations. We develop
a simple model to show that those favored cities facing a lower price of capital then
are likely to respond with larger population increases over the next decade, with the
change in supply elasticity.
What do we ﬁnd? By analyzing ﬁrm level data in China from 1998 to 2007, we
ﬁnd that, depending on the year, one or two of the four highest level administrative
unit cities in China experience a 20-40% lower price of capital than others. The
magnitude of diﬀerential in price is similar to the diﬀerential in favor of state over
private owned ﬁrms near the end of our time period. For these four cities, we ﬁnd
that the degree of bias varies overtime in predictable ways as national leadership
changes, consistent with our conceptual framework. We then turn to our main
analysis which looks at how the price of capital diﬀers city-by-city for the whole set
of cities and how these diﬀerentials seem to be driven by changing political forces
across China as they aﬀect local areas. Finally, we turn to the eﬀects of these
diﬀerential prices on city sizes and growth rates. The eﬀects on city sizes in a cross-
section framework are large. But even in the growth framework where identiﬁcation
is better defended we ﬁnd an elasticity on growth of about -0.124. A one standard
deviation in decrease in the price of capital would increase a city's growth rate from
2000-2010 by 4% given an average growth rate of 5%.
These ﬁndings face a variety of identiﬁcation issues that we try to resolve. A
city's cost of capital may be driven by non-political factors and capital prices are
not randomly allocated across cities. We construct relevant measures to account
for varying local economic culture, diﬀerences in historical total factor productivity
1For examples, these constraints include: taxes and fees on migration, job quotas, needing oﬃcial permissions
from both the sending and receiving places.
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(TFP), national programs promoting investment in speciﬁc sectors in which a city
has historical employment and built-up comparative advantage, and the like, to shore
up our evidence. For city growth analysis, in uncovering causal eﬀects, many other
factors may simultaneously aﬀect the cost of capital facing a city and its population
growth, including other forms of favoritism such as local infrastructure investments
funded from the outside and the assignment of politically favored leaders to faster
growing cities. Another issue for this growth analysis involves separating out the
positive eﬀects on growth of lower costs of capital from the negative eﬀects of cap-
ital market ineﬃciencies such as allowing ineﬃcient ﬁrms to be propped up and to
remain in business. We make serious attempts in circumventing these identiﬁcation
issues by use of speciﬁc controls and with two diﬀerent instrument variables. How-
ever, most candidates for an instrument for capital market favoritism are inherently
likely to have direct eﬀects on city growth, if only through aﬀecting other forms
of favoritism which might also aﬀect city growth. We interpret our instrumental
variable estimations cautiously, discussing their validity and limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 1.2 discusses a con-
ceptual framework for local favoritism in capital markets in China and reviews the
existing literature and Chinese context. In section 1.3, models and general econo-
metric speciﬁcations are respectively developed for measuring political favoritism in
the capital market and its link to city growth. Section 1.4 details data sources and
examines how the descriptive patterns further motivate this paper. Results on cap-
ital market bias and its eﬀect on city growth are separately presented and discussed
in Section 1.5. Lastly, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptualizing urban political bias in China
1.2.1 Conceptualizing favoritism
Based in part on work by Li (2001, 2002, 2005, 2013), Li (2005), and in Lim,
Porter, Romer and Spence (2011), how should we think about spatial favoritism in
China's capital markets? As we will discuss in more detail below the Communist
Party has various well deﬁned factions. People at the top of a faction are patrons
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to those below within that faction. At the city level, local leaders are evaluated
on the basis of economic performance, meaning literally local GDP growth during
their tenure as a local leader. The patrons of a local leader want to make conditions
conducive to economic growth in that city, so that leader will get a good evaluation.
A simple lever is intervention in local capital markets to ease credit for producers
in that city. Next we will discuss mechanisms for how capital is allocated across
cities, discussing, in particular, how provincial leaders inﬂuence the allocation of
capital across cities, noting that provincial leaders also appoint local leaders. The
expectation is that provincial leaders appoint people they favor and that they in turn
favor the cities of their appointees. This is simply patronage politics. Of course these
provincial leaders expect a pay-back: backing within the Party by these local oﬃcials
as these leaders later seek higher oﬃce within the Party.
While this is a general framework we note also that there is an administrative hi-
erarchy among cities in China: provincial level cities (our four visible cities), provin-
cial capitals and other prefectures. By place in the hierarchy, cities have diﬀerent
formal degrees of autonomy, diﬀerent ﬁscal responsibilities and resources, as well as
potentially diﬀerential favoritism in the state inﬂuenced capital allocation process.
Leaders of provincial level cities are like provincial governors and are appointed by
national leaders. These leaders are relatively high up in the political hierarchy; and
as such we might expect that leaders of higher level cities are overall favored in na-
tional politics and capital market allocations. However, as we will explained later,
given the speciﬁc factions within the party, national leaders can have allegiance to
particular provincial level cities and can favor those over others.
How is it possible for political leaders to distort capital market allocations? To
answer that, we examine the literature on the evolution of China's banking system.
The Appendix gives more detail but here we note key items. Despite China's eco-
nomic reforms since 1978 that successfully freed up most output market and induced
widespread growth, reforms in factor markets for labor, capital, and land have been
slow and incomplete. Banks in China today remain de facto state owned. There
have been extensive reforms over the last 20 years designed to put banks more on a
market basis and minimize the extent of non-performing loans. However, the Com-
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mittee of the Chinese Communist Party retains the power to appoint the boards of
directors and senior management of banks. The state's interest is not communicated
through shareholder's meetings but via the ﬁrm-level Communist Party Committee.
The Party Committee is not telling banks to act in the interest of shareholders, but
in accordance with stability, lawfulness, and national macroeconomic measures.
Individuals appointed to bank senior management posts are personnel with standing
in the Communist Party hierarchy (Howson, 2010) and move between government
and state bank corporate functions. As such, it is diﬃcult for state owned banks
to operate independently while facing pressure from diﬀerent levels of government.
In terms of spatial bias, Liu (2007) notes that after the establishment of China's
commercial banking system, bank lending concentrated not just on China's state-
owned enterprises, but also major cities. One issue is that commercial banks in China
have cautiously retrenched credit-extending authority from their local branches (Liu,
2007). Bank branches below provincial level are limited in their autonomy to extend
credit to new clients and new investment projects. Branches in cities are allocated
funds for loans with stated priorities, and such allocations may reﬂect the political
inﬂuence and connections of local leaders to provincial and antional leaders, as they
attempt to garner credit for enterprises in their cities. In addition there are national
industrial priorities announced once every few years, aimed at expansion of par-
ticular industries through better access to credit (State Council, 1989; 1997; 2000;
2005). To the extent such announced priorities actually aﬀect capital allocations,
cities with an initial larger base of favored industries may gain. However, interviews
we conducted also suggest there is simply a lot of idiosyncratic variation in local
practices both in interest rate manipulation and charges and in default provisions.
Corruption in the disbursement of loans is analyzed in Nan and Meng (2009).
As the major banks in China are unable to function freely, bias measured in the
capital market captures signals of political favoritism. The bias in China's capital
market by ﬁrm type is well documented. For example, Dollar and Wei (2007) show
much lower marginal products of capital in the state compared to private sector in
China for 2002-2004, consistent with the notion that private ﬁrms have less political
inﬂuence than state owned ﬁrms in capital markets. On the spatial side, early
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research on China noted the diﬀerential access to capital markets as reﬂected in
higher returns to [shortage of] capital in the rural versus urban sector, or higher
returns to rural town and village enterprises compared to state owned enterprises
(Jeﬀerson and Singhe, 1999; Au and Henderson, 2006a). In this paper we expand
these analyses to look more in-depth at spatial biases.
1.2.2 Other relevant literature
There is a literature on estimating the cost of capital. We utilize the traditional
average revenue product [ARP] methodology as in Dollar and Wei (2007), which
diﬀers from the recent work on China's overall factor market distortions. Starting
with Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and extended by Gao (2013) and then by Song and
Wu (2013), these papers develop methodologies appropriate to identifying welfare
losses from overall factor distortions. Our objective, however, is to quantify speciﬁc
diﬀerentials in the price of capital faced by ﬁrms in diﬀerent locations. Furthermore,
we note that some of the simplifying assumptions in the basic Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) or Gao (2013) approach are unpalatable in an urban framework. In particular
is the assumption of a single market clearing wage. From standard work on systems
of cities (Henderson, 1974; Roback, 1982; Duranton and Puga, 2004; Albouy, 2009b),
while returns to capital are equalized across space under a free capital market, there
are large cross-city diﬀerences in nominal wages and corresponding values of labor
marginal products under national free mobility of labor which equalizes real wages
across cities. Because city sizes, industrial compositions, and costs-of-living diﬀer
across cities in a ﬁrst best equilibrium, nominal wages and marginal products of
labor diﬀer also. In developed countries such diﬀerences between a big and small
city may be 60% or more (Albouy, 2009a, Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2012)
for both nominal wages and cost-of-living, but in developing countries they can be
much more (Henderson, 2002). To do a full analysis of distortions would require
quality adjusted wage data for a large sample of Chinese cities. Also Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) assume ﬁrm constant returns to scale and a single nominal wage
clearing all labor markets in a country under free mobility equilibrium. Constant
returns to scale has the uncomfortable issue that, with costless trade, all production
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in an industry in a country should occur solely in the one most eﬃcient ﬁrm in that
country.
Apart from the literature on favoritism of major political cities, there is a lit-
erature on the uneven distribution of city sizes and their diﬀerential growth rates
within countries. For example, Duranton and Puga (2013) note that the population
of US metropolitan areas range from 0.5 to over 18 million, and that their growth
rates from 2000 to 2010 have a standard deviation as large as the mean. And
in China more dramatically, the distribution of this ﬁgure has a standard deviation
double its mean2. The relative diﬀerences have led to modeling and empirical eﬀorts
to explain why there are wide size diﬀerences, with explanations based on varying
agglomeration economies and specialization, producer and consumer amenities, spa-
tial frictions and the like (e.g., Henderson, 1974; Roback, 1982; Duranton and Puga,
2013; Behrens and Robert-Nicole, 2015). Less is known about the role of institu-
tional factors in aﬀecting size distributions, such as democratization and federalism,
although there is suggestive empirical work that federalism and democratization
both lead to reduced dispersion, or greater equality in spatial allocations (Arzaghi
and Henderson, 2005; Fetzer and Shanghavi, 2015). Work on political favoritism
especially in less than democratic regimes suggests that politically important cities
in countries under dictatorship enjoy substantially better amenities than their coun-
terparts in the hinterlands (Ades and Glaeser, 1995) leading to increased urban
primacy. Country-speciﬁc evidence on favoritism of the largest political cities is
also documented for Indonesia in Henderson and Kuncoro (1996); and, in Albouy
(2009a, 2012), there is an analysis of bias in national taxation structures against
bigger cities in the US and Canada. This paper will look in a more comprehensive
fashion at diﬀerential bais across the entire set of cities in a country. A challenge to
the literature remains how to incorporate politics and bias into models looking at
the diﬀerential allocation of resources across cities and the size distribution of cities.
Finally there is a large literature on migration restrictions in China. One strand
motivates the empirical approach in looking at the eﬀect on capital cost reductions
on city growth, where a key element is the easing of migration restrictions after
2Authors' calculation.
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2000 (e.g., Chan, 2010; Cai, 2006). Second is a literature which suggests that
the easing of such restrictions will lead to increased growth of what are implicitly
favored cities. While existing theory (e.g., Duranton, 2007) predicts over-population
of favored cities in general under free mobility, Au and Henderson (2006a and 2006b)
demonstrate how formal migration restrictions muted the growth of cities in China
in the 1990's. Scholars in China then argued that the State understood that such
easing would induce greater population growth of the biggest and political cities (Cai,
2006) and that localities would respond by trying to discourage such in-migration,
as in Brazil in the 1980's (Feler and Henderson, 2011).
1.3 Models
1.3.1 Quantifying capital market biases
In this subsection we ﬁrst specify how to estimate the degree of China's capital
market favoritism city-by-city. Our objective is to quantify speciﬁc diﬀerentials in
the price of capital faced by ﬁrms in diﬀerent locations. Speciﬁc estimates call for
the average revenue product [ARP] approach, just as in Song and Wu (2013) when
they look at how the costs of capital vary across certain ﬁrm attributes, or as in
Dollar and Wei (2007) when they look at favoritism by ﬁrm type.
The ﬁrm produces output with inputs of labor and capital. Output (value added)
is taxed by a VAT. In the framework, labor costs are assumed to vary by location and
there can be non-optimization in the choice of labor. Output markets are assumed
to be relatively free, but the degree of local competition will diﬀer across industries
and locations. We allow for non-constant returns to scale.
Firm i in industry j in location s has the optimization problem:
max
l,k
p∗jsAijsxij(li, ki)− w∗s li − rijski
where p∗js is output price to the ﬁrm net of taxes; and depends on industry, location,
and competition. Aijs is a Hicks neutral productivity shifter, representing inherent
ﬁrm eﬃciency and local scale externalities; li, ki are ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁrm inputs of
labor and capital; w∗s is compensation cost per worker, which varies in equilibrium
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by location; and rijs is the price of capital speciﬁc to the ﬁrm. Optimizing with











where r¯ is the true market cost of capital and ηjs is the elasticity of demand facing
a ﬁrm in industry j in location s. If p∗js(1− 1ηjs )Aijs
∂xj(li,ki)
∂ki
= rijs > r¯ that implies
either the ﬁrm faces a higher than market cost of capital or the ﬁrm faces a binding
quantity constraint that raises its marginal revenue product (and shadow price of
capital) above the market return. If p∗js(1 − 1ηjs )Aijs
∂xj(li,ki)
∂ki
= rijs < r¯, the ﬁrm is
getting an eﬀective subsidy in capital markets.
The literature typically approximates the production function as being log-linear,




)αjxj / ki = rijs (1.1)





) = ln rijs − ln(1− 1
ηjs
)− lnαj + εijs (1.2)
While capital prices are speciﬁed to vary by each ﬁrm, in practice we have price of
capital varying by the typical ﬁrm of type i, in industry j and in location s. ln rijs,
relative to a base (e.g., private ﬁrms in textiles on the coast in regular prefecture
cities) is captured by a set of ﬁrm, industry, and location type dummies. We note
that the ﬁgures discussed earlier assume ηjs → 0, αj = α, ∀j. These industry and
elasticity terms will now be present and represented by controls to be discussed in
section 1.5.1.
Note if equations 1.1 and 1.2 hold exactly, for implementation, issues of selec-
tion on for example A's where perhaps better ﬁrms go to better locations does not
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matter per se. The critical assumption is that all ﬁrms adjust capital usage until
the marginal revenue product which is proportional to the average revenue product
equals the price (or shadow price) of capital they face. For the same price of capital,
demand elasticity, and capital intensity, ﬁrms with higher A's simply expand capital
usage until they have the same p∗jsxj/ki, as ﬁrms with lower A's, so A is not a right
hand side variable. This fact depends critically on the log linear speciﬁcation. If
for example we have a constant elasticity of substitution production function where
x = [alρ + bkρ]
1
ρ , ln(p∗jsxj/ki) =
1
1−ρ ln rijs +
1
1−ρ ln[(1− 1ηjs )−1(p∗jsAijs)−ρ/ αj]. Then
unobserved A's appear on the right hand side [RHS] and that creates problems in
estimation if, say, the allocation of capital costs across ﬁrms is related (positively or
negatively) to ﬁrm eﬃciency. Second if production is constant elasticity of substi-
tution [CES] the coeﬃcient we estimate is 1
1−ρ ln rijs =σ ln rijs.This says for a given
change in the price of capital, responses rise with the elasticity of substitution, σ ,
in production as would be expected.
The error term in equation 1.2 is for a ﬁrm in a city and industry, capturing
for example optimization and measurement error. As noted, if the speciﬁcation is
exact there are no identiﬁcation problems in estimation of capital price diﬀerentials,
even if capital prices are not randomly allocated across cities. However, two sorts
of problems may arise. First is that variables may not fully capture what they
are intended to represent. For example, within an industry, αj's may vary. Older
ﬁrms with more Soviet technological inﬂuence and engineering from the past may
favor more capital intensive technologies and younger or foreign direct investment
inﬂuenced ﬁrms may favor lower capital intensive technologies. If capital prices are
slanted towards one group or another, that will bias estimates of capital prices by
ﬁrm type. The second type of problem relates to whether or not technology is log-
linear. If not, the unobserved A's can be a RHS variable. If lower capital price
are slanted towards cities with higher A's that could result in an under-estimate
of capital market bias towards these cities. This has two implications. First our
estimates of capital prices themselves could misrepresent the extent of bias. In the
results section we will experiment with some controls based on historical TFP by city
and ﬁrm type to try to control for A's. The second implication is that, when we turn
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to city growth, systematic biases could be related to factors that aﬀect city growth.
While we use a static model of capital allocation, in a dynamic world with durable
capital, expectations and risk play a role. Cities that are favored may be viewed as
lower risk or may have expectations of higher future growth, both of which would
reduce the current returns demanded on investments. These identiﬁcation problems
will be analyzed below in the paper.
1.3.2 Capital market favoritism and city growth
Now, we turn to modeling the eﬀect of capital market favoritism on city size and
growth. For a simple and standard city growth framework we use the Roback (1982)
model, modiﬁed to incorporate the standard systems of cities model from Henderson
(1974), as articulated in handbook chapters (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Behrens
and Robert-Nicole, 2015; Desmet and Henderson, 2015). On the production side we
utilize a log-linear production technology, consistent with the previous speciﬁcation
of estimation of capital market biases. In that speciﬁcation we assume ﬁrms use
capital (k) and labor (l) to produce output x, where x = Akαlφ. Here to simply
discussion, we assume ﬁrm constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Given





s = ps, where for city s, As incorporates urban scale economies and city
production amenities, c is a collection of parameters, and w and r are respectively
the prices of labor and capital.
If we use the usual urban scale economy formulation, Lεs, where Ls is eﬀective








where Cs contains c, and the price and any amenity terms.
While this gives us urban wages it does not given us urban real income, or utility.
For that we turn to the standard urban model where workers commute in mono-
centric city from residences to the city center. Following Duranton and Puga (2004),
workers live in a city where they must commute to work in the city center. Each
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worker is endowed with 1 unit of labor and commuting reduces time spent working
at a rate of 4t per unit distance commuted. Those living far from the city center
spend less on land rents to compensate for their higher commuting costs, or lost labor
earnings. City land rents are redistributed to urban workers. Per worker net income,
after commuting and land rents are paid and land rent income is redistributed, is
y = w(1− tN) where N is city population3. City eﬀective total labor supply net of
time spent commuting, L, is L = N(1 − tN). Substituting into y = w(1 − tN) for







s (1− tNs)1+ ε1−α (1.3)
The economics literature has a standard empirical framework for evaluating the
eﬀect of capital price diﬀerentials on city sizes, the Roback model. In the stan-
dard Roback model there is prefect mobility of labor so everyone nationally earns y¯
(relevant to the time period). One might then argue that cities are endowed with
diﬀerential costs of capital in China in a world of perfect mobility. That then results
in diﬀerential changes in Ns such that ys = y¯. A city with a higher costs of capital






< 0, Z ≡ (1− tN)−1[ε/(1− α)(1− 2tN)− tN ] < 0
which speciﬁes a relationship between city size and price. Z is signed by imposing
stability of city size. In the model just presented, ceteris paribus, y rises, peaks, and
then declines as N increases. Stability in the Roback model requires the city be on
the downward sloping part of the city size-real income relationship. Note even in
this simple framework the implied coeﬃcient of a regression of city size on price of
3Following Duranton and Puga (2004), in a linear city, where each worker is endowed with 1 unit of time and
working time is 1 − 4tu where u is distance from the city center and 4t unit commuting costs, it is easy to derive
expressions for city labor force L as a function of population N (by integrating over the two halves of the city each
of length N/2), for the city rent gradient (equating rent plus commuting costs for a person at u with that of a
person at the city edge where rents are 0, so they are equally well oﬀ in equilibrium) and for total rents. These have
forms respectively: L = N(1− tN); R(u) = wt(2N − 4u); total rents= wtN2; where w is the wage rate. A person
living at the city edge and paying zero rent earns in net w(1− 2tNU , with the diseconomy arising from increasing
commuting distances reducing time available to work. After getting a share in urban rent income their net income
is y = w(1− tN).
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capital represents complex function of parameters and size. That makes it diﬃcult
to learn about speciﬁc parameter values. Inspection would suggest eﬀects should
be increasing in capital's share in production, α, as would be expected. We will
estimate such an equation. However such estimation faces severe missing variables
problems: all natural amenity and historical political infrastructure diﬀerences (here
captured by diﬀerentials in A) which might inﬂuence sizes and be related to prices
of capital.
A standard way to try to deal with problems of missing variables bias in esti-
mation of levels equations is to ﬁrst diﬀerence out the A's. The Chinese context
presents a compelling context to help with identiﬁcation in a growth context. La-
bor mobility in China prior to 2000 was sharply limited as explained above. A key
change is relaxation of at least formal migration restrictions right around 2000, in-
ducing a surge in migration and facing cities with more elastic labor supplies. So
our approach is to argue that diﬀerentials in capital costs appear before 2000 and
persist. The change inducing diﬀerential growth is cities' ability overall to attract
migrants with an increase in the elasticity of labor supply from the countryside fac-
ing all cities. We next argue that cities with lower prices of capital have a larger
increase in population with the change in supply elasticity, than cities with higher
prices of capital.
To show this we assume the supply curve facing the city in y, N space is γsN δs
where δ = d log y/d logN is the inverse supply elasticity. We now look at the eﬀect
of an increase in δ, or decrease in the supply elasticity of city population. Equating
γsN
δ
s to ys in equation 1.3, taking logs:
log γ + δ logN = logC − α
1− α log r +
ε
1− α logN + (1 +
ε
1− α) log(1− tN)
(1.4)






Z − δ < 0, Z ≡ (1− tN)
−1[ε/(1− α)(1− 2tN)− tN ] < 0 (1.5)
where stability would require that Z− δ < 0. So an increase in the supply elasticity
or decrease in δ increases city population as must be the case. The issue is to show






This states that, if the cost of capital to a city is higher, the response in city
population increase as the supply elasticity changes is reduced. From equation
1.4 we can show that d logN
d log r
= α
1−α(Z − δ)−1 < 0, given Z − δ < 0. Then we
need to sign d(d logN/dδ)
d logN





(Z−δ)2(1−tN)2 . This is not unambiguous since the second term in the
numerator is negative, even though the ﬁrst contains a city size term. One can pick
accepted values in the literature on ε (0.02-0.08 in Behrens et al), α (0.25-0.35) and
values of t such that real incomes peak at city sizes from anywhere from 100,000 to
10,000,000, to make a numerical evaluation. The bottom line will be as long as the
starting value of δ is not too large, the expression will be positive, with a benchmark
being Roback where δ = 0. Our results will be consistent with the current signing
of equation 1.6.
In estimation, given the equilibrium size condition is non-linear and involves
functional form simpliﬁcations/approximations, we use a simple growth formulation
where:
logNst+1 − logNst = α + b0 log rst +Xstb1 + est+1, b0 < 0. (1.7)
Nst is the population for city s at time t; r is our measurement of capital prices
from the previous section; X is the set of other characteristics that may aﬀect
growth. The sign of b0 is based on equation 1.6. Estimation of equation 1.7 faces
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obvious challenges such as unobservables correlated with the price of capital which
in themselves aﬀect city growth. Our approach to identiﬁcation is detailed in the
later relevant section.
1.4 Data and descriptives
In this paper, we conﬁne the analysis to the 283 prefectures in the provinces of
the Han part of China, where the spatial unit deﬁning local market areas is the
prefecture, which we have been labeling as a city. The data we use are from the
survey of medium and large size industrial ﬁrms in each year from 1998 to 2007, the
last year the relevant economic data are available. Industry is manufacturing plus
utilities. The survey is designed to cover all state owned ﬁrms plus all other ﬁrms
with over 5 million RMB in annual sales. So our sample covers most of industrial
output4. We trim the samples as is common with the China data, where with typos
and mis-reporting there can be signiﬁcant outliers. Our trimming is modest. We
start by removing a tiny fraction of observations which are clearly ﬂawed: output,
wages, ﬁxed assets and material inputs are less than or equal to zero; fringe beneﬁts
are negative, or current annual depreciation exceeds accumulated depreciation. We
then order observations by the ratio of value added to net assets, the dependent
variable. We remove the top 2% of observations in each year and we remove at
least the bottom 2%. At the bottom we remove all observations with negative value
added (rounding up to the nearest integer). In 2007 this is 2%. The fraction rises
over time as we go backwards, with the most being 6% in 1998. Tables will report
speciﬁc numbers for each year.
For establishing capital market bias patterns across groups, we ﬁrst deﬁne city-
region and ﬁrm types. As noted above for city types in China there is an admin-
istrative hierarchy: provincial level cities, provincial capitals and other prefectures.
We also distinguish regions (west, central, coast/east) based on policy initiatives,
such as those to promote development of the West. Firm types are deﬁned by share
4Some ﬁrms have sales less than 5m RMB, but in 2007 that is only 2.2% of ﬁrms in the data. What are we
missing in this data set? From the 2008 Economic Census, 75.3% of industrial ﬁrms have under 5M RMB in sales,
but they account for only 5.8% of total industrial sales nationally. Nevertheless, to the extent there is even greater
discrimination against smaller ﬁrms we are potentially understating eﬀects of discrimination.
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of paid-in capital rather than legal status per se. The hierarchy of types we iden-
tify are (1) wholly state owned ﬁrms; (2) majority state owned ﬁrms, where 50%
or more of paid in capital is from the state; (3) wholly collective owned ﬁrms; (4)
majority collective owned ﬁrms, where 50% or more of paid in capital is from the
collective, (unless the state owns 50%); (5) wholly private owned ﬁrms; (6) majority
private owned ﬁrms, where 50% or more of paid in capital is private (unless the state
or collective owns 50%); (7) wholly foreign owned ﬁrms; and (8) majority foreign
owned ﬁrms, where 50% or more of paid in capital is foreign owned (unless the state,
collective, or private owns 50%)5. Table 1 shows the dramatic change in industrial
structure for the 10 years, 1998-2007. In 1998 only 19% of ﬁrms are wholly private
ﬁrms, while in 2007 that has risen to 72%. Correspondingly there is a truly dramatic
drop in the relative number of ﬁrms in the state owned sector, but a more modest
drop in the state owned sector's share of value added. These reﬂect state policy
focused on limiting the state owned sector size, with the state sector focused on
strategic key industries, with typically large plant sizes.
In gauging bias in terms of cost of capital, people typically look at two types of
data. First is quantity data. Quantity data suggest that state-owned enterprises
are favored in capital markets: in 2011, state enterprises only contributed 26.2% to
national industrial output but still represented 43.9% of total debt; the correspond-
ing numbers for private ﬁrms were 29.9% and 17.8% (China Statistical Yearbook,
2012). For cities, the City Statistical Yearbooks tell us that in ﬁxed assets of in-
dustrial enterprises per capita from 2002-2007 in provincial level cities was almost
double that in ordinary prefecture level cities despite the greater relative presence
of manufacturing in the latter types of cities. However, the problem with quantity
data is that quantities may diﬀer for reasons other than favoritism: diﬀerential to-
tal factor productivity; varying eﬃciency by types of ﬁrms; disparate sub-industry
composition of ﬁrms in diﬀerent types of cities; and better economic fundamentals
in some city types than others.
5Note we break the small number of ties (0.34% of total ﬁrms) where ownership is equally split (50/50) in
a hierarchical fashion based on a modest presumption about level of political inﬂuence (highest to state, then
collective, then domestic private, then foreign). We drop the tiny percent (0.56% in 2007) of ﬁrms where there is
no majority control. The issues with this ﬁrm hierarchy have been well discussed in the literature and it is not our
focus (speciﬁcally to capital markets there is Dollar and Wei, 2007).
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Thus, the more compelling raw data evidence is to look at the distributions of a
simple measure that is proportional to the private marginal product of capital under
certain assumptions  perfect competition, equal capital intensity across industries,
and log-linear production functions. As discussed in the previous section, that mea-
sure is the ratio of after-tax value added to net assets6 (as deﬁned in equation 1.2).
Before getting into the econometric details, we ﬁrst present here descriptive patterns
of this key variable to establish the existence of large scale capital cost variations
across ﬁrm types and cities in China. The descriptives support two central points.
The ﬁrst is more well known: favoritism by ﬁrm type. Figure 1 for 2007 compares
the (log) marginal returns of ﬁrms which are wholly or majority state owned to
those that are wholly privately owned. The distribution for private ﬁrms is dis-
tinctly shifted to the right, indicating that they face either or both higher costs of
capital or restricted access to capital markets (and thus a higher shadow price of
capital).
The second point is that, controlling for ﬁrm type, certain cities per se are favored
in capital markets. While the approach when analyzing city growth across China
will be general, in the ﬁrst part of the paper, we focus on known political cities
and regions, compared to more ordinary cities. Figures 2 and 3 examine an aspect
of this spatial dimension. Here the diﬀerentials are a little more modest but still
compelling. Figure 2 compares the returns for all wholly private ﬁrms in non-
provincial level cities nationally with (1) all ﬁrms in the 3 east coast provincial level
cities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) and (2) just wholly private ﬁrms in the same
3 east coast provincial level cities. The latter two distributions overlap suggesting
that within provincial level cities, by 2007, all ﬁrms may be treated fairly equally,
6A discussion is due for the controversial measure of capital stock in the existing literature. Papers advocate for
a perpetual inventory based measure (see Brandt, van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012; or Song and Wu, 2013), using
accepted measures of economic depreciation and investment price indices applied to investment ﬂows, with a base
of some form of ﬁrst recorded book value. The problem is that this requires linking ﬁrms across years using ID's
(that may be incorrectly recorded), without interruption and missing values of investment series. These problems
can generate signiﬁcant losses in sample, with then various ﬁx-ups (Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu, 2013). An alternative
is to use either gross book value or net book value based on accounting depreciation and ignoring investment price
increases. The tradeoﬀ is that, the longer the series for a ﬁrm the worse is the problem between an economic measure
of capital stock and an accounting one (which uses diﬀerent depreciation rates and no indexing for price changes).
However, our context is unusual. In the 10 years covered by our sample, the total number of ﬁrms increases by
130%. In one critical margin, private ﬁrms, the number increased by 780% over the 10 years. About 50% of ﬁrms
in 2007 have been in the data set for less than 5 years (Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu, 2013). Therefore, we use net book
value to avoid loss of sample which means we rely on accounting depreciation rather than an economist's estimate
of depreciation and we do ignore price changes for investment although such changes in the mid-2000's are modest
(Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu, 2013). We think this is a reasonable way to proceed, but do robustness checks such as
controlling for ﬁrm age later on.
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at least as suggested by the raw data. However the returns for private ﬁrms in
non-provincial cities nationally are more concentrated and shifted right, compared
to ﬁrms in provincial level cities, suggesting political cities are favored in capital
markets. Figure 3 isolates an example and directly compares returns to privately
owned ﬁrms in each of the three east coast provincial level cities, Tianjin, Beijing
and Shanghai, with the supposedly freer wheeling, more (non-state) capitalistic
cities in the south-east, in particular Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The ordering is
very suggestive. The worst distributions in terms of favoritism are for Beijing and
its twin, Tianjin, the centers of national political inﬂuence certainly in 2007. Then
there is Shanghai, followed by Guangzhou. Guangzhou as a provincial capital still
has a distribution distinctly more concentrated and shifted to the right of those
for Beijing, Tianjin and arguably Shanghai. But Shenzhen dominates all these
political cities with a distribution distinctly to the right of all the others, reﬂecting
its distinctly higher cost of capital.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Estimating capital market favoritism
Regression speciﬁcations
As established in the previous sections, we estimate diﬀerences in the returns
to capital by city, accounting for diﬀerences in inherent ﬁrm and/or location pro-
ductivity and in the degree of competition in diﬀerent markets across locations and
industries. Recall that in equation 1.2, ln(
p∗jsxj
ki
) = ln rijs − ln(1− 1ηjs )− lnαj + εijs,
the ln rijs aspect is captured by ﬁxed eﬀects variously representing ﬁrm type, city
or region type and individual cities, depending on the speciﬁcation and issue we are
discussing. In equation 1.2, industry ﬁxed eﬀects control for diﬀerences in αj. To
control for diﬀerences in demand elasticities, we include the number of ﬁrms in the
industry the observation is in for that prefecture (where the degree of local com-
petition aﬀects the local value of ηjs). To account for other diﬀerences in demand
elasticities, for each city-industry a ﬁrm is in, we control for measures of overall
market scale and access, in particular distance to the coast and GDP within 150
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kms of the prefecture city center. Furthermore, to avoid feedback eﬀects, the base
industry ﬁrm counts are from the 1995 industrial census and the income measures
are for 1990 GDP. Results are robust to other dating choices for these controls (such
as for 2007 estimation, 2004 Census ﬁrm counts and 2000 GDP).
In the following subsections, we present the estimation on capital market fa-
voritism as they pertain to Chinese policies and give suggestive evidence of political
inﬂuence. We will ﬁrst focus on the 2007 cross-section pattern to establish the
methodology. Then we turn to all ten years of results, which we relate to political
events, so as to argue the link between capital market prices and political inﬂuence.
Illustrative results on city type and regional favoritism in 2007
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional results for 2007. The ﬁrst two columns look
at the eﬀect on average returns of being a particular type of ﬁrm, in a particular
type of location. We represent the hierarchy of ﬁrm types in each column and a
simple characterization of spatial diﬀerences, based on city-region types, not indi-
vidual cities. For these, the base case covers private ﬁrms in east coast ordinary
prefecture level cities. Column 1 controls only for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, while all
other columns reﬂect the inclusion of city-industry characteristics aﬀecting local de-
mand elasticities. Many of the results are similar but our preferred speciﬁcation is
in column 2.
In column 2, for ﬁrm types, relative to wholly private owned ﬁrms, wholly and
majority state owned ﬁrms have about 45-50% lower marginal products and eﬀec-
tive prices of capital. Foreign ﬁrms have about 25% lower returns; this may reﬂect
their overall easier access to (international) capital than domestic private ﬁrms. In
the smaller collective sector, wholly owned have modestly higher costs and majority
owned modestly lower costs. Finally, compared to wholly owned private ﬁrms, ma-
jority owned private ﬁrms also face lower eﬀective prices of capital. In the Appendix
Table A2, we look at these majority owned categories for collectives, foreign and
private. If the minority stakeholder is the state, compared to not the state, returns
are typically 20 percentage points lower. That is, the role of the state ownership in
having better access to capital markets extends beyond majority and wholly state
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owned ﬁrms to ones where the state is a minority stakeholder.
Next, turning to our main focus, spatial biases, in this section, we examine how
the price of capital in the four provincial level cities, in provincial capitals as a group,
and by west and east region diﬀers relative to ordinary prefecture level cities on the
coastal region. Below when we look across years we will build an evolving political
story around this. For regions, we ask if the policy of developing the hinterlands,
especially the West has any bite in capital markets. We see in column 2 in fact overall
the price of capital in the West and Middle regions is higher than on the coast in
2007, despite the develop the West rhetoric. When we group together provincial
capitals, perhaps surprisingly, on average compared to ordinary prefecture cities
in the Coast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Finally we look at each of the 4
provincial level cities at the top of the hierarchy on their own. For provincial level
cities, the twins, Beijing and Tianjin in 2007 have favored access with distinctly
lower returns: 19% for Beijing and 30% for Tianjin in column 2. On the other hand
Chongqing and Shanghai operate the same as ordinary prefecture level cities on the
coast. Below, we will see that these patterns diﬀer over time, as national leadership
changes.
In columns 3-6 we conduct robustness checks. First in column 3 we replace the
measure of capital stock, net book value, by gross book value. While qualitatively
results are the same, using gross book value tends to inﬂate the degree of bias for,
for example, the state owned sector with its older ﬁrms (with long series of non-
depreciated gross capital numbers). In column 4 we give LAD estimates for column 2
to check that measures based on the median as opposed to average ﬁrms are similar.
The coeﬃcients in the two columns are remarkably similar. In column 5, we add
to column 2 a control for ﬁrm age. That has no eﬀect on spatial biases but aﬀects
magnitudes for the older state owned ﬁrms.
Finally in column 6 we explore the bias issue from missing covariates in a non-
log-linear speciﬁcation, in particular city (and industry) speciﬁc A's. We have 1995
industrial census data (where we do not observe paid in capital by ﬁrm type). For
1995 we calculate TFP for each ﬁrm as ln(netV A) − 0.30 ln k + 0.70 ln l. We then
regress TFP on industry and city ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as elasticity controls on 1995
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numbers of ﬁrms in the own industry in the city, ln distance to the coast and 1990
GDP within 150 kms from the city. Then we insert these measures of industry and
city TFP into the column 2 speciﬁcation. The TFP variables themselves have large
positive but at best weakly signiﬁcant eﬀects. Second, they have no eﬀect on other
the covariates in this table. This is not to say we do not have an omitted variables
problem, but this speciﬁcation suggests missing A's may not be a key issue.
Margin at which to measure bias
In Table 3 we turn to several issues, which are critical to ﬁnal choices on how
to measure city type or city-by-city biases. Column 1 of Table 3 repeats the base
result from column 2, Table 2. The ﬁrst issue is if we want to represent city bias,
do we control for ﬁrm type or look just at private ﬁrms? Column 2 presents results
for just private ﬁrms; results on the city-type and regions are very similar as for all
ﬁrms in column 1. In column 3, we look at all ﬁrms again, but remove ﬁrm type
controls. The idea is that a city faces two sources of bias which we may want to
combine. First, all industries are favored by some percent; and, second, a city may
have a ﬁrm type composition where it has more favored types of ﬁrms, such as state
owned ﬁrms. The combined eﬀect is captured in column 3. Since cities grow both
by new ﬁrm entry and expansion of existing ﬁrms of all types, it seems this overall
measure may be more relevant. However, again the city type and region results are
very similar to column 1.
Finally in Table 3 in columns 4-6 we turn to the actual measures considered for
the growth analysis in Section 3. For these we remove the region and provincial
capital variables, and have a ﬁxed eﬀect for every city with Shenzhen being the base
city but we just report for the 4 provincial level cities. In column 4 we show results
where we control for ﬁrm type. In column 5, we remove ﬁrm type controls and
in column 6 we show for just private ﬁrms. We have three key ﬁndings. First in
column 4 relative to column 1, we get almost identical ﬁrm type eﬀects. Second and
mostly critically, in columns 4-6 with a full set of individual city ﬁxed eﬀects, where
the base city is Shenzhen, results on cities are not really comparable with those in
columns 1-3. All we can say is that all provincial level cities are favored relative to
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Shenzhen.
The third result is that if we take the 3 sets of city ﬁxed eﬀects in columns 4-6
the three pairwise correlations are all over 0.9775. This suggests that variants of the
basic formulation give very similar results. We are generally going to rely in what
follows on the results for the full sample without ﬁrm type controls, although we
will report some results when we add back in ﬁrm type controls.
Ten-year patterns and national politics
Are these region, provincial capital, and provincial level city patterns the same
over time? We will argue that we expect them to change to some degree with na-
tional leadership. The Communist Party has factions and a hierarchy, although a
precise description is elusive and there is inter-mingling. Key in the hierarchy are
Princelings, who are the descendants of senior communist oﬃcials historically in the
People's Republic of China (Li, 2013). For factions two stand out, the Shanghai
branch (Shanghai bang) and the Communist Youth League, or what we will call
Beijing branch (tuanpai). Until early 2003, Jiang Zemin was in oﬃce and repre-
sented the Shanghai branch of the party. As such he may have favored Shanghai
relative to other cities. But he was also a reformer and committed to privatization
(Li, 2001). When Hu Jintao was selected for oﬃce in late 2002 (oﬃcially to take
eﬀect in early 2003) he represented more the Beijing branch of the party and in
subsequent years pulled back on the full thrust of privatization reforms (Li, 2002;
Li, 2005). These national changes aﬀected policy, which might be represented in the
city-type and region ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as ﬁrm type eﬀects.
What are the patterns over time? In Table 4 we repeat the Table 2 column 2
formulation for all years. For ﬁrm type variables, we see the massive advantage
of state owned ﬁrms erodes almost monotonically with time, starting at a 118%
discount on the cost of capital and falling to 49%. Collectives experience little
change and little advantage or disadvantage over time. The advantage of foreign
ﬁrms also declines. That could be because capital markets in China improve, so
that the overall advantage of access to international capital markets declines. Or it
could be that that state promoted (subsidized) foreign ﬁrms more in the early years,
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but less or not at all later on.
Of central interest to this paper are the regional eﬀects. There are some particular
patterns in the data of interest, which coincide with changes in national leadership.
We do not want to make too much of this, but they do motivate the idea that
politics play a signiﬁcant role in the capital market. In Table 4 and coeﬃcients
graphed in Figure 4, relative to ordinary prefecture cities in the east, cities in the
West have lower costs of capital under the Jiang Zemin regime but under Hu Jintao
that reverses with the West facing higher costs of capital, whatever the rhetoric may
have been.
More telling, under the Jiang Zemin regime, Shanghai faced lower costs and
Beijing higher costs of capital. That diﬀerential disappears by 2003/04 as the Party
regime switches more to a Beijing orientation with Hu Jintao coming to oﬃce. By
2006/07 under Hu Jintao, the pattern has reversed with Beijing facing lower costs of
capital and its twin, Tianjin, being very heavily favored from 2004 on. Under neither
regime do provincial capitals as a group experience advantages or disadvantages.
The graph in Figure 4 suggests some degree of convergence in these diﬀerentials by
spatial units towards zero in 2003 then strong divergence after that. Is that a more
general pattern in the data: narrowing of spatial diﬀerences and then divergence?
To see if the data suggests a more general pattern of convergence and divergence,
we turn to the analysis of individual city ﬁxed eﬀects as in column 4 of Table 3.
We re-estimate the Table 4 speciﬁcation, for each year with ﬁrm type variables and
region and provincial capital indicators removed, but having a complete set of city
ﬁxed eﬀects, where Shenzhen is the base case in each year. Changes in the mean are
not relevant since that is about Shenzhen versus other cities in China. To look at
changes in dispersion we examine the time pattern of the coeﬃcients of variation for
these year-by-year city ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients. Figure 5 plots these. The coeﬃcient
of variation is lowest at the end of the Jiang Zemin era in 2002. After 2004 and
especially as we move into 2006 and 2007 the coeﬃcient escalates, consistent with
overall increase in dispersion of capital prices across cities, and retrenchment from
aspects of reform in capital markets.
Correspondingly in Table 5 we examine the year-by-year pairwise correlations
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in these annual vectors of city ﬁxed eﬀects. Two items emerge. On the relevant
diagonal, the sequential year correlation is lowest in 03-04 and 04-05, in the early
years of Hu Jintao's leadership. Second ﬁxed eﬀects in say 1998 (but any year up
to 2002) remain highly correlated with those for subsequent years up until about
2004 when that correlation drops noticeably in years subsequent to 2004. That
suggests a change in patterns of city capital market favoritism, timed with the
change in national leadership. Again, these are suggestive results, indicating that
capital markets in China are politicized and certainly diﬀerent cities face evolving
prices of capital as individual city fortunes evolve over time.
1.5.2 How does capital market favoritism aﬀect growth?
Regression speciﬁcations
In this section, we turn to a central theme of the city-urban bias literature: cities
which experience favoritism will have larger populations. To try to show this here,
we look at the eﬀect of the change in population supply elasticities to cities after
2000, to show that cities with lower prices of capital experience larger population
increases. Recall from section 1.3, we propose to estimate a standard city growth
equation 1.7:
logNst+1 − logNst = α + b0 log rst +Xstb1 + est+1
with expected b0 < 0. Similarly, we do the parallel analysis for the 2010 (log) level
of city sizes to shed light on the long-run equilibrium eﬀect:
logNs,2010 = α′+ b′0 log rst +Xstb′1 + e′st+1 (1.8)
with expected b′0 < 0.
First, we need to deal with the issue of how to characterize capital market fa-
voritism as it aﬀects city population growth from 2000 to 2010. One idea that relates
to identiﬁcation is to go with pre-period measures of favoritism (i.e., 1998-1999), as
occurring before shocks to city growth during the 2000 - 2010 time period (such as
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later changes in political leadership and contemporaneous favoritism). Note unlike
Table 4 where each year is treated separately, to reduce noise we pool two adjacent
years to try to capture pre-growth period favoritism. We use a 98-99 measure of city
ﬁxed eﬀects, which will be uncorrelated with later shocks aﬀecting growth from 2000
to 2010. However rather than a pre-period measure, we might want to try instead
to capture the eﬀects after 2002 of the changes in capital market favoritism that fol-
lowed changes in national leadership. For this we would want to know the later, say
06-07, level of favoritism. We show a variety of OLS speciﬁcations, experimenting
with diﬀerent measures of favoritism, before turning to instrumental variables work.
The challenges to arguing that we identify the causal eﬀects of capital market
favoritism on city growth are twofold. First is the possibility of selection bias  it
could be that favored cities are ones with more growth potential to begin with  that
is favoritism is not randomly sprinkled across cities.In examining prefecture popula-
tion growth from 2000 to 2010, to try to mitigate the issue of non-random favoritism
we control for pre-period growth trends (in an era of strong migration restrictions,
1982-1990). Second, even if favoritism was spatially randomized, favoritism of cities
may be favored in dimensions other than capital markets. To try to separate out
capital market favoritism from what other aspects the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects might
represent, we add relevant controls for which we have measures. There are two main
concerns: other types of favoritism and aspects of capital market eﬃciencies which
may be correlated with our measures of capital market favoritism. Other forms of
favoritism would be public sector allocations and the one key is infrastructure invest-
ment. We might expect that if a city if favored in private capital markets it might
be favored with subsidized public infrastructure investments. For that, we control
for the key item: allocations of major highways to cities in 1999. From Baum-Snow,
Brandt, Henderson, Turner and Zhang (2014) we extract a count of major highway
rays going out from the city center.
For aspects of capital market (in)eﬃciencies hindering growth we have two con-
cerns. First is that a lower local price of capital for all ﬁrms overall in a city could
also be correlated with a local culture of enhanced market reforms and privatiza-
tion, building on a long standing notion that cities dominated by SOE's suﬀered
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from slower reforms, inhibiting growth (Naughton, 2007; see also Au and Hender-
son, 2006a,b). Second and in contrast, a lower price of capital could be associated
with the propping up of local ﬁrms who are ineﬃcient, detracting from city growth
potential. To deal with these two concerns we utilize two measures from the 1995
Census of Industry. In 1995 we don't have data on types of ﬁrms other than by
title; from that we extract the share in employment of LTD ﬁrms which are sup-
posed to be limited liability private ﬁrms in 1995, as a measure of the local culture
of reform and enthusiasm for privatization in a city. To deal with aspects of capital
market bias which may be correlated with gross ineﬃciencies in the operation of
local markets, for 1995 we control for the share of industrial employment by ﬁrms
with revenues which do not cover operating costs, or speciﬁcally value added is less
than labor costs.
After all of these considerations and adjustment to the speciﬁcation, identiﬁcation
is still a concern. For example, even pre-period measures of capital prices may be
correlated with unobserved persistent conditions which aﬀect city growth directly,
like aspects of local business culture which persist over time that we don't capture
fully with our controls. The use of 06-07 measures of favoritism is even more chal-
lenging. Increased favoritism after 2002 may be correlated with other shocks which
stimulate city growth. And there may be other dimensions to city favoritism corre-
lated with capital prices which we don't fully capture with our controls. Ideally, in
this non-experimental context there would be an instrument which was correlated
with capital market favoritism per se, but not with city growth potential or other
forms of favoritism. We return to this issue after presenting the OLS results.
OLS Results
Table 6 presents OLS results for city population growth from 2000 to 2010. For
prices of capital we use the individual city ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients from speciﬁcations
where we pool 2 years of data and generally do not control for ﬁrm type. Standard
errors are bootstrapped. We start with pre-period estimates of city ﬁxed eﬀects as
the key covariate. The ﬁrst 3 columns show 2010 - 1990 growth regressed on a set
of pre-period covariates. In column 1 the only covariate is the city ﬁxed eﬀects from
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98-99 representing the city-by-city cost of capital (in logs). The eﬀect is insigniﬁcant
and has a sign that is positive, as opposed to the expected negative sign. Recall
cities with higher costs of capital are expected to have smaller population increases
after the relaxation of many migration restrictions. Column 2 adds in controls which
may be directly correlated with the cost of capital, but have their own eﬀects. In
particular, the share of employment by ﬁrms which revenues are not covering basic
operating costs would detract from growth and be negatively correlated with the cost
of capital. Thus adding these controls turns the positive coeﬃcient to the expected
negative sign but it is still insigniﬁcant. In column 3, we add in other basic controls
for growth which could be incidentally (or otherwise) correlated with the cost of
capital. These include 1982 population and 82-90 growth of prefecture population
as controls both for size and for early growth trends, distance to the coast which
represents poorer access to export markets and 1999 road rays which represents
greater infrastructure investments in the city. Controlling for these factors makes
the cost of capital coeﬃcient more negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In
column 3, a 1% decrease in the cost of capital is associated with an increase in city
size of 0.07%. Column 4 repeats column 3 with a measure of 98-99 city ﬁxed eﬀects
from a speciﬁcation which adds in ﬁrm type controls; the coeﬃcient is modestly
enhanced relative to column 3.
Column 5 presents results for city capital prices measured in 06-07 with strong
negative eﬀects of similar magnitude as column 3. This could be the most relevant
column. For growth from 2000-2010, it would be the price of capital after the
national political regime switch in 2002/03 which should mostly drive growth and
a mid-period (for 2003-2010) estimate should capture the average price diﬀerential
across cities as these start to widen after 2003 (Figure 5). The elasticity in column
5 is a little larger than column 3, at 0.08%. Column 6 controls for both 98-99 and
06-07 capital prices. Both signiﬁcantly deter growth, with marginal eﬀects being
somewhat higher for the later price. These OLS results are suggestive of the eﬀects
on growth of capital market favoritism, but there are clearly many sources of bias,
in addition to the downward bias of measurement error.
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Identiﬁcation: challenges and solutions
In addressing the endogeneity concerns in the OLS speciﬁcation discussed above,
our hope was to ﬁnd a suitable instrument for individual city level bias in capital
prices. We thought of two potential solutions. First, we turned to national policies
supposedly governing diﬀerential capital allocations across types of industries and
then deriving a city speciﬁc version of those based on cities' historical industrial
composition, a Bartik (2002) - Card (2001) type instrument. For the second can-
didate, we turned to political variables, measuring changes in local leadership and
their relationship to national factions of the party following the national leadership
change in early 2003.
For the Bartik-Card type instrument, once every few years, China's State Council
lists industries which development is to be favored by policy, the key to which should
be access to capital markets. For 2000 and 2005 we coded the favored industries at
the 4 digit level, with a 1 for favored and 0 for not listed. We calculated for both
the 1995 census and the 1998 survey of industries the share of each 4-digit industry
in 1990 prefecture manufacturing employment (from the 1990 Population Census).
We multiplied the share by the indicator of favored or not and summed across the
4-digit industries, to create an index of city likely capital market favoritism from
national policy for 2000 and 2005.
In Table 7 we present what might have been a ﬁrst stage of an IV regression with
this index of national favoritism. The 06-07 ﬁxed eﬀects are regressed on the index
in 2005 for each city for the two sets of Bartik weights. With regression controls
from Table 6 or without controls, this index is unrelated to our measures of capital
market prices. Recognizing that many favored industries have been on the books
for many years, we looked at just 35 newly favored ones added between 2000 and
2005; again there was no relationship to capital market prices. We also worried
that our controls for 2-digit industry eﬀects in the basic city ﬁxed eﬀects regression
was limiting variation in the data, and we re-estimated city ﬁxed eﬀects without
these controls. But these new ﬁxed eﬀects again are uncorrelated with national
industry favoritism indices relevant to each city. All this suggests that whatever
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national industrial policies are on the books, this has no eﬀect on individual city
capital market prices in the later 2000's. While disappointing to an identiﬁcation
strategy, the non-result hints that political forces drive price diﬀerentials, not policies
announced by national planners.
We then looked at observable political events at the local level. A newly ap-
pointed local leader with good patronage ties may bring in favorable capital market
conditions. We know when local prefecture leaders (party secretary) change oﬃce
and thought that newly appointed ones in the late 2002 to end of 2004 time frame
might be more favored leaders under certain conditions. There were also an unusual
number of changes in early 2003: 57 in the ﬁrst 4 months where usually that would
be about 20. We do not know the aﬃliation of these party secretaries but we know
the aﬃliation of the provincial governors who appointed them. We know if those
governors are Princelings, Communist Youth League (Beijing branch), Shanghai
aﬃliated, no known aﬃliation, or ambiguous aﬃliation, from records and a data
set assembled by Qinghua Zhang of Peking University. Being a new party secre-
tary appointed by one of these types of provincial leaders actually gives us a ﬁrst
stage for predicting capital market prices for 06-07, as reported in column 1 of Table
8. Relative to no new appointment (about 50% of the cases), a new appointment
that is the most politically connected in the party hierarchy, a Princeling, brings a
low price, while fence-sitting (ambiguous aﬃliation) brings the highest. This ﬁrst
stage gives a second stage, reported in column 2 of Table 8. The capital market
price is signiﬁcant and now even more negative with an elasticity of -0.12. If this is
the true elasticity, it implies that a one standard deviation decrease in the price of
capital would increase city growth by 4% relative to an average growth overall from
2000-2010 of 5%.
The ﬁrst stage results are consistent with our idea that politics play a big role
in capital market distortions. The problem is that politics may not only drive cap-
ital market prices but other forms of local favoritism. New dynamic local leaders
appointed from late 2002 to 2004 with better connections to the national new lead-
ership may have brought in other dimensions of favoritism. All this suggests that
the use of political instruments (in the literature for all kinds of local conditions)
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are suspect and must be viewed with caution. At best the -0.12 estimate relative to
-0.08 in Table 6 is correcting for measurement error; at worst it is biased estimate
picking up other favoritism factors besides capital market favoritism. Then what we
have is a reduced form estimate of the overall eﬀect of bais, not just capital market
bias.
How levels results diﬀer
We now turn to more typical types of estimates in the favoritism literature,
which uses a cross-section approach. In Table 9 we show results of estimating a
levels equation as in equation 1.8, where the LHS variable is the log of prefecture
population in 2010. Such a cross-section estimation may be worrisome for potentially
larger bias than the growth estimation, because ﬁxed city characteristics which aﬀect
size are diﬀerenced out in the latter. Nonetheless, this estimation sheds light on
the long-term outcome of capital market favoritism on city sizes with implied full
adjustment, while the growth estimation is only for 2000-2010. Column 1 of Table
9 show the results for the formulation corresponding to Table 6 column 3, and
column 2 shows the second-stage IV result corresponding to Table 8 column 2.
The set of control variables is kept identical. Essentially, we are looking at 2010
population conditioning on 1982 population, 82-90 population growth and other
city characteristics as a way of controlling for unobserved city amenity diﬀerentials
(Duranton and Turner, 2012). Now we see larger impacts of diﬀerences in capital
costs on city size as might be expected. For the IV results, a 1% reduction in the
price of capital reduces city size in 2010 by 0.19%, whereas the growth results suggest
a 0.12% reduction in growth.
Spillovers and heterogeneity
What about potential spillovers and heterogeneity? For spillovers, neighbors'
prices of capital may aﬀect an own city in two ways. First, lower neighbor prices
which spur their development may result in increased demand for own city products,
in a market access context. On the other hand, lower neighbor prices of capital may
make them better able to compete for local resources (e.g., regional labor) and hurt
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the own city. To the Table 6 column 3 base case, if we add in the average of all
contiguous neighbors' prices controlling for own and neighbor characteristics (other
dimensions on which neighbors compete), we get a small (absolute value less than
0.01) negative coeﬃcient for this spatially weighted neighboring price of capital.
In a column 5 or 6 formulation, the coeﬃcient on contemporaneous (i.e., pooled
2006/07) prices is negative and signiﬁcant7. All in all, the signing of the coeﬃcient
on contiguous neighbor's average capital price suggest that higher neighbor prices
hurt the own city, presumably via the aforementioned channel of reducing their
demand for own city products.
We examine heterogeneity in two dimensions. First, we asked if capital intensity
as measured by capital share in value added or as the capital to labor ratio either
increased from 2000 to 2007, or was higher in 2007 (as a level long run eﬀect) for
lower priced cities. The use of capital relative to labor is based on a clear price eﬀect,
and is thus the simplest measure. (Share measure responses depend on functional
form in production.) In all of our tested formulations, an increase in the price
of capital reduces capital intensity, but results diﬀer in signiﬁcance. In general, the
results for capital as a share of value added are strongest; but, for the key IV results,
we get strong signiﬁcant eﬀects for capital to labor ratios as well. For the growth
in capital intensity formulation using Table 6 covariates, the OLS coeﬃcient in the
share version is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, but insigniﬁcant for the capital to labor
ratio. We then did an IV version where the 2006/07 price variable is instrumented
for as in Table 8. There the coeﬃcients on the levels of capital intensity as either
the capital to labor ratio or share in value added are negative and signiﬁcant with
a good ﬁrst stage. For example, for a coeﬃcient of -0.552 (and standard error of
0.275), a one standard deviation decrease in the price variable leads to an increase
in the capital to labor ratio of 0.187 from a mean of 5.17. The parallel IV results
for the growth formulation have the correct signs but are statistically weaker. We
conclude that indeed higher prices of capital reduce capital intensity, passing a basic
test of what one might expect.
Additionally, we asked if cities with higher capital intensities have stronger price
7We have no way to do an IV version of this with any strength as in Table 8.
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eﬀects on size as might be expected from the model. We measure capital intensity
variously as total industrial survey capital in 1998, 1999, or the average of both per
industrial worker for corresponding years, per total employment in 2000, and as a
share of value added. In OLS versions corresponding to Table 6, capital intensity
itself generally has a positive and sometimes signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth, but the
interaction with the price of capital generates a tiny positive and insigniﬁcant eﬀect,
where a negative eﬀect is expected. We also tried an IV version as in Table 8
where we use 2007 capital intensity measures instrumented with historical intensity
measures (with the price variable also instrumented for as in Table 8). There the
interaction terms are negative as expected but insigniﬁcant; and the ﬁrst stage
regressions are very weak. Trying to capture an interaction term with shifting capital
intensities over time seems to be more than we can do with our data.
Thinking about welfare cost implications
In this paper, what we have estimated is a micro econometric relationship which
describes, from the equilibrium in China, how the growth or size of a single city would
change as response to a change in the price of capital. To evaluate welfare impacts
requires two considerations. For the single city, an increase in size in principle moves
it further down its average real income curve as graphed against city size so the city
is more over-sized and operating at a less eﬃcient scale. If the real income curve
is relatively ﬂat this loss in eﬃciency might be quite small; but there is the factor
of giant over-sized political cities with teeming slums and the work in Henderson
(2003) showing considerable growth losses induced by excess primacy, with a more
nuanced approach now available in Castells-Quintana (2015). Secodn, however, the
welfare inference issue is much bigger. In a deeper analysis moving beyond a partial
equilibrium look at one city, in a general equilibrium context such as in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), we would be trying to quantify the eﬀects on real national income of
misallocation of capital across cities on a national scale. But that involves a general
equilibrium model where there are cities and eﬃcient nominal wage diﬀerentials
between bigger and smaller cities in equilibrium. And for China this would be in
the context of limited labor mobility. While our ability to carry out such analysis has
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improved (Desmet, Nagy, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015), we are still some distance from
combined micro-econometric and structural estimation that would allow a proper
evaluation in such complex contexts. But it would be fundamental to evaluating
welfare costs.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on political favoritism in China's capital market
and quantiﬁes the diﬀerentials by ﬁrm, city, and region types. We also document
the shifting climate in city and regional favoritism over time in light of national and
local leadership changes. Lastly, we make a serious attempt to identify the causal
relationship between capital market favoritism and city population growth in China.
Our basic ﬁndings are as follows.
Firm type aﬀects the cost of capital. Compared to private ﬁrms, wholly or
majority state owned ﬁrms earn a much lower return on capital consistently across
space. The inferred value of marginal product of capital is over 50% lower for state
owned ﬁrms in 2007. This is an improvement over the 117% lower returns for state
owned ﬁrms in 1998. By city and region type, the provincial level political cities
and regions experience changing costs of capital related to changing national policies
and leadership. In the early years under Jiang Zemin, Shanghai and the West were
favored relative to Beijing and Tianjin. By 2006-2007 under Hu Jintao, this has
reversed. Dispersion in capital market prices across cities drops to a low in 2002
and then escalates under Hu Jintao, representing a reintroduction of willingness to
intervene in capital markets.
We then test the eﬀects of a lower price of capital on the growth of cities after the
national relaxation in migration restrictions in the period around 2000. Controlling
for other factors likely to be correlated with the costs of capital which also aﬀect
city growth, we ﬁnd strong and suggestive evidence that lower costs of capital result
in larger increases in city size. This ﬁnding is further supported and its magnitude
strengthened in the better defended causal context with local political faction af-
ﬁliation as the instrumental variable. Additionally, we also examined the spatial
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Figures
Figure 1.1: 2007 Diﬀerential Returns. Ownership Comparison at National Level State owned or
majority controlled ﬁrms versus wholly private ﬁrms
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Figure 1.2: 2007 Diﬀerential Returns. All Private Firms Nationally in Non-Provincial Level Cities
versus Private and also All Firms in East Coast Provincial Level Cities
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Figure 1.3: Diﬀerential Return. Wholly Private Firms by Major City. Prefecture Level East Coast
Cities versus South Coast Free Wheeling Cities














kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.2567





1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
West Central Beijing Shanghai Tianjin
55
Figure 1.5: Dispersion of city ﬁxed eﬀects over time (no ﬁrm type controls)
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Tables
Table 1.1: Composition of ownership (by paid-in-capital) 2007 versus 1998
Estimating sample: Share of ﬁrm count Share of value added
1998 2007 1998 2007
Majority collective 9.14% 0.94% 6.74% 1.22%
Wholly collective 21.30% 3.51% 11.00% 2.77%
Majority foreign 4.30% 2.45% 6.95% 4.81%
Wholly foreign 6.29% 12.42% 7.26% 16.12%
Majority private 9.13% 5.36% 11.09% 10.78%
Wholly private 18.98% 72.06% 16.45% 48.46%
Majority state 5.43% 0.71% 11.15% 4.23%
Wholly state 25.44% 2.55% 29.35% 11.62%
Any state ownership 34.46% 4.15% 47.33% 19.90%
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Table 1.2: Base results for 2007
Base Full covariates Gross book k LAD Add ﬁrm age Add TFP covar.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West 0.0377 0.2361*** 0.1803** 0.2630*** 0.2413*** 0.2463***
(0.0583) (0.0707) (0.0781) (0.0131) (0.0703) (0.0695)
Central 0.0672 0.2034*** 0.2501*** 0.2361*** 0.2039*** 0.1978***
(0.0506) (0.0573) (0.0606) (0.0096) (0.0573) (0.0576)
Provincial capital -0.0074 0.0216 -0.0455 0.0272*** 0.024 0.0168
(0.0812) (0.0883) (0.0886) (0.0085) (0.0886) (0.0852)
Beijing -0.2405*** -0.1935*** -0.2961*** -0.1850*** -0.1910*** -0.1691**
(0.0390) (0.0711) (0.0707) (0.0222) (0.0712) (0.0748)
Shanghai 0.0432 0.0293 -0.0579 0.0766*** 0.0301 0.0469
(0.0396) (0.1310) (0.1322) (0.0211) (0.1311) (0.1355)
Chongqing 0.0119 0.0067 -0.0249 0.0189 0.0074 0.0623
(0.0506) (0.0942) (0.0989) (0.0316) (0.0939) (0.1002)
Tianjin -0.3015*** -0.2966*** -0.3309*** -0.2854*** -0.2961*** -0.2765***
(0.0379) (0.0784) (0.0772) (0.0229) (0.0786) (0.0820)
Wholly state -0.4614*** -0.4491*** -0.6271*** -0.4253*** -0.3793*** -0.4486***
(0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0182) (0.0332) (0.0292)
Majority state -0.4978*** -0.5004*** -0.6839*** -0.5094*** -0.4672*** -0.4988***
(0.0491) (0.0470) (0.0441) (0.0313) (0.0486) (0.0469)
Wholly collective 0.1160*** 0.1161*** -0.0733** 0.1487*** 0.1459*** 0.1183***
(0.0270) (0.0252) (0.0294) (0.0145) (0.0247) (0.0251)
Majority collective -0.1145*** -0.1302*** -0.3167*** -0.1291*** -0.1044*** -0.1269***
(0.0390) (0.0331) (0.0356) (0.0272) (0.0323) (0.0336)
Wholly foreign -0.2385*** -0.2777*** -0.3833*** -0.2963*** -0.2785*** -0.2762***
(0.0334) (0.0374) (0.0418) (0.0086) (0.0372) (0.0375)
Majority foreign -0.2014*** -0.2307*** -0.3917*** -0.2514*** -0.2272*** -0.2297***
(0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0335) (0.0171) (0.0263) (0.0265)
Majority private -0.2138*** -0.2268*** -0.3144*** -0.2268*** -0.2182*** -0.2276***
(0.0209) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0118) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Firm age -0.0041***
(0.0009)
1995 ind. TFP FE 0.7069
(0.8064)
1995 city TFP FE 0.1408*
(0.0823)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elasticity controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 312351 312351 312142 312351 312351 312351
R-squared 0.0767 0.0836 0.1028 0.0844 0.0843
This table shows various speciﬁcations to look at the cross-sectional average return diﬀerentials by ﬁrm type and
locational hierarchy in 2007. Column 1 accounts for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, while columns 2-6 include city-industry
ﬁxed eﬀects reﬂecting local demand elasticities. Column 2 is our preferred speciﬁcation.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Variants of the basic speciﬁcation and individual city ﬁxed eﬀects
Main spec Private ﬁrms Without ﬁrm type ind city FE Without ﬁrm types private ﬁrms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West 0.2361*** 0.2778*** 0.2117***
(0.0707) (0.0769) (0.0722)
Central 0.2034*** 0.2169*** 0.1947***
(0.0573) (0.0623) (0.0584)
Provincial capital 0.0216 0.0209 0.0053
(0.0883) (0.1013) (0.0847)
Beijing -0.1935*** -0.2567*** -0.2183*** -0.6341*** -0.5185*** -0.7796***
(0.0711) (0.0758) (0.0748) (0.0399) (0.0410) (0.0447)
Shanghai 0.0293 0.0289 -0.0135 -0.4698*** -0.4305*** -0.5872***
(0.1310) (0.1425) (0.1350) (0.0492) (0.0507) (0.0553)
Chongqing 0.0067 -0.0155 0.0044 -0.2701*** -0.1177* -0.3201***
(0.0942) (0.0985) (0.0974) (0.0682) (0.0677) (0.0744)
Tianjin -0.2966*** -0.3490*** -0.3457*** -0.7185*** -0.6543*** -0.8629***
(0.0784) (0.0848) (0.0820) (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0421)
Wholly state -0.4491*** -0.4222***
(0.0293) (0.0261)
Majority state -0.5004*** -0.4735***
(0.0470) (0.0452)
Wholly collective 0.1161*** 0.1069***
(0.0252) (0.0173)
Majority collective -0.1302*** -0.1113***
(0.0331) (0.0286)
Wholly foreign -0.2777*** -0.2973***
(0.0374) (0.0300)
Majority foreign -0.2307*** -0.2196***
(0.0262) (0.0225)
Majority private -0.2268*** -0.1795***
(0.0203) (0.0182)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elasticity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City ﬁxed eﬀects No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 312351 225086 312351 312351 312351 225086
R-squared 0.0836 0.062 0.0738 0.1308 0.122 0.1202
This table presents a variant of speciﬁcations to establish how we measure bias in the capital market. Column 1 is a repetition
of our preferred speciﬁcation (column 2 of Table 2) for comparison. Column 2 constrains this speciﬁcation to just private
ﬁrms. Column 3 repeats column 1 without ﬁrm type controls. Column 4 uses individual city instead of political hierarchy
ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns 5 and 6 are parallels of columns 3 and 2 for column 4.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: All ﬁrm sample for all years
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
west -0.2690*** -0.2480*** -0.2233*** -0.2136*** -0.1386** -0.1030* -0.0125 0.0876 0.1652** 0.2361***
(0.0541) (0.0520) (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0629) (0.0557) (0.0576) (0.0656) (0.0686) (0.0707)
middle 0.1957*** 0.1246** 0.0938 0.0856 0.0818 0.1301** 0.1091** 0.2007*** 0.1856*** 0.2034***
(0.0604) (0.0581) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0548) (0.0556) (0.0453) (0.0502) (0.0537) (0.0573)
Provincial capital 0.0131 0.0512 0.0244 0.051 0.06 0.0633 0.0426 0.033 0.0334 0.0216
(0.0741) (0.0629) (0.0586) (0.0646) (0.0636) (0.0670) (0.0677) (0.0717) (0.0843) (0.0883)
Beijing 0.2164*** 0.1213*** 0.0522 0.0965** 0.0455 -0.0145 0.0192 -0.0354 -0.1189* -0.1935***
(0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0417) (0.0457) (0.0518) (0.0483) (0.0509) (0.0662) (0.0653) (0.0711)
Shanghai -0.1833*** -0.0953 -0.1940*** -0.01 -0.1401* -0.0302 -0.0537 0.053 0.1098 0.0293
(0.0539) (0.0582) (0.0627) (0.0670) (0.0812) (0.0827) (0.0908) (0.1210) (0.1211) (0.1310)
Chongqing 0.0391 0.0607 -0.0914* 0.0954 -0.0053 0.1324** 0.0622 0.0014 -0.024 0.0067
(0.0610) (0.0519) (0.0552) (0.0599) (0.0702) (0.0673) (0.0732) (0.0907) (0.0946) (0.0942)
Tianjin 0.1174*** 0.0727* -0.0703* -0.0018 -0.1223** -0.0517 -0.2658*** -0.1571** -0.3740*** -0.2966***
(0.0384) (0.0392) (0.0408) (0.0441) (0.0506) (0.0489) (0.0557) (0.0710) (0.0714) (0.0784)
Wholly state -1.0980*** -1.0703*** -1.0617*** -1.0326*** -0.9285*** -0.8263*** -0.7430*** -0.6177*** -0.5993*** -0.4491***
(0.0547) (0.0492) (0.0416) (0.0410) (0.0366) (0.0334) (0.0338) (0.0356) (0.0362) (0.0293)
Majority state -0.8786*** -0.8548*** -0.8357*** -0.8494*** -0.7936*** -0.7245*** -0.5960*** -0.5665*** -0.5568*** -0.5004***
(0.0486) (0.0439) (0.0426) (0.0430) (0.0431) (0.0364) (0.0373) (0.0380) (0.0576) (0.0470)
Wholly collective 0.1371*** 0.1153*** 0.1026*** 0.0894*** 0.0768*** 0.0838*** 0.1205*** 0.1280*** 0.1028*** 0.1161***
(0.0362) (0.0315) (0.0303) (0.0296) (0.0265) (0.0275) (0.0262) (0.0249) (0.0277) (0.0252)
Majority collecitve -0.0585* -0.0668** -0.0754** -0.1009*** -0.0720** -0.0729** -0.1032*** -0.0604* -0.0768** -0.1302***
(0.0333) (0.0321) (0.0318) (0.0306) (0.0298) (0.0316) (0.0298) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0331)
Wholly foreign -0.3475*** -0.3300*** -0.3171*** -0.3736*** -0.2936*** -0.3183*** -0.3321*** -0.2927*** -0.2739*** -0.2777***
(0.0535) (0.0479) (0.0497) (0.0448) (0.0470) (0.0459) (0.0510) (0.0380) (0.0433) (0.0374)
Majority foreign -0.5005*** -0.4344*** -0.4036*** -0.4270*** -0.3573*** -0.3138*** -0.2849*** -0.2718*** -0.2367*** -0.2307***
(0.0416) (0.0393) (0.0346) (0.0329) (0.0306) (0.0325) (0.0262) (0.0267) (0.0281) (0.0262)
Majority private -0.1426*** -0.1635*** -0.1864*** -0.2004*** -0.1760*** -0.1816*** -0.1831*** -0.1850*** -0.2048*** -0.2268***
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0182) (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0184) (0.0172) (0.0178) (0.0186) (0.0203)
N 134717 134443 137569 146658 156751 175404 247443 246302 276888 312351
Percentage bottom trim 6% 5% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
R-squared 0.1967 0.1933 0.1875 0.1809 0.1621 0.148 0.1168 0.1054 0.1017 0.0836
This table repeats our preferred speciﬁcation (column 2 of Table 2) for the full time span of our data, i.e., 1998-2007. This table shows us how bias in the capital
markets varies over the 10-year span, to which we relate the changes in national leadership.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Year pairwise correlations in annual city ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 4 speciﬁcation)
1998 1999 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1998 1
1999 0.927 1
2000 0.884 0.947 1
2001 0.859 0.911 0.946 1
2002 0.814 0.862 0.902 0.921 1
2003 0.779 0.804 0.851 0.895 0.896 1
2004 0.648 0.665 0.699 0.746 0.795 0.854 1
2005 0.462 0.475 0.498 0.539 0.614 0.714 0.843 1
2006 0.336 0.352 0.393 0.442 0.507 0.635 0.747 0.901 1
2007 0.23 0.223 0.253 0.314 0.378 0.522 0.652 0.83 0.924 1
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Table 1.6: How does varying city-level capital market favoritism relate to city growth, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
City ﬁxed eﬀects without ﬁrm type controls, 1998-1999 0.0263 -0.0289 -0.0688*** -0.0468**
(0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0248) (0.0219)
City ﬁxed eﬀects with ﬁrm type controls, 1998-1999 -0.0823***
(0.0259)
City ﬁxed eﬀects without ﬁrm type controls, 2006-2007 -0.0801*** -0.0657***
(0.0172) (0.0174)
1995 share of emp by ﬁrms whose Y-M-labor costs <0 -0.1231** -0.1639*** -0.1454*** -0.0818* -0.1386**
(0.0555) (0.0582) (0.0485) (0.0441) (0.0577)
1995 share of emp by LTD ﬁrms 0.4575*** 0.3223*** 0.3132*** 0.3283*** 0.3339***
(0.0770) (0.0896) (0.0874) (0.0776) (0.0767)
Log pref Pop in 1982 -0.0262** -0.0270** -0.0238** -0.0213*
(0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0119)
Population change from 1982 to 1990 -0.049 -0.0415 -0.0493 -0.0375
(0.2074) (0.2045) (0.2274) (0.3048)
ln(Distance to coast) -0.0248*** -0.0241*** -0.0149*** -0.0215***
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0039) (0.0054)
1999 all road rays 0.0107*** 0.0114*** 0.0101*** 0.0097**
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0041)
Constant 0.0652*** 0.0123 0.5124*** 0.5088*** 0.4325** 0.4195**
(0.0149) (0.0188) (0.1876) (0.1888) (0.1840) (0.2057)
N 284 283 283 283 283 283
R-squared 0.0109 0.1912 0.2824 0.286 0.2999 0.3151
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the OLS regression results on relating capital market favoritism to
city population growth. Various city-level measures of capital market bias are tested with or without variables measuring other city
characteristics that may simultaneously aﬀect growth.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Capital market favoritism (06-07 city ﬁxed eﬀects) on city growth, Historical
employment composition of favored industries as IV, ﬁrst-stage.
(1) (2)
Index of favored manufacturing industries in 2005 with 1995 weights 0.0051
(0.015)
Index of favored manufacturing industries in 2005 with 1998 weights 0.0098
(0.012)
Other controls: same as Column 3 Table 6 Yes Yes
N 283 283
R-squared 0.022 0.022
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 1.8: Capital market favoritism (06-07 city ﬁxed eﬀects) on city growth, Political
faction as IV
First stage Second stage
(1) (2)
Political faction: Chinese Youth League 0.1198
(0.0793)
Political faction: ambiguous 0.3230***
(0.0948)
Political faction: none 0.0232
(0.0544)
Political faction: prince -0.2315***
(0.0566)
Political faction: Shanghai 0.0855
(0.0566)
1995 share of emp by ﬁrms whose Y-M-labor costs < 0 -0.1093 -0.0830*
(0.1806) (0.0445)
1995 share of emp by LTD ﬁrms 0.1382 0.3388***
(0.2211) (0.0821)
ln(prefecture population in 1990) 0.2689 -0.0367
(0.1664) (0.1619)
ln(prefecture population in 1982) -0.18 0.0174
(0.1567) (0.1561)
ln(Distance to coast) -0.0098 -0.0148***
(0.0145) (0.0038)
1999 all road rays -0.0219* 0.0092**
(0.0118) (0.0042)
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China Enterprise Database 1998-2009 covers all state-owned enterprises in China
and all non-state enterprises with annual sales revenue more than 5 million Yuan.
Most of the variables come from three basic accounting tables for Chinese enterprises,
namely the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the Cash Flow Statement,
although many of them are not available in all years. The rest variables include total
number of employees, ﬁrm paid-in capital, ﬁrm registered ownership and opening
years etc.
The main variables we use in this paper include output in current price, total
input, net ﬁxed asset, gross ﬁxed asset, paid in capital, wage, welfare payable and
industry code at four-digit level8. Value added net of tax is calculated as output in
current price minus input. Input includes both direct inputs that turn into products
and indirect input consumed by the administrative and sales branches of a ﬁrm.
Input is not available in 2008 and 2009; hence our investigation on capital eﬃciency
can only go as far as 2007. Welfare payable includes employee medical expenses and
the cost of providing other amenities. Welfare payable is one part of fringe beneﬁt as
the later also includes employee housing fund and social insurance. However, welfare
payable is the only variable available in all years between 1998 and 2007. Thus we
use it as a proxy to fringe beneﬁt. Paid in capital variables show the amount of
equity owned by the state, the collective, legal persons, individuals, Taiwan Hong
Kong and Macau investors and foreign investors. Unlike ﬁrm registered ownership,
paid in capital variables are updated every year.
Control variables include city types, region types, count of ﬁrms in own indus-
try own prefecture in 2004 (for 2007 regressions) and city characteristics in 2000.
Provinces in the east include Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fu-
jian, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong and Hainan. Provinces in the west
include Xinjiang, Gansu, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan,
Guangxi, Xizang and Qinghai. We later conﬁne our analysis to Han Chinese area.
Provincial level cities are the four cities that enjoy the same level of administra-
tive ranking as provinces, namely Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. City
(prefecture) characteristics in 2000 include total population, the share of agriculture
in total employment, the share of manufacturing in total employment, the share of
migrants in total population and the share of high school and above graduates in
the labor force (age group of 19 to 55), from the 2000 Population Census.
We drop irregular observations that have negative values in output, input, wage,
net ﬁxed asset or whose current year depreciation is smaller than accumulated depre-
ciation. We also drop ﬁrms that don't have a majority ownership. Furthermore, for
all 2007 regressions, we trim the bottom and top 2% of (output-input)/net ﬁxed asset
8 In the current work we only use industrial classiﬁcation at two-digit level. Industrial code in all years has been
converted to the standard 2002 Industrial Classiﬁcation for National Economic Activities (GB/T4754-2002).
64
and (output-input-wage-fringe beneﬁt)/net ﬁxed asset to get rid of extreme values,
as explained in the text. Table (A-1) shows the statistics of the main variables.
Table A-1. Descriptive Statistics (2007 industry variables)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Value added 29872.8057 374969.044 2 140503104
Capital (net of tax) 41205.2114 719104.01 3 156000000
Capital (gross) 55820.1147 1032540.9 0 221000000
Wholly state share 0.0255 0.1576 0 1
Wholly collective share 0.0351 0.184 0 1
Wholly private share 0.7206 0.4487 0 1
Wholly foreign share 0.1242 0.3298 0 1
Majority state share 0.0071 0.0841 0 1
Majority collective share 0.0094 0.0963 0 1
Majority private share 0.0536 0.2253 0 1
Majority foreign share 0.0245 0.1547 0 1
count: coal mining 3.3063 32.5454 0 784
count: petro and natural gas mining 0.0011 0.1118 0 50
count: black metal mining 0.2756 4.1039 0 98
count: colored metal mining 0.2867 5.2009 0 200
count: non-metal mining 0.5962 7.333 0 215
count: mining supportive activities 0.0001 0.0239 0 7
count: agro-processing 8.3754 42.8876 0 674
count: food manufacturing 2.0749 21.3042 0 477
count: beverage manufacturing 1.0084 14.266 0 803
count: tobacco manufacturing 0.0012 0.0833 0 14
count: textile manufacturing 32.8311 139.0384 0 1296
count: apparel manufacturing 12.0786 78.5493 0 1104
count: leather/fur manufacturing 3.6454 33.1225 0 535
count: wood/bamboo manufacturing 2.5786 24.3463 0 477
count: furniture manufacturing 0.7616 9.0445 0 225
count: paper manufacturing 2.3982 18.6764 0 333
count: printing 2.6605 31.0576 0 655
count: stationary/sports/entertainment 1.0272 13.4918 0 381
count: petro product 0.1587 2.7302 0 96
count: chemical product 14.3677 75.0318 0 872
count: medicine 0.8856 10.3418 0 287
count: chemical ﬁber 0.1145 2.0243 0 60
count: rubber product 0.6343 8.4559 0 216
count: plastic product 11.0065 68.3546 0 797
count: nonmetal mineral product 21.7019 93.9588 0 1365
count: black metal reﬁne and process 1.2075 12.1957 0 339
count: color metal reﬁne and process 0.7565 7.887 0 197
count: metal product 16.8047 106.1789 0 1336
count: equipment - general purpose 31.1282 148.4186 0 1429
count: equipment - special purpose 8.1898 56.7691 0 794
count: equipment - transport 10.887 76.2625 0 880
count: electrical machinery 17.6089 106.7582 0 1376
count: telecom/computer/electronics 6.8543 48.7862 0 654
count: instrument and oﬃce machinery 1.8282 22.9009 0 557
count: crafts and miscellaneous 2.6663 23.1239 0 422
count: electric/heat production and supply 0.9776 13.0193 0 502
count: gas production and supply 0.0048 0.159 0 9
count: water production and supply 0.1324 2.5741 0 139
ln(Distance to coast) 4.1868 1.8535 -5.3784 7.3961
ﬁrm age 8.2651 9.4892 0 1807
population growth, 2000-2010 0.0505 0.1139 -0.5921 0.5423
1995 share of emp by ﬁrms whose Y-M-labor costs <0 0.2342 0.1192 0.036 0.7104
Continued on next page
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Table A-1. Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD Min Max
1995 share of emp by LTD ﬁrms 0.1117 0.1138 0.0011 0.691
ln(population in 1990) 14.9283 0.6757 11.6081 17.1782
ln(population in 1982) 14.7974 0.7074 11.3022 17.1103
1999 all road rays 2.8561 1.6962 0 8
Table A2: Baseline with majority ownership split out by state
participation or not
Majority collective with some state ownership -0.3620***
(0.0837)
Majority collective with no state ownership -0.1120***
(0.0347)
Majority foreign with some state ownership -0.4440***
(0.0639)
Majority foreign with no state ownership -0.2059***
(0.0249)
Majority private with some state ownership -0.4331***
(0.0344)
Majority private with no state ownership -0.2018***
(0.0203)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The evolution of domestic capital markets and the banking
sector in China
The banking sector in China controls 70% of assets in the entire ﬁnancial system,
and the four large state-owned banks are the central pillars of the banking sector.
Together they hold 45-55% of banking sector assets in China (Wang, 2010; China
Bank Regulatory Commission, 2012). In order to understand capital market issues,
we discuss the banking sector's evolution and current practices that lead to diﬀeren-
tial treatment toward ﬁrms of diﬀerent ownership types and ﬁrms in diﬀerent cities.
We will also brieﬂy review the limited alternatives for private enterprises in seeking
credit outside the state controlled banking sector.
Banking sector reform
In 1978 as China embarked on its economic transformation, the People's Bank
of China (PBC) and rural credit cooperatives were the only ﬁnancial institutions
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in China (Chen, 2010). In urban areas, enterprises were owned by government or
collective bodies and investment decisions were made by the state. The PBC had
no independent lending policies and primarily functioned to collect deposits (Chen,
2010). The ﬁrst banking reform was to remove deposit-taking functions from the
PBC and establish four state-owned banks9 to take over speciﬁc lines of business,
and then later to designate the PBC as the central bank, supervising all other state-
owned banks. The four state-owned banks were established as policy banks, so the
lion's share of lending went to ﬁnance projects that were sanctioned by planning
committees and regional governments (Green, 2010). In the mid-1990s, three policy
banks10 were established to take over policy loans from the big four banks and
to free them for more market-oriented businesses. However in this time period,
the four state-owned banks did not progress to develop independent risk assessment
mechanisms, since they were merely generally underwriters of projects that had been
pre-determined by the state. By 1999, the four state-owned banks had inherited and
accumulated large proportions non-performing loans (NPL), which crippled their
ability to develop market-oriented commercial business. At this point in preparation
for later public listing and strategic investment and minority shareholding by foreign
banks to add technical know-how and modern corporate governance (Green, 2010),
the state removed RMB1.3939 trillion worth of NPLs from the balance sheets of
the four banks, handing the NPLs over to specially established Asset Management
Companies11 (AMCs). Since then, the risk situation of the four banks has improved
signiﬁcantly (Wang, 2010), but political inﬂuence remains strong with two forms of
discrimination of interest here.
Sources of discrimination by ﬁrm ownership type
Despite the on-going reform eﬀort, private enterprises still face strongly discrim-
inatory access to the formal ﬁnancial system. According to an All China Federation
of Industry and Commerce report (2010), it is very hard for private enterprises to get
9 The Agriculture Bank of China took over lending business for the agricultural sector; the China Construc-
tion Bank for infrastructure ﬁnance; the Bank of China for foreign exchange management and the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China for commercial banking
10 These were the China Development Bank (CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the Export-
Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank))
11 The Asset Management Companies are Huarong, Changcheng, Dongfang and Xinda. They were set up specif-
ically to attend to the task of disposing of the NPLs of the state-owned banks (Wang, 2010).
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mid-term or long-term loans. Wei (2012) estimates that only 20% of private ﬁrms
in Wenzhou (one of the centers of informal ﬁnancing) can get loans from the formal
system, with the rest relying solely on underground ﬁnancing. And earlier we noted
the disproportionate share of industrial enterprise debt held by state enterprises
even in 2011. Why is there discrimination by ﬁrm type?
Howson (2010) notes that, despite years of reform of state-owned banks, the Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party retains the power to appoint the boards of
directors and senior management of banks. The state's interest is not communicated
through shareholder's meetings but via the ﬁrm-level Communist Party Committee.
The Party Committee is not asking banks to act in the interest of shareholders,
but in accordance with “stability” , “lawfulness” , and national “macroeconomic
measures” . Individuals appointed to bank senior management posts are personnel
who have standing in the Communist Party hierarchy (Howson, 2010) and move
between government and state bank corporate functions. As such, it is diﬃcult for
state owned banks to operate independently while facing pressure from diﬀerent lev-
els of government. Private enterprises have little leverage in this power politics. It
creates an environment where private sector ﬁnancial needs will be sidelined when
state-owned enterprises and local governments are looking for money.
Feyzioglu, Porter and Takats (2009) further argue that China's existing interest
rate control structure with a large gap between the ceiling on the deposit rate and
the ﬂoor on the bank lending rate12 reduces the incentive for China's state-owned
banks to improve eﬃciency and risk assessment. In exercising credit control and
in deciding which ﬁrms get how much credit, since politically and well-connected
enterprises have better access and connections to bank oﬃcers and the bottom line is
not proﬁt maximization, credit control creates an environment where loan oﬃcers are
more likely to channel funds to politically favored undertakings (Feyzioglu, Porter
and Takats, 2009). Moreover the whole structure tends to breed corruption in the
banking sector (Nan and Meng, 2009).13
12 As for June 2012, the Yearly Current Deposit Baseline Rate was 0.35% , while the Yearly 6-month Loan
Baseline Rate was 5.6% (the People's Bank of China, 2012).
13 All this is over and above the incentive to focus on bigger loans to spread the ﬁxed costs in making a loan. The
costs include information costs and supervision costs. Information costs include resources invested on researching a
ﬁrm's creditability and the costs of Non-Performing Loans due to insuﬃcient information before lending. Supervision
costs include the costs of supervising both lending enterprises and bank loan oﬃcers (Yin, Weng and Liang, 2008).
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Finally, the standard for evaluating credit ratings is determined by the headquar-
ters in Beijing of the banks in China; each bank imposes a uniﬁed standard on all
branches across the country. Enterprises that do not reach a certain credit rating
standard do not qualify for loans (Chen, 2010). However, many standards were
set up according to the circumstances of the largest ﬁrms in major cities. Smaller
enterprises often lack the resources to meet the formal standards for preparation of
accounting and auditing documents, even though they may provide higher growth
potential than large state-owned ﬁrms.
Discrimination over space
The ﬁrst aspect of discrimination across space concerns the urban versus rural
sector. Chen (2010) argues that the commercialization of state-owned banks led
to the fall of rural ﬁnancing for rural, town and village enterprises (TVE's). The
“Law on Commercial banks of the People's Republic of China” passed in 1995 set
up stringent requirements on collaterals and guarantees. State-owned commercial
banks can extend banking credit only on the basis of clearly deﬁned assets (Chen,
2010), usually land and buildings (Cousin 2006)14. The Collateral Law forbids rural
land from being mortgaged, so rural enterprises and households cannot collateralize
their most important asset to get credit from the banking sector (Chen, 2010).
Beyond the evolving TVE sector, more generally, county-level branches of state-
owned commercial banks do not have the power to issue loans (Chen, 2010). Since
state enterprises disproportionally concentrate in big cities, private enterprises in
smaller cities and rural enterprises suﬀer relative credit shortage.
In the paper we focus initially on discrimination across cities of diﬀerent political
signiﬁcance, but then generalize to all cities. We already observed the imbalance
in bank loans going to entities in provincial capitals and provincial level cities,
relative to their contribution to GDP. Liu (2007) notes that after the establish-
ment of China's commercial banking system, bank lending concentrated not just on
China's state-owned enterprises, but also major cities. One issue is that commercial
banks in China have cautiously retrenched credit-extending authority from their lo-
14Movable assets back only 4% of commercial loans; inventory and receivables cannot be collateralized under
Chinese Security Law (WB-PBOC Report, 2006).
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cal branches (Liu, 2007). Bank branches below provincial level are limited in their
ability to extend credit to new clients and new investment projects. In general one
would expect that ﬁrms in provincial level cities and provincial capitals have a closer
relationship to provincial level branches where most of the credit extending power
rests, than their counterparts in cities lower in the political hierarchy. Later we will
argue that issues of favoritism are more widespread and may for example be related
to the political inﬂuence and connections of local party secretaries and provincial
leader attempting to garner credit for enterprises in their cities, or to national pro-
grams aimed at expansion of particular industries (through better access to credit),
in which some cities are more specialized.
Alternatives for private ﬁrms
The private sector in China depends on informal ﬁnancing on diﬀerent degrees
in diﬀerent places to meet their investment needs (Tsai 2002, Allen, Qian and Qian
2005, Linton 2006). Farrell et al. (2006) notes that alternative ﬁnancial sources
could represent up to a quarter of total bank deposits in China; and Tsai (2002)
claims that at least one quarter of all ﬁnancial transactions are done through the
informal system. Unlike formal ﬁnancial intermediaries, informal lenders require no
or very lenient collateral, charge very high interest rate, and reply on alternative
enforcement measures that usually involve reputation or coercion (Allen, Qian and
Qian, 2008). Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2010) argue that Chinese
private enterprises which have access to bank loans grow faster than similar ﬁrms
without bank ﬁnancing. They argue that the monitoring and enforcement mech-
anisms from the informal sector are ill equipped to scale up and serve the higher
end of the market. Hence informal ﬁnancing is not a suﬃcient substitute for for-
mal ﬁnancing, and it is increasingly the case as the size of Chinese economy grows.
Firms, especially private ﬁrms, face sub-optimal growth potential when they are
denied access to the formal ﬁnancial system. To the extent this lack of credit varies
across cities that aﬀects city growth potential.
In principle, private ﬁrms could turn to equity markets. However in China, the
banking sector dwarfs its equity market and bond market, in terms of both mar-
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ket capitalization and total value traded (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic,
2010; Naughton, 2007). The equity market is a vehicle for state-owned enterprise
semi-privatization rather than a level playing ﬁeld for all ﬁrms to raise capital.
Furthermore, the process of capital market listing is largely controlled by the gov-
ernment (Wang, Xu and Zhu, 2004). Durnev et al. (2004) argues that China has one
of the worst performing equity markets in the world. Highly synchronous returns in
the market are the consequences of weak property rights, corporate opacity and rent
seeking. China's corporate bond market is undeveloped too, crippled by excessive
government regulation, the lack of institutional investors and credit rating agencies
to set the price accurately (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2010).
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Chapter 2





Establishing development zones1 is one of the most prominent examples of place-
based policies and certainly the most popular tool among policy makers across the
world. Such policy instrument aims at attracting ﬁrms and businesses (with a fre-
quent focus on foreign direct investment) to designated locations by oﬀering tax
holidays, providing ﬁscal support, infrastructures, and sometimes regulatory con-
cessions. The latest statistics from the World Association of Investment Promotion
Agencies report 249 member agencies from 157 countries2. These common policies
are expensive to implement, hence the relevant outcomes of their targeted areas
require careful evaluation.
The eﬃcacy of such place-based policies is heatedly debated, as challenges in iden-
tiﬁcation often impede researchers from deriving unbiased conclusions from standard
cost-beneﬁt analysis. (e.g., Greenstone et al. (2010); Head and Ries (1996); Moretti
(2014); Wei (1993)). Such programs are set out to spark local economies by spend-
ing large amount of tax expenditure, where decision makers have the incentive to
choose locations that are most likely to success from such government support. In
some cases, they are timed speciﬁcally with the hope to rescue economic downturns.
What exactly goes on behind these selection processes is rarely fully available to
researchers, hindering our ability to identify the most suitable control group for
estimating causal treatment eﬀects of place-based policies.
In the case of China, its development zone program has been accredited to have
played a crucial role in boosting its post-reform economy, as one of the ﬁrst and major
set of policies carried out by the Chinese reformist leadership after taking oﬃce in
19783. Led by Deng Xiaoping, these policies were learning-through-experiment
measures aimed at revitalizing the economy, which at the time was in much distress.
Today, China has more than 219 such zones at the national level, and approximately
1350 at provincial level (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2016; Wang, 2013),
1Development Zones, Special Economic Zones, or sometimes Enterprise Zones, are industrial park type of areas
within a location that enjoy a set of policy packages (e.g., low tax rates, subsidies) to attract foreign investment and
foster export production (mostly in developing economies), or to rejuvenate local business and growth (more often
in developed countries) (Moretti, 2014).
2http://www.waipa.org/why.htm. Accessed in August 2014.
3Another one of the major ﬁrst breakthroughs is the well-known Household Responsibility System, which greatly
boosted agricultural productivity by providing the right incentives (Naughton, 2007).
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spanning over 270 prefectures. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
(2014) Announcement No.54, national development zones in 2013 accounted for
12.1%, 9.9%, and 18.7% of China's annual national GDP, tax revenue, and import
and export volumes.
Despite how the media has celebrated its expansive scale, eﬃcacies in promoting
local economy and fostering healthy urbanization, research on China's development
zone program face the same set of aforementioned identiﬁcation challenges. Drawing
consistent and unbiased inference from this program will enhance our understand-
ing of similar place-based policies. This will continue to play an important role in
China's economy today, as well as being modeled after and implemented in many
other countries (Boyenge, 2007; Farole and Akinci, 2011). While a handful of per-
suasive evidence for evaluating placed-based policies exists for various programs in
the United States (Busso et al., 2013; Greenstone et al., 2010; Kline and Moretti,
2014), that of development zone programs in developing economies (and most no-
tably in China given its unique context) is more debatable due to less convincing
identiﬁcation strategies.
Regarding the challenges stated above, this paper complements the existing lit-
erature from the following aspects. Firstly, I highlight the heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) by zones governed at the na-
tional versus provincial levels, and their timing of establishment between 1980 to
2006. Given the drastic changes in China's political and economic climates dur-
ing this time period, early versus late hosting prefectures of the development zone
program faced completely diﬀerent economic conditions. Speciﬁcally, prefectures
hosting early (prior to 1990) national development zones were the only places to
legally receive FDI inﬂow then, and this advantage does not hold for later hosts as
this restriction was lifted in 1991. Along with the diﬀerential subsidy and super-
vision levels by national versus provincial governments, prefectures having received
this treatment varying by timing and support level are hardly comparable. Hence
in this paper, I ﬁrstly present both descriptive plots and a diﬀerences in diﬀerences
panel analysis to show that prefectures hosting early (pre-1990) national develop-
ment zones attract substantially more FDI inﬂows and more new foreign ﬁrms than
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their late or provincial counterparts since designation, and that these diﬀerential
eﬀects persist.
Next, I devise an original instrumental variable to predict the designation of the
group of early national development zones, in order to recover the causal eﬀect of
hosting these zones on FDI inﬂow and their subsequent urbanization patterns. The
construction of this instrumental variable utilizes the fact that the group of early
national development zones is designated with the emphasis to attract overseas
Chinese investors (Vogel, 2011). Therefore, when a prefecture has strong ties with
overseas Chinese investors, its probability of becoming host to an early national
development zone is higher, all else being equal. Throughout numerous historical
incidences and political movements prior to China's economic reform in late 1970s,
waves of out-migration from mainland China occurred for reasons uncorrelated to
the local economic conditions and potential of their sending places. This variation
thus exogenously predicts a location's later likelihood of being chosen as an early
national development zone. Thus, the connection between a Chinese prefecture and
overseas regions with potential investors of Chinese descendant is modeled through
shares of historical Chinese immigrants in these regions by their place of origin in
mainland China.
The 2SLS estimates from this set of instrumental variables, having controlled
for a comprehensive set of other locational economic characteristics and geography,
show that prefectures hosting early national development zones persistently receive
higher FDI inﬂows and attract more new foreign ﬁrms. As a result, these early
national development zone hosts also attract more internal migrant workers. This
happened ﬁrstly within the urban sector in the 1990s due to China's strict migration
restriction. Later in the 2000s with policy relaxations, migration occurred from rural
to urban sectors and intensiﬁed China's urbanization process, consistent with exist-
ing literature (e.g., Au and Henderson, 2006a). In terms of potential mechanisms
behind this persistency, I ﬁnd that prefectures hosting early national development
zones have more productive ﬁrms, for either their head-start in growth and hence
local agglomeration advantages or ﬁrm sorting, or likely both.
On the exclusion restriction front of instrumental variable strategies, one may
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worry about a prefecture's stronger ties with overseas Chinese in and of itself attract
more FDI from this group of investors. In order to investigate this concern, I show
that among early national development zones, FDI did not dis-proportionally ﬂow
into places with stronger connection to overseas Chinese4. While the Chinese central
government's locational choices of early national development zone hosts are largely
determined by each prefecture's closeness to overseas Chinese, as evident in the ﬁrst
stage results, this sentimental tie alone does not attract foreign investors. Rather,
the hosting prefectures of early national development zones had the ﬁrst-mover
advantage in attracting FDI as they were the only legal FDI-receiving places and
faced nearly no competition. This contrast between policy-making and economic
motivation is of itself interesting, and further mitigates the concern of it violating
exclusion restriction.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 3.2 brieﬂy overviews
the institutional context of China's development zone program, the existing litera-
ture and challenges, as well as the historic relevance to the construction of IV and
China's internal migration policies. Section 2.3 carries out an analysis parallel the
existing literature, which distinguishes heterogeneous eﬀects by groups of develop-
ment zones. Section 2.4 estimates the impact of early national development zone
establishment on FDI and urbanization patterns via instrumental variable approach.
Lastly, Section 3.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Research context: types and timing of development zones
In 1980, four cities were ﬁrst established as hosts of Special Economic Zones
(SEZ's). The term special economic zone is a misnomer for what should have
been translated as development zone, yet adopted in the existing literature until
today. SEZ is eﬀectively a type and hence subset of development zones. For a juris-
diction to host a development zone, it entitles the local management committee to
autonomously set up an industrial park type area, within whose boundary various
4Note that however this group has a small sample size of 16.
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policy beneﬁts and liberal economic environment are endowed. Common beneﬁts for
ﬁrms locating inside these zones include tax deductions, customs duty exemptions,
discounted land-use fees, and so on (Alder et al., 2013; Wang, 2013). During China's
early reform  a time of capital- and technology-deprivation  founding development
zones was largely motivated to attract foreign direct investments. Over the follow-
ing three decades, many more development zones of various types were gradually
designated and built up both along the coastal cities and across major prefectures
in China, as a result of the widely believed success of the ﬁrst waves of pilot areas.
As previously mentioned, paramount contributions to economic growth made by
national development zones have been consistently documented by oﬃcial sources.
But in contrast, such statistics by provincial zones are not systematically available,
as they are designated and managed by individual provincial governments as op-
posed to the central government. Regardless, the perceived success of development
zones across the board continues to incentivize experiments on new (types of) zones.
For instance, the current central leadership of Li Keqiang launched the Pilot Free
Trade Zone in Pudong, Shanghai in 2013 to test further liberalization on interna-
tional trade and currency. The growth-promoting eﬃcacies of development zones
is also widely supported by academic research, a discussion that I elaborate in the
next section. In this paper, however, I argue for the need to distinguish hetero-
geneous eﬀects of these development zones by their level of governing, as well as
by early versus late waves of zone establishment. The distinctions between these
groups of development zones are closely related to the reform and political contexts
(Xu, 2011). The diﬀerence of support level, managing governance, and motivations
behind zone designation (especially for the provincial ones) could all aﬀect their
eﬃcacies varyingly, yet systematically within-group, which has been largely absent
from existing literature (except Alder et al., 2013). In this paper, I distinguish
hosts of national from provincial development zones. National development zones
are supported by the central government, either since its designation or had a later
promotion from provincial level. The provincial development zones are only sup-
ported by the provincial government and never became national during the period
of study (1970-2006). Furthermore, the central government could also shut down
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any level of development zones when the proliferation of lower level development
zones was deemed unnecessary and ill-managed. One major round of tidying up
started in late 2003, and reduced the number of development zones from 6,866 to
1,568 in two-year's time (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2013a).
More importantly, I further categorize national development zones into three
waves according to the oﬃcial deﬁnition. The necessity of this distinction is also
motivated by the fact that the timing of a development zone designation is closely
related to the local economic conditions and climate, which evolved rapidly and
substantially since China's market reform in and around the 80's, rendering a ho-
mogeneous treatment eﬀect or assumption of random timing unsuitable. Speciﬁcally,
the national development zone designation waves were of the following oﬃcial time-
line. Between 1980 and 1989, the ﬁrst wave of national development zones was
established as experiments. This policy was pushed forward by China's leader at
the time, Deng Xiaoping, and was temporarily interrupted between 1989 and 1990
due to political instability (e.g., Tiananmen incident). The second wave of national
development zone establishments resumed in 1991 and continued onto 1990, which
was known as the growing period. During this time, China also started to open
up its economy nationally with relevant laws put in place to protect and regulate
foreign investment, making it possible for all Chinese cities to legally receive FDI
(Chen, 2011). And the last wave, the stable development group, in my sample
was between 2000-20065 (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, 2012, 2013b; Zhou,
2012). Since these waves of national development zones were established with dif-
ferent economic goals, the selection of them as well as the overall political and legal
climates they face were also diﬀerent from one another. Therefore in this paper, I
put particular emphasis on the potential heterogeneity in treatment eﬀects by waves
of national development zones, as well as distinctively apart from the provincial level
ones. As my analysis in the section 2.3 shows, the ﬁrst wave of national develop-
ment zones, which I call the early NDZ group, is the only group showing eﬃcacies
in attracting FDI. The geography of early national, late national, and provincial
development zones is shown in Figure 2.1.
5This group is, by the oﬃcial deﬁnition, those established between 2000 to 2008.
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2.2.2 Relevant literature and ongoing challenges
In the existing research of place-based policies, much of the early eﬀort is dedi-
cated to studying their eﬀectiveness. Such policies are common tools for stimulating
local economy, with the goal to either start it up or break it free from recession.
They are set out to ﬁrst generate economic growth, which will then be ideally fol-
lowed up with self-reinforcing agglomeration forces that both sustain and compound
growth. On the other hand, place-based policies are ﬁnanced by tax revenues and
costly to implement, while the cost-beneﬁt analysis do not always oﬀer consistent
verdicts (e.g., Einio and Overman, 2015; Head and Ries, 1996; Neumark and Simp-
son, 2014; Wei, 1993). The main challenge of any such policy evaluation lies in
many sources of confounding factors. The information used in the decision-making
of which place to receive such of a policy, either to pick the ones more likely to suc-
ceed or help lagging regions, is often not fully disclosed to researchers. Hence, any
simple event study by treating place-based policies as stand-alone exogenous shocks
would be subject to selection bias. Additionally, place-based policies are frequently
accompanied by infrastructure investment, labor, land market regulations and so
on, which are supplemental policies that tend to induce bias to key point estimator
in the case of data unavailability (Zeng, 2010). To circumvent these selection and
omitted variable bias, recent research focuses on ﬁnding the most convincing control
group with diﬀerences in diﬀerences (DD) strategy and panel data  most notably
are Greenstone et al. (2010), Busso et al. (2013), and Kline and Moretti (2014),
in order to estimate unbiased and consistent economic eﬀects of these place-based
policies.
Across the existing literature of all place-based policies, China's development
zone program is where the successful evidence concentrates (Moretti, 2014). The
early work on China's development zone policies show substantial growth diﬀeren-
tials between treated versus non-treated prefectures, however is shy of convincing
counterfactuals despite the consistently positive ﬁndings (e.g., Cheng and Kwan,
2000; Demurger et al., 2002; Head and Ries, 1996; Jones et al., 2003; Wei, 1993).
More comprehensive data availability has enabled recent studies to improve upon
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identiﬁcation and expand the sample period for evaluation. For example, Wang
(2013) and Alder et al. (2013) conﬁrm the growth-generating eﬀects (in FDI, ex-
port, GDP growth, etc.) on prefectures with development zone treatment under the
DD and panel setting. Schminke and Biesebroeck (2013) analyze ﬁrm productivity
and export behavior changes after they locate to development zones. Cheng (2014)
further reﬁnes the unit of analysis to counties, and ﬁnds that the development zone
program shift labor across sectors from agriculture to manufacturing, but not across
regions within manufacturing.
Despite such comprehensive scrutiny of China's development zone program, iden-
tiﬁcation in this context still falls short for two reasons. Firstly, all of the above
mentioned research relies heavily on the DD strategy in absence of a nearly identical
control group, where the assumption validity requiring random timing of treatment is
easily challenged. In other words, development zones established by diﬀerent levels
of governments and at diﬀerent times are treated as on parallel trends. Mean-
while, development zones supported by national versus provincial governments are
arguably set up to serve diﬀerent agendas and receive policy beneﬁts at varying
scales. Moreover, development zones established right after China's economic re-
form in 1978 and before it opened up fully to foreign direct investment in the early
90's, face diﬀerent market conditions than those set up afterward6. Secondly, all but
one of the recent evaluations of China's DZ programs carried out their analysis at
the prefecture level covering a long period of time  which means that most prefec-
tures in sample would have received at least one or more opportunities of hosting
a development zone. This would lead to ambiguous interpretations of key point
estimates, where prefectures receiving treatment late might face entirely diﬀerent
conditions than their early counterparts. With unreliable identiﬁcation, potential
modiﬁable areal unit problem could also exacerbate (Briant et al., 2010; Openshaw
and Taylor, 1979). In this paper, I construct a novel instrumental variable to provide
an alternative causal identiﬁcation approach to this question, which addresses both
of the above challenges. This will allow me to complement the existing literature by
6Another minor issue in DD and panel designs is that they are generally subject to potential caveats of downward
bias and leaving out useful information, as discussed in detail in Bertrand et al. (2004) and Baum-Snow and Ferreira
(2014).
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examining the impact of early designation of national development zones on FDI at-
traction over time, as well as the program's role in inﬂuencing China's urbanization
patterns between 1990 and 2010.
Even if place-based policies have worked in starting up the local economy, does its
positive eﬀect last? This is the natural follow-up question that has strong theoretical
underpinning (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson, 1974; Henderson et al., 1995;
Krugman, 1991), but not yet fully addressed empirically. Conceptually, successful
local economies would further attract and host productive ﬁrms, share infrastruc-
ture, well-matched labors, and foster knowledge and information spillovers. With
such dynamic agglomeration forces, such of an economy could self-sustain growth in
the context of place-based policies when the subsidy is later withdrawn. In their no-
table empirical work, Kline and Moretti (2014) show that the regional development
program of the Tennessee Valley Authority led to large employment gains in both
agriculture and manufacturing, while only the latter persisted after the federal sub-
sidy ended. A similar persistent trend is also observed in China's development zone
program under the DID framework (e.g., Wang, 2013). This paper complements
this research question with evidence from the IV approach, showing a positive and
long-lasting positive impact of China's early national development zone policy in
attracting FDI inﬂows and internal labor movement. Along with evidence of more
productive ﬁrms locating in hosting prefectures of early national development zones,
this paper empirically supports the existence of persistent agglomeration economies
of this policy.
2.2.3 Mainland Chinese emigration and early national development zone
designation
To further complement existing literature, I provide an instrumental variable
approach to identify the eﬀects of early national development zone establishment on
attracting foreign direct investment and its subsequent urbanization patterns. The
construction and validity of this instrumental variable relies on the historical and
institutional contexts of early waves of Chinese emigration, which is depicted in this
section.
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In the ﬁrst few years following China's market reform, the majority of its inward
FDI came from Hong Kong and Taiwan (Huaxia Jingwei News, 2007a,b; Xinhua
News, 2008; Zhang, 2005). This is a result of many political and economical reasons
combined. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan are geographically close to mainland China.
They share very similar languages and culture ties, as Hong Kong and Taiwan
are populated with Chinese descendant throughout hundreds of years of historical
migration waves. Such proximities oﬀer a strong bond and low ﬁxed cost for potential
overseas Chinese investors to be more likely to invest in China. Javorcik et al. (2011)
further conceptualize that strong ethnic network also facilitates information ﬂows
and serve as contract enforcing mechanism. As a result, strong ethnic ties indicate
more FDI inﬂows to migrants' places of origin, other factors being equal. In the
Chinese case, these channels are arguably more important with its cultural emphasis
on networks and connections (Zhang, 2005).
In addition to theoretical and empirical supports in the literature, the connection
between ethnic ties and FDI also motivated the policy makers' locational decisions
for designating the early development zones. When Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of
China during this era, was selecting the ﬁrst sites to host this special economic zone
experiment, he particularly looked for places that are more attractive to overseas
Chinese investors, on top of their underlying economic characteristics and potential.
Deng's persistent emphasis on targeting overseas Chinese originated from the fact
that most of the receiving places of Chinese emigrants at this time were far ahead
than mainland China in their economic conditions7, and were more likely to invest
in mainland China than other investors with no ethnic or nostalgic ties. Hence, a
prefecture's tie to regions with potential overseas Chinese investors such as Hong
Kong and Taiwan was an important consideration in Deng's selection of national
development zones locations (Vogel, 2011).
Building on this well-supported framework, I measure a Chinese prefecture's his-
torical share of outgoing emigrants to Taiwan in order to proxy for its tie with
Taiwan. This measure relies on the existing ethnic demographic composition of Tai-
wanese residents prior to 1970 (a stock measure), as well as a similar measure for
7For instance, the four East Asian tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have had rapid annual
economic growth between the early 1960s to 1990s.
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the most recent wave of emigrants from mainland China to Taiwan (a ﬂow mea-
sure). The idea is that the ﬂow measure may capture additional variation resting
on the fact that the most recent wave of emigrants would have much stronger ties to
their places of origin. Unfortunately, I am unable to do the same for Hong Kong due
to limited data availability and variation. Less worryingly, however, various news
sources report that FDI by Taiwanese investors in the early stage of China's mar-
ket reform (1980-1990) has consistently been under-reported for political reasons.
The tense cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan caused much
of Taiwanese investments to re-route through Hong Kong before entering mainland
China, despite cross-strait economic cooperation such as this was encouraged by
both Chinese and Taiwanese governments at the time. As a result, early FDI com-
ing from Taiwan has been systematically under-reported (People's Daily Online,
2002; Xinhua News, 1979, 1981). This in turn mitigates the concern of not having
the same IV measures for Hong Kong.
In short, the greater a prefecture's historical share of outgoing emigrants to Tai-
wan, holding everything else equal, the more likely it would be chosen as one of the
ﬁrst hosting places of national development zone. In order for this to be a valid
instrument, the motivations for the early emigrants to leave their hometowns in
mainland China need to be uncorrelated to other local characteristics that later con-
tributed to their designation as national development zones and economic growth.
This condition is validated by the history of mainland Chinese emigrants. Very
early waves of emigration from mainland China to Taiwan prior to the 20th century,
which arguably contributes to the majority of variations in the stock measurement,
occurred as results of war (Skeldon, 1996, 2002; Wong, 2011). Given the long gap
in time between these migration waves and China's unstable modern history un-
til the late 1970s, it is unlikely that prefecture diﬀerentials in economic conditions
persisted.
As for the ﬂow measurement, the most recent wave of migration from mainland
China to Taiwan was a result of KuoMinTang (KMT) retreat, when the party ruling
China for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century lost the civil war to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). Throughout the 1940s, over 1.3 million KMT oﬃcials,
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other elites and their families relocated to Taiwan. Entrepreneurs intending to ﬂee
from a Communist system started to transfer funds, equipment and stocks of raw
materials abroad. The fare from Shanghai to Taiwan was 80% more expensive by air
and 60% by sea in 1949, and were still in great shortage(Lin, 2011; Mengin, 2015).
While the exact data in ethnic composition of this wave of emigrants by prefecture is
unavailable, it is modeled via the share of KMT army generals and vice generals by
their hometown multiplying the distance to the nearest of the ﬁve prefectures with
air/seaports still under KMT control during this time of retreat (namely, Shang-
hai, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Qingdao, and Chengdu). Hence, the proposed proxy
measures the varying diﬃculty of retreating to Taiwan from diﬀerent prefectures.
The higher the KMT general share of a given province indicates higher chance for
the resident (otherwise similar in other provinces) from this province to gain ac-
cess to airplanes and ferries through same-province networks of family and friends8.
Multiplying distance to the nearest of the ﬁve main KMT ports then captures the
within-province diﬀerentials in travel cost for getting to the port. The economic
conditions under KMT ruling may not necessarily be positively correlated to that
under CCP ruling, as the two parties do not share the same political favoritism in
geography. However, they could potentially be negatively correlated. For example,
a prefecture with strong KMT ties may intentionally be less favored under CCP
ruling. This raises a potential threat to the exclusion restriction of IV design.
2.2.4 Urbanization in China under the hukou system
In order to examine how early national development zones aﬀect the urbanization
patterns in its hosting prefectures via FDI, I provide a necessary overview of the rel-
evant context  namely China's unique hukou system in this section. China's hukou
system works similar to an internal passport system. When a Chinese citizen is
born, he or she inherits a local citizenship tied to his or her mother's hukou place of
residence (as speciﬁc as to neighborhood subdistrict, jiedao). This citizenship enti-
tles the individual to either a rural or an urban status, which is a direct inheritance
of whether or not one's ancestors are peasants. This dichotomy of legal status,
8The lao xiang network  network of people from the same hometown  is especially potent among immigrants
from developing countries (Munshi, 2003)
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along with locational diﬀerentials, determine one's rights to housing, schooling, job
opportunities, health care, and even grain ratios prior to 1990s (Chan, 1994).
As one's legal rights are so ﬁrmly tied with his or her hukou location and status,
China's internal migration is strongly restricted through the hukou system. Prior
to 2000, changing one's hukou status or to move across locations legally is very
diﬃcult. The rare channels are through college education or job relocation within
the government or large state owned enterprises, with high friction and monetary
cost. People could otherwise move illegally as unregistered migrant or legally but
temporarily, and in both cases, they are entitled to zero or little local public provision
at the receiving place (Au and Henderson, 2006b). Therefore, such inﬂexibility
discourages anyone from moving.
However, China's market reform that started in the late 1970s and the subsequent
inﬂows of foreign direct investment (FDI) created labor demand for manufacturing
workers. This motivated surplus labor to move both within the urban sector and
more so from rural to urban sectors even under strict hukou regulations. Starting
in 2000, substantial relaxation (but not elimination) over hukou restrictions had
further opened the door for internal migration (Chan, 2013). Existing literature
comprehensively studies eﬀects of the hukou system in labor mobility and city sizes
(e.g., Au and Henderson, 2006a,b; Bosker et al., 2012). This paper is the ﬁrst one
to provide empirical evidence on this curious topic in light of the regional policy
instrument of designation and establishing development zones.
2.2.5 Data
The scope of this paper covers all 286 majority-Han Chinese prefectures (colored
areas in Figure 2.1) . Han China is where most economic activities take place, con-
taining about 85% of China's population. The rest of China (gray area in Figure
2.1) is left out mainly because of data restrictions. As they are mostly autonomous
regions, this exclusion is not concerning for the purpose of this paper. The relevant
time span varies by the outcome variable examined, and is noted in each respec-
tive speciﬁcation9. Prefecture deﬁnitions over time are standardized to the 2005
9Some variables are available from 1970 to 2006 while others 1982 to 2010.
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boundary following Baum-Snow et al. (2015).
Data comes from several sources. Firstly, I collect information on both national
and provincial development zones from oﬃcial government websites such as the Min-
istry of Commerce and the Ministry of Land and Resources of the People's Republic
of China10. The location, level of supporting government and designating year of
a development zone are used to deﬁne types of development zones, as discussed in
Section 2.2.1 and their geography visualized in Figure 2.1.
In order to examine the eﬀect of development zones on attracting foreign ﬁrms,
I use two measures. One of them is the direct measure of annual FDI inﬂows from
1996 to 2010 reported by the oﬃcial Chinese statistical oﬃce. These ﬁgures are
available at the county level from China Data Online, which I then aggregated up
to construct prefecture measures11.
However, the earliest FDI inﬂow measure starts in 1996, which is more than
15 years later than the ﬁrst national development zone designation. In order to
better capture the immediate post-treatment eﬀects, I alternatively compute the
total number of new foreign ﬁrms births annually from the Medium and Large
Industrial Firm Surveys, 1998-2007. Foreign ﬁrms are identiﬁed as those with more
than 50% foreign paid-in capital. As ﬁrms' open years are reported in the survey,
I can track birth years back to as early as 1970. The total number of foreign ﬁrm
births at the prefecture level from 1970 to 1998 is computed in the following way.
Firstly from the 1998 survey, prefecture births of foreign ﬁrms are calculated for
1970-1998. Then the same annual ﬁgure for 1999 to 2007 are ﬁlled in from each of
the corresponding survey. This conservative computation avoids double counting as
the same ﬁrms may be surveyed multiple times during 1998-2007, while attempting
to identify repeated ﬁrms from this series of surveys faces many challenges (Brandt
et al., 2014).
Next, to examine urbanization patterns of prefectures that are hosts to early
national development zones, I gather data on population and various migration
measures from 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010 national population censuses. Again,
10Accessible at: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/ and http://www.mlr.gov.cn/.
11Since its market reform, China went through intensive urbanization that inevitably involved frequent boundary
changes. By aggregating all ﬁgures up from the smallest geographic unit possible, I reduce potential bias introduced
via measurement errors from inconsistent boundaries.
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data at the county level is aggregated up to the prefecture level for minimizing
measurement errors from inconsistent boundary change.
Lastly, the two instrumental variables proxy for ties between mainland Chinese
prefectures and Taiwan, as introduced in section 2.2.3 and detailed in 3.4.2, are
the distribution of Taiwanese residents by their original domicile in mainland China
and the hometown of all Kuomintang (KMT) generals and vice generals. The dis-
tribution of Taiwanese by their original domicile is recorded in 1956 for all residents
settled in Taiwan in and after 1945 (post civil war in China). This data is publicly
available in paper form at the Taiwan National Library. The hometown record of
army generals are those served between 1912 and 1993, compiled by historian Ren
(2007). Next, distance from each prefecture to Taiwan and its nearest Kuomintang
retreat port are computed in ArcGIS. Both distance measures are to proxy for the
costs of traveling between one's hometown and Taiwan, either directly or through
one of the KMT retreat ports. Distance is computed as the shortest distance be-
tween two polygons (from the border of a mainland Chinese sending city to the
border of Taiwan).
2.3 Heterogeneous time trends
In this section, I present descriptive time trends of FDI attraction by diﬀerent
types of development zones. The descriptive patterns showcased in this section,
although not causal, provides further evidence that the early national development
zones enjoyed the early-mover advantage of this policy by persistently attracting
more new foreign ﬁrms than late national and provincial development zones. In
other words, drastic heterogeneous eﬀects exist across types of development zones.
This heterogeneity in turn motivates the question on how hosting early national
development zones shapes the urbanization patterns of their hosting prefectures, as
laid out in Section 2.4.
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2.3.1 Time trends by types of development zones
As previously discussed, one would expect there to be diﬀerential eﬀects by zone
type in this context. National zones are expected to perform superior to provincial
ones because they receive more and better support. The early national development
zones, having been established in the ﬁrst decade of China's market reform, were the
only legal places to receive foreign investment and hence faced little competition. In
comparison, their later counterparts were established when the entire country has
opened up for foreign trade.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide descriptive evidence for this. Both ﬁgures are Ker-
nel density plots of logged total prefecture-level FDI inﬂows by zone types (early
national, late national, and provincial). Each curve is the smoothed distribution of
pooled ﬁve-year sum of annual census ﬁgures of committed FDI inﬂow to the group
of prefectures hosting a particular zone type12. As these ﬁgures clearly show, prefec-
tures hosting the early national development zones are substantially ahead of the rest
of the development zone types. However, two factors could be at play here (assume
for a moment that all treated zones are on average comparable, a causality issue I
bring back to discussion later). One is that the early national development zones
are more eﬀective at attracting FDI than late national and provincial development
zones. The other explanation could be the length of time since zone establishment
as the policy beneﬁts to attract FDI may take time to set in. For example, in Figure
2.2, the early national development zones would have been designated for at least
10 years while the late national and provincial zones were just around 4 years into
their establishment. Regardless of which factor or both, the ﬁrst-mover advantage
enjoyed by the early national development zones is sizable and its persistency is
unambiguous.
Next to make these types of development zones more comparable, I employ the
diﬀerences in diﬀerences (DD) strategy to estimate this heterogeneous eﬀect by de-
velopment zone types on new foreign ﬁrm births before and after zone designation.
The births of new foreign ﬁrm, as a measure on the extensive margin of foreign
12Prefecture ﬁgures are aggregated up from the county ﬁgures to minimize measurement errors introduced by
administrative boundary change over time.
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investment, can be traced back to as early as 1970, and hence will inform us with
regards to the pre-trends and immediate eﬀects of zone designation. The speciﬁca-
tion is the following:
newFFpt = Yeart + Prefecturep +
∑
k∈K
θk(type k DZ post treatment trend)pt + εpt
(2.1)
The dependent variable is the share of new foreign ﬁrm births over all new ﬁrms
in a given prefecture, p, and a year, t, where t ∈ [1970, 2007], the sample cov-
erage. On the right hand side, the panel nature of this dataset allows for diﬀer-
encing out the prefecture- and year-speciﬁc characteristics with ﬁxed eﬀects (Yeart
and Prefecturep). θ's capture the annualized post treatment time trend for each
of the k types of development zones: k ∈ K = {early national development
zones, late national development zones, provincial development zones }. respec-
tively. (type k DZ post treatment trend) is the product of post treatment dummy
(switches on for all post treatment periods) and the number of years since treatment.
Hence, these post trend variables take value 0 prior to the prefecture's treatment
of development zone designation, and take the value of number of years since its
treatment post-designation. In other words, each estimated θ is the average annual
eﬀects for the speciﬁc type of development zone, while the reference group is all
prefectures prior to zone designation. The sample window is 7 years before and 7
years after designation. Lastly, the disturbance term is clustered at county level to
address potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
This speciﬁcation is applied ﬁrstly to the entire sample of 286 Han prefectures.
The estimation results are shown in column 1 of Table 2.1. Prefectures hosting
the early national development zones are the only group showing positive and sig-
niﬁcant trends after designation: an annual average of 3 more foreign ﬁrm births
than before. Whereas those hosting late national and provincial development zones
show (small and) negative or no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Secondly, equation
(2.1) speciﬁcation is applied to the sample of 273 prefectures that ever received a
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development zone designation by 2006, and the results are shown in column 2. The
overall pattern is very similar to column 1 with the ﬁrst wave of NDZ's showing
statistically signiﬁcant and positive estimate.
To visualize these time trends on a year-to-year basis, I plot the average annual
births of new foreign ﬁrms for each development zone type in Figure 2.4, as estimated
by the speciﬁcation below:





pt + εpt (2.2)
where everything except for δ's follow exactly the same as Equation 2.1. Dk,npt is a
binary variable equaling to 1 if in year t the prefecture p is n years to/from the year it
became host to k type development zone, and 0 otherwise. Hence, δ's are the average
annual births of new foreign ﬁrms for each development zone type relative to the year
of their designation, while this number for the year of designation is normalized to
0. These point estimates are plotted in Figure 2.413. It reveals the familiar pattern
corresponding to the regression results. The early national development zone hosts
on average attract 3 more new foreign ﬁrms than before its designation, which in
this plot translates to about 20 ﬁrms after 7 years. The late national development
zones worked in the ﬁrst 4 years and this eﬀect starts to fade out. However, we
need to be cautious about the fact that part of this diluted eﬀect could be due to
their late designation. For instance, a late national development zone designated
in 2003 would only have 4 years of post-treatment data since the analysis ends in
2007. Hence, we do not have suﬃcient evidence to conclude on the persistency
of late national development zone designation. Lastly, the provincial development
zones experience a small drop right after treatment and maintain a ﬂat trend over
time. The three sets of evidence above all point to a consistent pattern that the
early national development zones are substantially more eﬀective and its impact
longer-lasting than the late national and provincial development zones. Analysis in
this section shows that the scale and timing of policy implementation matter for
its eﬀectiveness. However, it is worth noting that no causal claim is being drawn
13Please note that these parameters are estimated after demeaned with prefecture and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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here, since the requirement of random timing of designation is not likely to be
met in this context. Unbiased and consistent estimate of these DID setup require
that these development zones follow the same trend as their pre-treatment selves in
absence of treatment, where any trend breaks would come from being designated
as development zones. As exhibited in Figure 2.4, the three types of development
zones do not follow a parallel trend prior to treatment. Instead of any causal claims,
this section focuses on providing evidence for the heterogeneity in development zone
eﬀects  that the FDI-attracting eﬀect is seen on the early designated national
development zones for potential explanations discussed earlier. The next section will
address how the designation of early national development zone aﬀects its hosting
prefectures urbanization patterns.
2.4 The eﬀects of early national development zone designa-
tion on urban growth
As learned from Section 2.3, the eﬀectiveness of attracting FDI on the ﬁrst wave
of national development zones is substantially stronger and more persistent than
the late national and provincial development zones. However, the above estimates
are likely biased. Ideally for an unbiased estimate of such a policy, one would need
to utilize exogenous variation that inﬂuences the locational decision of treatment
but is uncorrelated with the economic potentials of such a location. Hence, I con-
struct an original instrumental variable to assess the local average treatment eﬀect
of early national development zone designation, ﬁrstly on FDI and then on how it
subsequently inﬂuenced the urbanization patterns of its hosting prefectures.
2.4.1 Predicting the ﬁrst wave of national development zone designation
IV construction
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the share of historical emigrants from a Chinese
prefecture to Taiwan (in stock and ﬂow terms) predicts its probability of being
chosen as host to an early national development zone. The motives behind these
historical emigration waves are largely uncorrelated to local economic potentials.
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However, there are locational features that could aﬀect its likelihood to host an
early national development zone and its future economic performance. I try my
best to control for these potential endogenous conditions. A prefecture's distance
to coast is an example, as coastal area could be sending out more emigrants and
favored by foreign investors simultaneously for its geography. As ﬁrst formulated
by Sachs et al. (1999) and widely applicable to the economic geography literature,
distance to coast is one of the dominating factors for explaining economic growth
diﬀerentials across countries. Meanwhile, residents from coastal regions, who face
shorter distance to coast as well as to Taiwan, are also more likely to emigrate given
cheaper transport cost, especially during an era when incurring transportation cost
could be substantial. Therefore, the distance to coast of a location is systematically
correlated to both its share of emigrants and economic potentials. I address this
challenge by ﬁrst incorporating distance into the instrumental variable construction
following Boustan (2010) and later separately control for it:
IV-TWp = ShImTWj · 1DTWp (2.3)
where p, j are subscripts for prefecture and provincial level variations respectively.
IV-TW is the instrumental variable at the prefecture level that captures the tie
between a Chinese prefecture and Taiwan through the stock of its population de-
mographic breakdown by original domicile in the 1956 Taiwanese Population Census.
It is the product of two components: the share of its Chinese immigrants by their
mainland Chinese province of original domicile (ShImTW) and the inverse distance
from each Chinese prefecture to Taiwan (DTW−1)14. The ﬁrst component mea-
sures the then existing tie between a Chinese province and Taiwan, while the second
component takes a form of distance measure to proxy for the out-migration trans-
portation cost variation. This instrumental variable construction therefore models
a mainland Chinese prefecture's likelihood of being chosen to host national develop-
ment zone in the early stage of market reform by capturing its non-economic tie to
Taiwan, and proxied by its share of emigrants to Taiwan prior to the Chinese Civil
14Distance is computed as the nearest distances between the borders of two polygons.
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War. Additionally, a similar measure is applied to proxy for the most recent ﬂow
of emigration from mainland China to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War:
IV-KMTp = ShGenKMTj · 1DPortp (2.4)
where ShGenKMTj is the share of KMT generals whose hometown is province j,
proxying for the tie between a province and the party. Similarly, the cost to travel to
one of the main KMT retreat ports15 is modeled by the shortest distance from a given
prefecture to one of the nearest ports, computed similarly as above. Therefore, the
interaction of the two variables gives this instrumental variable proxying for higher
emigration ﬂows to Taiwan in the 1940s from prefectures with stronger KMT ties.
First stage speciﬁcation and results
With the above instrumental variables, I predict the designation of the ﬁrst wave
of national development zones with the following speciﬁcation:
earlyNDZp =β1(IV-TWp) + β2(IV-KMTp) + γ(DCoast
−1
p )
+ (X−1p )ω + KMT Portp + εp (2.5)
where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for early NDZ designation at
the prefecture level. It is predicted by the instruments following equations 2.3 and
2.4 while controlling for prefecture inverse distance to coast (DCoast−1p ), and other
prefecture-level characteristics, X−1p , depending on speciﬁcation. Prefecture inverse
distance to coast is included to mitigate the worry that it is correlated to both larger
share of emigration pre-reform and better economic performance post-reform, as the
former determines travel cost for emigrants and the latter could be a dominating
factor for explaining economic growth diﬀerentials across regions (Sachs et al., 1999).
Xp are measures on prefecture-level economic characteristics with data availability,
which include 1980 measures of road and rail rays to proxy for local infrastructure
conditions as in Baum-Snow et al. (2015), and 1982 population to proxy for initial
15Recall that these ports are in Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Qingdao, and Chengdu.
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market size. Lastly, KMT retreat port ﬁxed eﬀects are included to take out any
permanent connections between the port and KMT. The sample is the full set of
286 Han Chinese prefectures16.
Table 2.2 presents variations of the ﬁrst-stage regression outputs. The ﬁrst two
columns predict early national development zone designation with and without other
prefecture-level economic characteristics. Both instrumental variables have strong
predictive power, with the most recent ﬂow of Chinese emigrants showing smaller
point estimates but substantially stronger statistical power than the historical stock
of emigrants. On average, having sent more immigrants to Taiwan by 1950s increases
a prefecture's likelihood of hosting an early national development zone by 20%,
whereas the most recent tie-strengthening post Civil War ﬂow increases it by 7%.
It is worth noting that by including controls on economic conditions in column 2,
point estimates on the instrument variables stay consistent. This implies that the
IV's are not biased by these measurable economic potentials. Next, columns 3 and
4 run the predictions instead on designations of late national development zones
(i.e., after 1990). No positive predictive power is shown here, consistent with the
previous reasoning that the instrumental variables should and are only applicable
to the early treated prefectures supported at the national level.
2.4.2 Identifying the eﬀect of early national development zone designa-
tion on foreign investment and urbanization patterns
With predicted linear probability of early national development zone designation,
we can then estimate the unbiased eﬀect of such treatment on post-treatment eco-
nomic measures via two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator following the general
speciﬁcation:
ln(yp,t) =κ( ̂earlyNDZp) + η(DCoast−1p ) + (X
−1
p )ρ
+ ψ(yp,t−n) + KMT Portp + up (2.6)
16Instead of the full sample, same analysis are run by restricting it to the group of 273 prefectures ever received
any development zone designation between 1978 and 2006, as well as the sample of prefectures in coastal provinces
only. Both sets of results show consistent patterns .
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where the dependent variable y represents various outcome measures (logged) at the
prefecture level at time t. Additionally, the same measure of y lagged by n years is
included on the right-hand-side when available, to control for pre-conditions17. The
rest of the equation remain the same as previously stated. Equations 2.5 and 2.6
combined hence gives unbiased estimates of the treatment eﬀect of early national
development zone designation on hosting prefectures' FDI attraction over time and
its resulting urbanization patterns.
Eﬀects on FDI inﬂow, 1996-2010
Firstly, this analysis is applied to the measure of FDI from 1996 to 2010 at a
ﬁve-year interval with ln(FDIp,1996−2000), ln(FDIp,2001−2005), and ln(FDIp,2006−2010)
as the dependent variables. I pooled these annual measures every ﬁve years for
two main reasons. The ﬁrst is that data availability for this time series is not
perfectly balanced, and pooling could mitigate potential missing variable concern.
Secondly, the main pattern is readily present and easily seen when annual measures
are aggregated up to ﬁve years. Since FDI measures prior to 1996 are not available,
I use instead the count of total foreign ﬁrms born between 1970 to 1995 in the 1998
industrial survey to proxy for the pre-condition). The results are shown in Table
2.3 for each ﬁve-year intervals with OLS and IV estimations tabulated side by side.
Across the ﬁrst row, we see that being able to host one of the ﬁrst national
development zones allows a prefecture to persistently attract substantially more FDI
inﬂows during the period of 1996-2010. Speciﬁcally, these prefectures are estimated
to attract approximately 381% higher total FDI inﬂows over the ﬁve-year interval
of 1996-2000 (cumulative), and this lowers slightly to 328% and 338% times more
between 2001 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010 respectively. Translating these ﬁgures into
annualized terms, early national development zone hosts on average attract 31%
more FDI than the rest of Han China annually from 1996-2000. This ﬁrst mover
advantage persists at an average annual rate of 27% more throughout the ﬁrst decade
of the 21st century. These estimates seem large in scale, but not unreasonable given
the context. Essentially, these early national development zones were the only legal
17This lagged variable, although not shown in equation 2.5, is also included in the ﬁrst-stage when 2SLS analysis
is performed.
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receiving places throughout the 1980s for any FDI, as China was only slowly opening
up and improving its legal regulations over foreign investment starting in the 1990s.
These early NDZ hosts thus faced much less competition for FDI inﬂows than they
later did from 2001-2010. As China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001
and sparked another surge of annual FDI inﬂow (Walmsley et al., 2006), these early
movers remarkably maintained their advantage18.
Next, we see that IV results are consistently larger than their OLS counterparts
across all time periods. OLS estimates showing downward bias suggest that the
ﬁrst wave of national development zones are not all comprised of places that are
more likely to win. Instead of looking for places that are originally more likely to
be successful in attracting FDI, the central government could have allocated some
of this beneﬁcial policy to politically important (rather than economically sound)
cities, of which such political favoritism is known to exist (Chen et al., 2015). This
negative selection is consistent with what we observed in the ﬁrst stage results
where measured economic potentials in the early 1980's do not predict early NDZ
designation. Moreover, this pattern of strong and positive treatment eﬀect of the
early national development zones is consistent with the previous DD estimates in
Section 2.3. Although the IV analysis here is of direct FDI inﬂow measures whereas
the DD design focused on new foreign ﬁrm births, evidence from both the intensive
and extensive margins are in line. Lastly, we turn to the set of covariates in this
analysis. Everything else being equal, having better rail infrastructure, large market
size, and stronger pre-existing ties to foreign ﬁrms are positively associated with
attracting more FDI inﬂows. However, these do not imply causality and are hence
not of focus19.
Eﬀects on own urbanization patterns
As prefectures that host early national development zones consistently attract
more foreign investment, how does the eﬀectiveness of this policy subsequently im-
pact the urban patterns of these prefectures? Along with greater FDI inﬂows, these
18However, I caution the literal interpretation of these coeﬃcients as the sample of early NDZs is small (17 out
of 286 prefectures).
19I had looked into analyzing neighbors' treatment eﬀects with the same set of instruments with spatial weight,
but the ﬁrst stage does not have enough power
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hosting prefectures also enjoy other beneﬁts from this policy bundle (e.g., more
infrastructure building or earlier improvements in the legal system) that could fun-
damentally aﬀect their city growth trajectory and in particular labor market. This
section looks into the average treatment eﬀect of hosting early national development
zone on city size diﬀerentials, as well as by more detailed demographic group.
Tables 2.5 through 2.7 are set out to test if prefectures hosting early national
development zones are larger in terms of various types of population measures.
Table 2.5 ﬁrstly shows that early national development zone hosting prefectures do
not diﬀer in total population sizes to the other prefectures in any of the decennial
census measures, although OLS results in 2000 and 2010 would lead to diﬀerent
conclusions.
To examine this further, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 explore how the internal movements
of diﬀerent types of labor are aﬀected by this policy varyingly. As discussed in
section 2.2.4, while internal migration was strictly limited prior to 2000, holders of
urban hukou always faced relative ease for relocation in comparison to their rural
counterparts (Chan, 2010, 2013). In these tables, each of the in-migration outcome
measure is deﬁned as inﬂows of the speciﬁc type of migrants from the rest of China in
the previous ﬁve years leading up to the census year. Speciﬁcally, urban migrants are
those who hold non-agricultural hukou. Similarly, rural migrants are those who hold
agricultural hukou in their sending place. Working-age migrants are then those aged
between 18 and 55, irrespective of their hukou type. Since these migration variables
are only available in 1990, 2000, and 2005, a pre-trend measure (i.e., yp,t−n) for the
1990 regressions is absent. However, this does not challenge the comparability across
regressions for the three census years because internal migration was practically
nonexistent prior to 1990 due to very strict hukou regulations20.
Table 2.6 looks at the eﬀect of hosting early national development zone on at-
tracting urban and rural migrants respectively. Nationally, urban hukou holders
showed strong movement to prefectures hosting early national DZ's by 1990. This
eﬀect diminishes in the 2000 and 2005 censuses. Columns 4-6 show a reverse pat-
tern when rural migrants are examined, with larger scales in 2000 and 2005 and less
20Some special cases existed but happened only infrequently (Au and Henderson, 2006b).
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movements in 1990. Next, table 2.7 looks at speciﬁcally population of migrants of
working-age. They show very similar patterns to that of rural migrants.
These urbanization trends suggest the following interactions between hosting
early national development zones and changes in hukou regulation. Firstly, hosting
early NDZs bring in higher FDI and more foreign ﬁrms. These capital and ﬁrms
were mostly concentrated in the export-processing industries (Zhang, 2005; Zhang
and Song, 2001; Zhang and Felmingham, 2001), which then generated demand for
manufacturing labor that guided internal migration ﬂows. Given the strict hukou
restrictions prior to 2000, this surge in demand for labor was only met by migrants
with urban hukou by 1990, and later in 2000 and 2005 by migrants with rural
hukou. However, as internal migrants account for a small share of overall popula-
tion (average share is 10% in 2010), I do not ﬁnd the same eﬀect on city size. These
quantitative trends conﬁrm the existing qualitative and descriptive ﬁndings in the
literature, most notably by Chan (2012) and Chan (2013).
The underlying mechanisms behind persistency
With the above analysis, we can conclude that the hosting prefectures of early
national development zones are given the head-start by this policy, beneﬁting from
the status of being the only legal recipients of FDI at the time. Along with other
beneﬁt packages that come with the development zone program such as infrastruc-
ture investment, these prefectures built up agglomeration economies that allowed
them to have persistent advantage over the rest of Han China in attracting FDI and
grew bigger in size. Although I am unable to pinpoint which particular channels of
agglomeration (e.g., labor pooling, sharing of infrastructure or intermediate suppli-
ers, knowledge spillover, etc.) are at play or matter more relative to one another, I
explore these with my best eﬀort in this section.
Firstly, the investigation is done at the ﬁrm level to examine any productivity
diﬀerentials between ﬁrms in early development zone hosting prefectures and those
in the rest of Han China. The speciﬁcation is of the following:
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ln(output)ipt =ψ1(ln(capital)ipt) + ψ2(ln(employment)ipt) + industryi + ownershipi
+ yeart + λ(TFP1995p) + κ( ̂earlyNDZp) + η(DCoast−1p )
+ (X−1p )ρ+ KMT Portp + uipt (2.7)
where i is the subscript for ﬁrm level variation. The dependent variable is the
log of value added output. Firms are assumed to follow standard Cobb-Douglas
production function where capital and labor have diﬀerential impacts on output,
where 2-digit industry, ﬁrm ownership type, as well as year ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
Furthermore, I control for 1995 prefecture level TFP measures to control for the
pre-trend. This prefecture TFP measure is derived from 1995 industrial census
data, same as in Chen et al. (2015). Firstly the ﬁrm-level TFP is calculated as
ln(net VA)− 0.30 ln k + 0.70 ln l. Next, ﬁrm-level TFP is regressed on industry and
city ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as elasticity controls on 1995 numbers of ﬁrms in the own
industry in the city, ln distance to the coast and 1990 GDP within 150 kms from the
city. Then the estimated city ﬁxed eﬀects are used as city-level TFP for Equation
2.8. The rest of the Equation 2.8 follows exactly Equation 2.6 where treatment
is predicted similarly to Equation 2.5, but at the ﬁrm level with the above list of
covariates.
Since the dataset is cross-sectional annual medium and large ﬁrm surveys from
1998 to 2007, I am unable to follow ﬁrms over time during the key treatment pe-
riod (namely, from 1980 to 1990 when the early national development zones are
established). Hence, I am unable to tease out ﬁrm sorting from local agglomeration
forces. Instead, we should think of this as the total factor productivity diﬀerential
between ﬁrms located in prefectures hosting early national development zones versus
the rest of Han China. The results are shown in Table 2.8. The ﬁrst column follows
exactly the speciﬁcation of Equation 2.8, where the second column has an additional
control to account for the number of years that the ﬁrm has been located in an early
national development zone prefecture at the time of survey. It is evident that ﬁrms
in the treatment prefectures are at least 20% more productive than the rest. Also
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as expected, state-owned ﬁrms are substantially less productive than the reference
group, which include the private ﬁrms. Lastly, cities that are more productive in
1995, have better rail connections and higher populations in the early 1980s also
have more productive ﬁrms. However as discussed, my analysis in this section could
only provide suggestive rather than causal evidence. It is clear that productivity dif-
ferentials exist between treatment and control cities, but nothing about ﬁrm sorting
versus agglomeration can be identiﬁed.
Another potential underlying mechanism behind the observed persistency of early
national development zones is that, potentially the early Taiwanese investors settle
into these zones and build up local networks that further attract more Taiwanese
investors in the following years. Here, we turn to analysis that may shed light on
this potential channel. For this, I collect data on yearly Taiwanese FDI ﬂows by
Chinese provinces from 1991 to 2010, as well as the migration pattern of foreign
born and settlers in China. However, data is again limited as the variation is only
at the provincial rather than prefecture level. Thus, I aggregate all other measures
to provincial level to perform the following IV-estimate:
ln(y)jt = κ( ̂earlyNDZj) + η(DCoast
−1
j ) + (X
−1
j )ρ+ Yeart + ujt (2.8)
where j again denotes provincial variation. The dependent variables are the log-
levels of Taiwan investment ﬂows to Chinese provinces from 1991 to 2010 from the
Investment Commission of Taiwan Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs; number of foreign
born settlers with Chinese citizenship in Chinese provinces; and lastly number of
foreign born settlers without Chinese citizenship, both from the 2000 National Cen-
sus. Thus for Taiwanese investment inﬂows, I can further include year ﬁxed eﬀects,
while for the external immigration measures there is no time variation. The rest of
the variables follow exactly from Equation 2.6 but all (ﬁrst-stage included) at the
provincial level.
The results are presented in 2.9. Column 1 shows that provinces that host early
national development zones continues to attract substantially more FDI from Taiwan
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over time. The last two columns showing external migration patterns are very weak
analysis with limited cross sectional variation across 23 provinces, where 9 of them
being early national development zone hosts. Hence, nothing can be concluded
from them. This exercise shows that indeed Taiwanese FDI has strong persistency
ﬂowing to places that initially attracted Taiwanese FDI and hence built up network
and local knowledge that later reinforce further investment.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I ﬁrst highlight the heterogeneous eﬀects of China's development
zone program by their level of government support and timing of designation. I
show that early and national development zones have substantially greater success
in attracting FDI, with long-lasting impact over time. This observation face sim-
ilar identiﬁcation challenges as much of the existing research on this topic, which
motivates the next set of analysis.
Secondly, I provide an instrumental variable approach to identify the causal eﬀects
of early national development zone designation on its local economy in attracting
FDI and the subsequent urbanization patterns. Hosting a national development
zone prior to 1990 allows the prefecture to attract substantially more inward FDI,
migrants from within the urban sector prior to hukou relaxation, and migrants from
rural to urban sectors afterward.
Despite the above complementaries to the existing literature, this paper is limited
in the following ways. Firstly, the key treatment of interest  designation of early
national development zones  is of a relatively small scale in comparison to the other
levels and timing of development zone treatment. As a result, the point estimates
may not be precise. Secondly and more importantly, despite the novel contribution
of an instrumental variable strategy in the research of place-based policies that
mostly rely on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence and panel settings, the estimated eﬀects come
short in its external validity.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Geography of DZ-hosting prefectures by type, 1980-2006
Legend
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Figure 2.4: Annual births of foreign ﬁrms before and after development zone designation for early
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Tables
Table 2.1: Heterogeneous eﬀects by types of development zone designation
All prefectures: All treated prefectures:
(1) (2)
Post early national development zone trend 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004)
Post late national development zone trend 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)






Year and prefecture ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Prefecture-clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
Note that this table is not directly comparable to ﬁgure 2.4. The dependent variable here is
the share of new foreign ﬁrms over total new ﬁrms, while the one in ﬁgure 2.4 is the number of
new foreign ﬁrms. Furthermore, this table reports the time-weighted annualized average.
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Table 2.2: IV: ﬁrst stage
Predicting early NDZ: Predicting late NDZ:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV-TW 0.204*** 0.189** 0.094 0.133
(0.071) (0.073) (0.142) (0.139)
IV-KMT 0.071*** 0.071*** -0.016*** -0.031***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Inverse distance to coast 0.000 0.000 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river -0.034** 0.099
(0.014) (0.064)
1980 road rays -0.010 0.020
(0.007) (0.018)
1980 rail rays 0.001 0.041**
(0.008) (0.019)
ln(1982 population) 0.012 0.057
(0.034) (0.034)
ln(total raining days in a year) -0.083* 0.058
(0.047) (0.076)
ln(range of elevation) 0.001 -0.060*
(0.007) (0.034)
Mean surface roughness -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature 0.006* -0.003
(0.003) (0.006)
Constant 0.038*** 0.187 0.192*** -0.591
(0.012) (0.414) (0.024) (0.593)
N 286 286 286 286
R2 0.28 0.30 0.05 0.13
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.3: OLS versus IV estimates: eﬀects on FDI inﬂows
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early national development zone 1.779*** 2.700** 1.447*** 1.792* 1.273*** 2.074***
(0.497) (1.291) (0.512) (0.980) (0.449) (0.536)
Inverse distance to coast 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river 0.236 0.265 -0.022 -0.013 0.180 0.201
(0.188) (0.188) (0.348) (0.339) (0.217) (0.213)
1980 road rays -0.115 -0.100 -0.047 -0.041 -0.014 -0.001
(0.081) (0.081) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064)
1980 rail rays 0.228** 0.233*** 0.101 0.102 0.234*** 0.238***
(0.092) (0.090) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075)
ln(1982 population) 1.030*** 1.003*** 0.946*** 0.937*** 0.545*** 0.524***
(0.177) (0.173) (0.157) (0.156) (0.128) (0.127)
ln(total raining days in a year) -0.678 -0.584 -0.316 -0.283 -0.801** -0.721**
(0.419) (0.425) (0.423) (0.405) (0.340) (0.329)
ln(range of elevation) 0.012 0.020 -0.119 -0.116 -0.131 -0.124
(0.138) (0.135) (0.132) (0.129) (0.127) (0.124)
Mean surface roughness -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.120*** 0.117***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Counts of new foreign ﬁrms in 1995 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant -4.833 -4.947 -3.380 -3.423 5.608** 5.491**
(3.309) (3.184) (3.302) (3.180) (2.686) (2.614)
N 265 265 277 277 272 272
KP F stat 59.15 58.38 56.63
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.4: FDI does not dis-proportionally go to places with strong Taiwanese ties
Total number of foreign ﬁrms ln(Foreign Direct Investment)
3 years post designation 5 years post designation 1996 1996-2000 total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV-TW 0.176 6.947 0.064 0.020
(6.323) (23.755) (1.804) (2.342)
IV-KMT 2.569 13.146 0.597 0.509
(4.724) (17.031) (0.781) (1.033)
Inverse distance to coast 0.443 2.049 -0.045 -0.029
(0.556) (2.016) (0.128) (0.166)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river -35.287 -271.840 -0.521 1.191
(53.467) (192.826) (9.547) (12.561)
1980 road rays 3.429 29.414 0.158 0.060
(9.850) (37.125) (2.856) (3.709)
1980 rail rays 3.620 6.345 -1.056 -0.774
(7.947) (30.740) (3.000) (3.871)
ln(1982 population) -0.503 -9.415 0.205 0.098
(5.594) (20.612) (1.246) (1.632)
ln(total raining days in a year) -10.378 -73.154 -1.967 -1.420
(24.352) (89.165) (6.196) (8.033)
ln(range of elevation) 1.540 -8.263 3.101 2.898
(18.498) (69.018) (4.573) (5.976)
Mean surface roughness 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean daily temperature 1.182 6.647 0.135 0.113
(1.730) (6.020) (0.190) (0.251)
Constant 12.759 324.791 -5.568 -3.407
(218.977) (837.423) (68.319) (88.723)
N 17 17 17 17
R2 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.83
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.




Table 2.5: Eﬀects on city sizes
1990 2000 2010
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early national development zone 0.135 0.027 0.338** 0.200 0.471** 0.351
(0.088) (0.043) (0.164) (0.159) (0.182) (0.317)
Inverse distance to coast 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028)
1980 road rays 0.012** 0.011** 0.025** 0.024** 0.026** 0.024**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
1980 rail rays 0.009** 0.009** 0.015** 0.014** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
ln(1982 population) 0.921*** 0.923*** 0.837*** 0.840*** 0.800*** 0.802***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.051) (0.050) (0.055) (0.054)
ln(total raining days in a year) -0.017 -0.027 -0.054 -0.066* -0.111** -0.121**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.038) (0.034) (0.048) (0.050)
ln(range of elevation) 0.010 0.009 0.022* 0.020* 0.019 0.017
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015)
Mean surface roughness -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 1.200*** 1.228*** 2.479*** 2.515*** 3.278*** 3.309***
(0.297) (0.324) (0.537) (0.577) (0.612) (0.645)
N 286 286 286 286 286 286
KP F stat 49.42 49.42 49.42
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.6: Eﬀects on internal migration
Urban citizens Rural citizens
1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early national development zone 1.568** 0.942 0.857 0.813 1.746*** 1.814***
(0.687) (0.632) (0.680) (0.804) (0.558) (0.656)
Inverse distance to coast 0.009*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.008*** -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river -0.020 0.129 0.167 0.037 0.158 0.188
(0.138) (0.093) (0.103) (0.149) (0.112) (0.120)
1980 road rays 0.028 0.033 0.038 -0.022 0.037 0.047
(0.052) (0.033) (0.040) (0.051) (0.043) (0.047)
1980 rail rays 0.127** 0.081** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.009 0.029
(0.051) (0.035) (0.043) (0.054) (0.040) (0.044)
ln(1982 population) 0.701*** 0.203* 0.183 0.347** 0.131 0.101
(0.140) (0.114) (0.116) (0.141) (0.099) (0.106)
ln(total raining days in a year) 0.087 0.106 0.026 0.331 0.056 0.380*
(0.260) (0.155) (0.187) (0.251) (0.186) (0.206)
ln(range of elevation) -0.015 0.033 0.023 -0.055 -0.024 -0.059
(0.087) (0.053) (0.070) (0.082) (0.062) (0.072)
Mean surface roughness -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature -0.028* 0.025* 0.031** -0.004 0.043*** 0.031**
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(1990 in-migration, urban) 0.381*** 0.466***
(0.068) (0.074)
ln(1990 in-migration, rural) 0.531*** 0.547***
(0.063) (0.066)
Constant -1.823 2.033 2.677 3.847* 2.246 1.830
(2.261) (1.434) (1.695) (2.116) (1.560) (1.617)
N 283 283 282 285 285 285
KP F stat 49.16 75.21 74.58 49.52 74.93 74.93
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust SE in parenthesis.
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Table 2.7: Eﬀects on working-age internal migration
1990 2000 2005
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Early national development zone 1.445*** 1.005 1.101*** 1.656*** 1.126*** 1.538**
(0.360) (0.822) (0.250) (0.600) (0.275) (0.674)
Inverse distance to coast 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river 0.033 0.019 0.145 0.162 0.154 0.167
(0.147) (0.145) (0.108) (0.108) (0.119) (0.119)
1980 road rays 0.011 0.006 0.024 0.031 0.034 0.039
(0.053) (0.052) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
1980 rail rays 0.136** 0.134** 0.026 0.031 0.057 0.061
(0.057) (0.055) (0.039) (0.038) (0.044) (0.043)
ln(1982 population) 0.436*** 0.443*** 0.119 0.123 0.106 0.109
(0.150) (0.151) (0.101) (0.096) (0.106) (0.102)
ln(total raining days in a year) 0.409 0.370 -0.013 0.044 0.222 0.264
(0.268) (0.270) (0.173) (0.174) (0.196) (0.196)
ln(range of elevation) -0.021 -0.026 -0.031 -0.025 -0.056 -0.052
(0.088) (0.085) (0.061) (0.059) (0.072) (0.071)
Mean surface roughness -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature -0.011 -0.008 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.035** 0.032**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
ln(1990 in-migration, working-age) 0.548*** 0.521*** 0.582*** 0.561***
(0.059) (0.063) (0.061) (0.066)
Constant 1.902 2.015 2.778* 2.697* 2.344 2.284
(2.478) (2.481) (1.534) (1.473) (1.618) (1.559)
N 286 286 286 286 286 286
KP F stat 49.42 76.99 76.99
KMT port FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.8: Total factor productivity diﬀerentials between ﬁrms in and out of early national devel-
opment zone hosting prefectures
(1) (2)






Collective owned ﬁrms -0.003 -0.008
(0.017) (0.017)
Foreign owned ﬁrms 0.026 0.028
(0.030) (0.030)
State owned ﬁrms -0.708*** -0.713***
(0.023) (0.023)
City level TFP in 1995 0.231*** 0.231***
(0.065) (0.064)
Inverse distance to coast 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river -0.033 -0.033
(0.037) (0.038)
1980 road rays 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
1980 rail rays 0.012 0.012
(0.013) (0.013)
ln(1982 population) -0.001 -0.008
(0.036) (0.037)
ln(total raining days in a year) -0.194** -0.186**
(0.081) (0.082)
ln(range of elevation) -0.023* -0.022*
(0.013) (0.013)
Mean surface roughness -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature 0.013** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006)





KP F stat 43.24 15.96
Industry, ownership, year, and port ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.9: Early national development zone eﬀects on later Taiwanese FDI inﬂows and external
migration patterns
dependent variable: ln(Taiwan FDI) ln(Foreign born citizens) ln(Foreign born residents)
(1) (2) (3)
Early national development zone 3.208*** 1.935** 0.907
(0.231) (0.791) (0.610)
Inverse distance to coast -0.005*** 0.018*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
Inverse distance to the nearest major river 0.153*** -0.327** -0.045
(0.038) (0.135) (0.104)
1980 road rays 0.018 -0.038 0.031
(0.015) (0.052) (0.040)
1980 rail rays 0.002 -0.071 -0.051
(0.018) (0.064) (0.049)
ln(1982 population) -0.055*** -0.058 -0.010
(0.014) (0.050) (0.039)
ln(total raining days in a year) 0.143*** 0.167* 0.080
(0.029) (0.100) (0.077)
ln(range of elevation) -0.002 0.084 -0.041
(0.022) (0.078) (0.060)
Mean surface roughness -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean daily temperature 0.009*** -0.011 -0.001
(0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant 10.547*** 4.632*** 3.805***
(0.342) (0.813) (0.627)
N 429 23 23
KP F stat 149.76 4.44 4.44
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes No No
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Chapter 3




Environmental regulations are becoming more prevalent in developing countries
as they begin to tackle pollution. In order to understand the local economic impacts
of such regulations, two opposing forces are of consideration. On the one hand,
regulations increase the cost of production and lower productivity of polluting ﬁrms
(Greenstone et al., 2012; Roback, 1982; Shapiro and Walker, 2017). This could hurt
local economic activities and labor market (Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone,
2002; Walker, 2013). On the other hand, good air quality is an amenity that attracts
human capital and likely beneﬁts the local economy (Chay and Greenstone, 2003;
Chen et al., 2017a; Currie and Neidell, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2001; Heblich et al.,
2016; Lin, 2018; Schlenker and Walker, 2016). While the existing literature provides
sound evidence on how these two forces respectively aﬀect the local economy, our
knowledge of the net eﬀects of these two opposing forces is limited.
In this paper, I study the eﬀects of pollution regulation on China's local economies
between 2000 and 2010 by considering the above two opposing forces and their net
eﬀects. China is one of the largest coal consumers in the world and ﬁndings in
this context will provide valuable insights for other emerging economies. Policy
implications for developing countries may be diﬀerent to developed countries as
the former face signiﬁcantly greater levels of pollution and challenges to regulation
enforcement, due to their institutional contentions (Greenstone and Hanna, 2014;
Oliva, 2015). We also have little evidence of how amenities such as air quality is
valued in developing countries (Freeman et al., 2017; Zheng et al., 2011; Zheng and
Kahn, 2017). Lastly, avoidance behavior such as migrating away from high pollution
areas may be more costly in the developing world for institutional reasons or lack of
transport infrastructure and information, which could exacerbate adverse regional
shocks (Morten and Oliveira, 2016).
China undergoes two unique policy reforms in its environmental and migration
regulations at comparatively the same time. This enables the possibility of learn-
ing both the productivity and amenity eﬀects of environmental regulation on its
local economies. In around 1998, China implements the Air Pollution Prevention
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and Control Law (APPCL), marking the state's ﬁrst serious eﬀort to regulate pol-
lution. The state council sets out a national air quality standard in APPCL for
all prefectures to achieve. Prefectures with worse air quality at the time of im-
plementation would face more stringent regulation in the following years. While
intensity of pollution regulation is often diﬃcult to measure (e.g., Greenstone and
Hanna, 2014), in this case a prefecture's existing level of SO2 pollution serves as a
reasonable proxy for the regulation intensity it will face (Shi and Xu, 2018). This
assumption is also supported by statistical evidence. Shortly after, in 2000, China's
labor mobility restrictions (hukou system), which previously curtail internal migra-
tion, begins to relax (Au and Henderson, 2006a). This reform essentially reduces
migration costs, making it possible for people to move to prefectures where they
are better oﬀ. Changes in city sizes and local employment between 2000 and 2010,
therefore, reveal both the potential productivity eﬀect of APPCL and the amenity
eﬀect of diﬀerent air quality across space.
To formalize the above discussion, I lay out a Rosen-Roback style spatial equilib-
rium model based on Moretti (2011) and Allcott and Keniston (2014). Under this
framework, eﬀects on the local economy are measured in terms of changes in pre-
fecture population and employment. The implementation of APPCL is captured by
reduction in productivity. Reform in labor mobility that reduces migration costs,
modeled as an increase in eligible social beneﬁts Tombe and Zhu (2017), allows
population and employment changes across space to occur from initially sharply re-
stricted starting points. I focus on heterogeneous workers of two skill types: high and
low-skilled workers employed by diﬀerent sectors who have skill-speciﬁc valuation
of amenity and migration costs1. As APPCL stringency positively correlates with
existing air pollution levels, it aﬀects local population and employment when migra-
tion costs are lowered via two channels in the Roback terminology. The ﬁrst channel
relates to variation in air pollution itself. Workers are more likely to sort to places
with better amenity (e.g., cleaner air) in light of reduction of migration costs. This
1While both heterogeneous tastes for amenity and migration costs by skill are backed by existing literature and
actual policy, the assumption that high- and low-skilled workers have no overlap in sector is extreme. However,
relaxing this assumption will not change the main messages from the model. Adhering to it allows me to keep the
model simple and straightforward. In fact, less than 5% of the workforce in the industrial sector is documented to
have college degrees and above.
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channel is more salient for high-skilled workers, because of their relatively higher val-
uation of air quality and consistently lower migration cost. The second is through
the productivity channel. APPCL imposes higher costs on SO2-polluting ﬁrms, and
more so on those in heavier polluted prefectures. Prefectures with higher pollution
levels at the start of APPCL, relative to their less polluted counterparts, receive a
negative productivity shock. This lowers local employment, particularly in the pol-
luting sector. The resulting adverse labor demand shock worsens the employment
outlook for low-skilled workers locally. Depending on the relative strengths of their
migration costs and idiosyncratic preferences for home location, low-skilled work-
ers may subsequently reallocate to the non-polluting sector in the same prefecture,
other prefectures less aﬀected by APPCL, or remain unemployed.
By empirically testing the above discussion, the main identiﬁcation challenge I
face is the non-random distribution of local pollution levels. A prefecture's air qual-
ity is frequently correlated with its level of economic activity (Chay and Greenstone,
2003). Heavily polluted places tend to be more developed or industrialized, and may
have endogenously distributed industry compositions. Moreover, development and
particularly urbanization can lead to further heavier air pollution (Zheng and Kahn,
2013), raising concerns of reverse causality. Therefore, comparing prefectures with
non-randomly distributed air pollution levels and regulation intensity would lead to
bias.
I extend the literature by constructing a novel instrument of power plant suit-
ability to capture a location's likelihood to pollute heavily. Thermal power plants
contribute to over 40% of China's SO2 emissions (Lu et al., 2010), while electricity
distribution and pricing are centralized. Two prefectures with comparable economic
characteristics may diﬀer substantially in their ambient SO2 levels simply due to
one hosting a thermal power plant and the other does not. However, the actual
power plant locations may still be endogenous for reasons such as political nepo-
tism. Therefore I construct a measure of a location's suitability for hosting thermal
power plants by borrowing from engineering literature. This suitability index is a
nonlinear transformation of a given location's characteristics, including measures of
its elevation, slope, access to water, distance to rail and so on. The nonlinear trans-
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formation of these factors is determined from the engineering considerations based
on their relative importance in power plant construction. In order to compute this
index, I draw together a large set of remote sensing data that jointly produce spatial
accuracy of nine by nine square kilometers.
The suitability index strongly predicts the actual thermal power plant locations,
through which its predictive power of local ambient SO2 levels is established. No-
tably, the exogeneity of this instrument comes from the nonlinear transformation
and weights applied to each factor of its composition, rather than the factors them-
selves. This functional form determines the importance of each factor for building
thermal power plants solely from engineering considerations, while some of the fac-
tors themselves may still be endogenous to the economic outcomes of a location.
Therefore in the analysis, I take several measures to ensure the validity of using this
suitability measure as an instrumental variable. The ﬁrst step I take is to further
control for three sets of variables. The ﬁrst is a set of local economic characteris-
tics including existing transport infrastructures, share of agricultural employment,
etc. They control for key initial diﬀerences across prefectures. The second set in-
cludes other amenity measures that are not factors in the computation of power
plant suitability, such as annual average temperature and wind speed. The last
set of variables are components of the suitability index that could potentially have
economic inﬂuences themselves. For example, having access to water is crucial to
building thermal power plants for cooling. As proximity to waterways is commonly
considered as a contributor to local economic growth, I include distance to large
rivers and coasts as additional controls in the analysis. The inclusion of these three
sets of variables minimizes threats to the instrument for meeting the criterion of
exclusion restriction.
I conduct falsiﬁcation and sensitivity tests conditional on the above covariates.
The set of falsiﬁcation tests show that prefectures with higher suitability values
do not have pre-existing growth advantage in terms of prefecture sizes, high-skilled
workers, or manufacturing and overall employment. Analysis using an alternative
computation of the instrumental variable, where only relatively non-economic factors
are included, conforms with baseline estimates. Moreover, key results are also robust
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to using the classic air pollution instrumental variable, thermal inversion (e.g., Arceo
et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2017; Jans et al., 2014; Sager, 2016), which is subject to
diﬀerent spatial variation from power plant suitability. Further sensitivity tests, from
dropping samples in the bottom quartile of SO2 pollution distribution to additionally
controlling for pre-regulation industrial compositions, all show consistent results
aligning with the baseline.
The main ﬁndings of this paper are the following. Prefectures with 10% higher
pollution see their high-skilled population decline by 1% between 2000 and 2010 as
migration costs fall. The migration reform enables high-skilled workers to sort more
easily across space based on their preferences, in particular air quality diﬀerences.
On the other hand, a 10% higher local pollution, implying more stringent regulation
under APPCL, causes local secondary industry employment to decline by 1.6%.
While the secondary sector employs mostly low-skilled workers, this reduction in
employment however does not translate into reduction in its population. As informed
by the model, it is highly likely that migration costs for low-skilled workers remain
relatively high even after the migration reform. As the high-skilled workers account
for less than 10% of the overall population for an average prefecture, declining high-
skilled population in these prefectures does not lead to substantially diﬀerent city
sizes.
To further investigate the regulatory impact on employment, I turn to industrial
ﬁrm survey data which allows for detailed analysis by ﬁrm ownership type and
SO2 polluting intensity. Estimation results show that the employment reduction
eﬀect of APPCL concentrates in the heavy SO2-polluting industries. Meanwhile,
employment in local non-polluting industries increases slightly, but not enough to
oﬀset the overall negative impact on the secondary sector. A further break down by
ownership shows that the state-owned sector bears the brunt of regulatory impacts.
This heterogeneity by ownership shows non-uniform regulatory stringency across the
distribution of ﬁrm size.
Findings in this paper connect to the literature on the impact of environmental
regulations on local economies. This paper provides developing country evidence,
where there is a growing demand for environmental regulations under diﬀerent po-
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litical contexts. Previous studies on APPCL have focused on its adverse eﬀects on
ﬁrms' export production (e.g., Hering and Poncet, 2014; Shi and Xu, 2018), whereas
here I consider its impact on local employment. In comparison to environmental
regulation eﬀects in developed countries, the adverse labor market shock shown in
this paper is smaller in magnitude (e.g., Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone,
2002). This is perhaps related to various contextual diﬀerences in developing coun-
tries and especially quality of institution, as discussed in Greenstone and Hanna
(2014). In China during this period of study, APPCL implementation did not alter
prefectures' relative ranking in pollution severity. Whereas for example, the impact
on air quality of the Clean Air Act in the US is immediate and substantial (Auﬀham-
mer et al., 2009; Henderson, 1996). This ineﬀectiveness of environmental regulations
in developing countries partially explains the smaller adverse impact estimated in
this paper.
With the unique setup of China's mobility reform, I am able to consider the
overall impact of regulatory shocks on local economies when migration costs fall2.
The lack of reallocation across space from low-skilled workers whose labor market
outcomes are adversely aﬀected by environmental regulations, implies that one or
more of the following are true: they still face high mobility costs; they have strong
preferences for their hometown; they have low valuation for air quality. Existing
ﬁndings in the literature lean toward the explanation of high mobility costs (Au
and Henderson, 2006b; Tombe and Zhu, 2017). With limited employment realloca-
tion from polluting to non-polluting industries locally, lack of mobility across space
further aggravates the adverse labor demand shock stemming from environmental
regulations. This contributes to welfare loss additional to the loss of agglomera-
tion productivity beneﬁts as the hukou system restricts Chinese city sizes (Au and
Henderson, 2006a).
On the other end of the skill distribution, high-skilled workers whose employment
situation is largely unaﬀected by pollution regulations are able to move to where
they are better oﬀ once migration costs reduce. This is consistent with the exist-
ing literature that high-skilled workers value amenity such as air quality, in both
2The recent work on this topic in China has focused solely on the amenity channel of how air quality diﬀerences
aﬀect migration choices after hukou reform (e.g., Chen et al., 2017a; Freeman et al., 2017; Zheng et al., 2011).
124
developed and developing countries alike (Chay and Greenstone, 2003; Chen et al.,
2017a; Currie and Neidell, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2001; Heblich et al., 2016; Lin, 2018;
Schlenker and Walker, 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
details of the two policy reforms, APPCL and hukou, in light of the existing liter-
ature. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework to outline the factors and
channels at work. Sections 4 discusses the research design and data while Section 5
present estimation results and discussion. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 SO2 and APPCL
The air pollutant of focus in this paper is sulfur dioxide (SO2). SO2 is the major
by-product of burning fossil fuels such as coal by power plants and related industrial
facilities. High levels of SO2 in the air is harmful to the human respiratory system.
It is also a primary precursor of acid rain that damages agricultural land, forests,
buildings, and overall ecosystem. When interacted with other compounds in the
atmosphere, it contributes to the formation of haze and particulate matter (US
Environmental Protection Agency, 2017a,b). SO2 pollution in China is a serious
issue because around 80% of its electricity is generated by coal on an annual basis
prior to 2010 (EIA, 2013).
Given the severity of SO2 pollution and its adverse health impacts, China's ﬁrst
serious environmental regulation, Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (AP-
PCL), targets SO2 reduction and focuses on the usage of coal. Coal mines of high
sulfur content are to be shut down and new mines can only be commissioned for low-
sulfur coal. Main coal users including coal-ﬁred power plants and factories in heavy
SO2 polluting industries are required to burn coal with low sulfur content, upgrade
boilers and kilns, and treat euent gas. Those with ineﬃcient technology are shut
down. Such policy instruments added input and operation costs to related indus-
tries. World Bank (2003) shows that high-sulfur coal is 50% cheaper than low-sulfur
coal. Upgrading equipment and treating pollutant can also add costs. For example,
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Becker and Henderson (2000) estimate such increase in average cost is as high as
17% from the Clean Air Act in the US. In addition to the above requirement, emis-
sion charges are also levied on extremely heavy polluters, and in 2003 generalized
to all discharges of pollutants (Goulder, 2005). The above details of APPCL show
that it is reasonable to conceptualize its implementation as an adverse productivity
shock to ﬁrms.
As part of China's 9th Five Year Plan (1996-2000), APPCL sets out a national
air quality standard for all prefectures to achieve. APPCL implementation formally
starts in 1998, meaning more polluted prefectures at the time will face more stringent
regulations going forward. This allows me to use prefecture's existing level of SO 2
pollution as a reasonable proxy for the regulation intensity it will face, similar to that
in Shi and Xu (2018). While the above regulation details apply to all prefectures
across China, the State Council further designates 175 prefectures known as the Two
Control Zones (TCZ's)3 for direct supervision. These TCZ prefectures contributed
to around 60% of SO2 emission in China at the time (Hao et al., 2001).
3.2.2 SO2 emission and pollution trends
While the eﬃcacy of APPCL in improving SO2 pollution is beyond the scope
of this paper4, a few facts about its trends following APPCL implementation are
important for identifying its eﬀects on the local economy. Firstly, national SO2
emissions in China decreases following APPCL implementation, although its time
trend ﬂuctuates a lot. In ﬁgure 3.1, yearly time trends of SO2 emission levels for
China, US, and EU 33 are shown with emission numbers normalized to their 1990
values within each group of countries. The two brief declining periods in China's
SO2 emissions starting in 1998 and 2007 both follow the timing of APPCL regula-
tions: 1998 is the beginning of APPCL implementation, and 2007 is two years after
the State Council announces amendments to APPCL5. To highlight the contextual
3The two in TCZ means high in SO2 pollution or acid rain frequency. These TCZ prefectures are identiﬁed
based on their SO2 emission records, annual and daily average ambient SO2 concentrations at the time.
4For multi-disciplinary evidence, please refer to Li et al. (2010); Ma and Takeuchi (2017); Schreifels et al. (2012);
Tan et al. (2017); Xu (2011)
5The detailed amendments are the following. All existing regulatory terms were strengthened. Most emission
reduction targets termed as expected in the 1998 APPCL amendments became compulsory, and their compliance
linked directly to local political oﬃcers' promotion perspective (China Central Committee, 2006). SO2 emission
targets were set more speciﬁc for each province with emphasis on power sector and manufacturing ﬁrms in heavily
polluting industries. Pollution levy tripled to 1.26 RMB/kg for SO2 (Cao et al., 2009). Additionally, all coal-ﬁred
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diﬀerences in emission levels and regulations between emerging economies and de-
veloped countries, I compare China's national SO2 time trend to those of the US
and the EU 33 countries in ﬁgure 3.1. The latter two are both on steady decline
between 1990 and 2010, when they are subject to respective air pollution regula-
tions6. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the degree of SO2 pollution and
the eﬃcacy of regulation are diﬀerent in this context for emerging economies and
may not be directly comparable to evidence based in developed countries.
To further explore the eﬀect of APPCL on SO2 pollution levels, I turn to time
trends at the prefecture level. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 take a closer look at prefecture
ambient SO2 levels between 1998 and 2010 by their Two Control Zone status. Figure
3.2 shows kernel density plot of ambient SO2 levels by TCZ status in 1998 and 2010.
The observation is that all prefectures become more polluted over this period, and
the relatively more polluted in 1998 remain so in 2010. To closer examine any
diﬀerences in trends by TCZ status, ﬁgure 3.3 is a convergence plot of SO2 change
between 1998 and 2010 based on their initial pollution levels. Both groups show
greater decline in the change of SO2 levels for prefectures that were more polluted
within the groups. In particular, TCZ prefectures show small but signiﬁcant decline
in their change of SO2 levels, potentially due to the regulation.
Lastly, ﬁgure 3.4 shows the relative decline in the change of SO2 levels in TCZ
prefectures shown in ﬁgure 3.3 is not enough to alter the ranking of prefectures
based on their relative pollution levels in both 1998 and 2010. The rate at which
almost all prefectures become more polluted is not too diﬀerent to change how
polluted they are relative to each other. Therefore throughout this paper, I focus
on 1998 SO2 pollution levels, rather than the change between 1998 and 2010, for
that a prefecture's relative ranking of pollution levels is what matters in APPCL
implementation stringency or people's migration choices.
power plants are required to install the Flue-Gas Desulfurization (FGD) system  SO2-scrubbing equipment  and
keep its operating rate above 90% of the time to avoid potential ﬁnes US Environmental Protection Agency and
China State Environmental Protection Administration (2007).
6The US and EU 33 countries have reduced over 60% SO2 emission between 1990 and 2010.
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3.2.3 The Hukou system and its impact on labor mobility
Another key piece of policy change in around 1998 was China's reform of its hukou
restrictions that relaxed internal labor mobility. The hukou system works similarly
to an internal passport system. When a Chinese citizen is born, he or she inherits
a local citizenship tied to his or her mother's hukou place of residence (as speciﬁc
as to neighborhood subdistrict, jiedao). This citizenship entitles the individual to
either a rural or an urban status, which is a direct inheritance of whether or not
one's ancestors are peasants. This dichotomy of legal status, along with locational
diﬀerentials, determine one's rights to housing, schooling, job opportunities, health
care, and even grain ratios prior to 1990s (Chan, 1994).
As one's legal rights are so strictly tied with his or her hukou location and status,
China's internal migration is strongly restricted through the hukou system. Prior to
2000, changing one's hukou status or to move across locations legally is very diﬃcult.
The rare channels are through job assignments after university education, or job
relocation within the government and large state owned enterprises, or marriage, etc.
Each means comes with high friction and monetary cost. People could otherwise
move illegally as unregistered migrant or legally but temporarily, and in both cases
they are entitled to zero or little local public provision at the receiving place (Au and
Henderson, 2006b). Therefore, such inﬂexibility hugely disincentives anyone from
moving and local labor supply is largely inelastic.
The gradual hukou reform beginning in around 2000 substantially relaxes (but
does not eliminate) hukou restrictions, and internal migration grows in scale. This
relaxation allows people to relocate with legal rights to local employment and hous-
ing. However, access to other social beneﬁts varies by skill. Those with university
degree and above can relocate their hukou with relative ease. This means full ac-
cess to the local social beneﬁts. However, access to social beneﬁts is limited for
low-skilled workers, e.g., health care, schooling for their children, etc. (Chan, 2013).
There is also spatial heterogeneity that prefectures with higher political hierarchy
such as Beijing and Shanghai have greater restrictions even after hukou reform.
Hence in this paper, hukou reform is treated as a skill biased reduction in migra-
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tion cost from 1998 to 2010. The amenity channel through which the variation in
air quality is then more salient for high skilled workers because of their lower mo-
bility cost and higher valuation of amenity. Whereas for low-skilled workers whose
valuation of amenity is potentially lower, hukou reform makes it possible to iden-
tify whether they sort across places when their employment outlook is negatively
aﬀected by APPCL.
3.2.4 Reform of state-owned enterprises
Another key piece of background information is on the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). As China begins its market reform in the late 1970s, reform over SOEs
also starts and its timing brieﬂy overlaps APPCL implementation. Background
information on the state-owned sector is hence important for understanding the
heterogeneous eﬀects of APPCL implementation by ownership types, if any.
The reform of SOEs began soon after China's market reform, but it was not until
the mid-1990's that serious reinforcement actions had taken place. Measures such
as ﬁnancial support, layoﬀs, buy-out and action against corporate insolvency were
implemented to help SOEs become proﬁtable (OECD, 2009). Existing work docu-
ments large scale of privatization of SOEs across all ﬁrm sizes and industries between
1997 and 2001 (Fang, 2002; Jeﬀerson and Su, 2006). Rawski (2002) estimates 6 out
of 44 million state industrial workers loses their jobs during this time.
During my sample period, data shows that the privatization of state owned ﬁrms
continued throughout 1998 to 2007. State's share of ﬁrm count reduced from 35%
to 4% while private's grew from 29% to 77% between 1998 and 2007. Meanwhile,
state's share of value-added shrank from 47% to 20% and private's increased from
28% to 59%. The reversing trends of their economic importance are crucial for
interpreting estimation results.
3.3 Theoretical framework
The simple theoretical model presented here aims to formalize the relationship
between prefecture-level ambient SO2 pollution and local growth prospects in the
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context of China's policy changes on environmental regulation and labor mobility. It
follows largely the works of Moretti (2011) and Allcott and Keniston (2014). There
are two prefectures, c ∈ {a, b}. Workers have skill types either high or low k ∈ {h, l}.
Each prefecture has two labor-intensive production sectors, j ∈ {m, s}. m represents
the non-SO2 polluting sector and s for SO2-polluting sector. Both sectors employ
low-skilled workers (at skill level l). Additionally, there is a skill-intensive sector f ,
employing workers of skill level h. All three goods are internationally traded and
have exogenously determined prices Pm, Ps, and Pf = 1.
There are two time periods. t = 1 is the initial state, when both prefectures are
the same in every aspect except for their air quality, Ac1. Suppose that prefecture
a has worse ambient SO2 pollution, so Aa1 < Ab1. This diﬀerence is assumed to
be exogenous here and will be instrumented for in the empirical exercise. There is
no regulation over air pollution in t = 1. Labor mobility is greatly restricted under
hukou regulation so in this period the spatial equilibrium is curtailed by extremely
high skill biased migration costs.
In the second time period, t = 2, regulation over hukou is relaxed and migration
cost is lowered for everyone, although its skill biased property remains. Meanwhile,
environmental regulation is implemented. The SO2-polluting sector s faces higher
costs, captured by decrease in productivity. In particular, the SO2-polluting sector
in prefecture a is regulated more stringently as it has higher initial ambient SO2
level. Prefecture-level productivity is hence lowered more in a than b.
3.3.1 Production
Demand for low-skilled workers
Each sector j ∈ {m, s} has a composite ﬁrm employing N ljc low-skilled workers





1−γ, where γ ∈ (0, 1). X ljc is revenue produc-
tivity7, and change in X lsc will be used to capture cost of APPCL regulation in
the polluting sector. Low-skilled workers have homogeneous productivity and hence
wage level is equalized across the two sectors m, s within a prefecture. Firms in
a given labor-intensive sector have proﬁt equation Πljc = R
l
jc −W lcN ljc. Assuming
7Revenue productivity by deﬁnition is Xljc = PjΩ
l
jc, price of the product times and physical productivity.
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that workers are paid their marginal productivity, ﬁrm proﬁt maximization gives
the wage equation: W lc = (1 − γ)X ljc(N ljc)−γ. Rearranging it obtains demand of

































Demand for low-skilled workers in prefecture a relative to prefecture b is then:
nla − nlb = −
1
γ
(wla − wlb) + (x˜a − x˜b) (3.1)
Relative demand of low-skilled workers in prefecture a will be higher if its relative
wage for low-skilled workers is lower and their relative productivity is higher.
Demand for high-skilled workers
For simplicity, the skill-intensive sector f is similar to m, s except for the skill






1−γ. Therefore, the relative labor demand for high-skilled workers
in prefecture a is:
nha − nhb = −
1
γ
(wha − whb ) +
1
γ
(xhfa − xhfb) (3.2)
3.3.2 Housing market
Following Moretti (2011), I assume that the number of housing units in prefecture
c equals to the number of workers with housing supply elasticity of g: phc = g ln(N lc+
Nhc ) + g0. 1/g is thus the price elasticity of housing supply. Although the local
labor markets are segregated by skill, the housing market is not. The housing price
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diﬀerence between a and b is:








) = g(na − nb) (3.3)
The implication is straightforward that the relative housing price of a prefecture will
be higher as more people move in.
3.3.3 Consumers and workers
Individuals decide where to live and how much to consume by supplying 1 unit
of labor. A representative individual consumes Cim, Cis, Cif , Cih units of labor-
intensive polluting, non-polluting, and skill-intensive goods, as well as housing.
Their utility also depends on amenity, Ac, for which in this paper I focus on variation
of local SO2 level. I also incorporate the idiosyncratic taste term Eic from Moretti
(2011) to have imperfect labor mobility throughout. Both Ac and Eic are skill-
speciﬁc. Speciﬁcally, high-skilled workers value air quality more than low-skilled
workers.
In order to incorporate migration costs that realistically describe the eﬀect of
hukou, I introduce a wage multiplier termDkc to consumer budget constraint. D
k
c ≥ 1
represents the diﬀerence in local social beneﬁts one receives at their hukou prefecture
c relative to the non-hukou city. This is similar to that in Tombe and Zhu (2017) but
instead of a ﬂow measure I model it as sunk cost. In period 1, Dkc decreases to 1 if
an individual migrates to their non-hukou prefecture and forgo all the social beneﬁts
they get at their hukou prefecture. This term is again skill-biased to capture the
fact that migration costs imposed by hukou have always been lower for high-skilled
workers (i.e., Dlct > D
h
ct). In t = 2, hukou reform reduces migration costs for both
skill types so that Dkc2 < D
k
c1.














subject toW kc D
k
c−PmCim−PsCis−PfCif−PhcCih ≥ 0, with α, β, λ, 1−α−β ∈ (0, 1).




c −αphc− βps−λpm + akc + ekic plus some
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constant. Individual with hukou in prefecture a is indiﬀerent between prefectures a
and b if ukia = u
k
ib, which is equivalent to:
wka − wkb = α(pha − phb)− (aka − akb )− (ekia − ekib)− dka
By assuming that ek is distributed type I extreme value with scale parameter (sk)2
where sk ∈ (0,∞), we have ekia − ekib = −sk(nka − nkb ). As deﬁned in Moretti (2011),
s characterizes the degree of labor mobility based on preference. Larger s means
that workers have stronger attachment to their current location and are therefore
less likely to migrate. Further combining with equation 3.3, we obtain the relative
labor supply in prefecture a:
nka − nkb =
1
sk
[(wka − wkb )− αg(na − nb) + (aka − akb ) + dka] (3.4)
For both skill types, the relative labor supply in prefecture a will be higher if its
relative wage is higher, housing cost is lower, and air quality is better. Additionally,
better social beneﬁts that workers receive in their hukou prefecture dkc is the oppor-
tunity cost to migrate. Lastly, these eﬀects are scaled by skill-speciﬁc preference
sk.
3.3.4 Equilibrium conditions
Spatial equilibrium under hukou restriction
In the labor market equilibrium, there is equalization within skill type between
the prefecture-level labor demand and supply. Combining equations 3.1, 3.2 and
3.4, we obtain population diﬀerences between a and b by skill type in period 1:
low-skilled: (nla − nlb)t =
1
γ + sl
[γ(x˜a − x˜b)t − αg(na − nb)t + (ala − alb)t + dlat]
(3.5)
high-skilled: (nha − nhb )t =
1
γ + sh
[(xhfa − xhfb)− αg(na − nb)t + (aha − ahb )t + dhat]
(3.6)
As standard Roback models would suggest, the population diﬀerence for both skill
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types is determined by diﬀerences in city-level productivity (positively), housing
cost (negatively), and amenity (positively).
Furthermore, equations 3.5 and 3.6 above highlight two key features. Firstly,
high-skilled workers value air quality more than low-skilled workers by assumption.
Thus the same diﬀerence in air quality will result in stronger eﬀects on popula-
tion diﬀerences in high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers, all else being equal.
Namely, (aha−ahb )t > (ala−alb)t since prefecture a is assumed to have higher SO2 pol-
lution to begin with. Secondly and uniquely to the Chinese context, these standard
eﬀects driving population diﬀerences across prefectures are muted under the hukou
system due to the large discrepancy in social beneﬁts between hukou and non-hukou
locations that an individual is entitled to, dkct. The scale of this migration cost keeps
the actual relative population sizes of both skills in prefecture a artiﬁcially higher
than they otherwise would be if dkct = 0.
Employment in a given labor-intensive sector
Lastly, we are also interested in employment in diﬀerent sectors. From ﬁrm proﬁt
maximizing FOC, relative sectoral labor demand is nlja−nljb = − 1γ (wla−wlb)+ 1γ (xlja−
xljb). Substituting in relative equilibrium wage diﬀerence for low-skilled workers, we
can re-write it as:






[sl(x˜a − x˜b) + αg(na − nb)− (ala − alb)− dla]
(3.7)
Employment in a given sector j in prefecture a relative to b is therefore determined
by two main parts. Firstly, its within prefecture sectoral productivity aﬀects it
positively. The second term of the above equation is comprised of prefecture-level
characteristics. The relative strengths of these two forces determine the signing of
relative employment in a given labor-intensive industry.
APPCL implementation, air quality, and hukou reform
Going from t = 1 to t = 2, two things happen. Firstly, the implementation of
APPCL adds costs to sector s, reducing its productivity (Becker and Henderson,
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2000; Greenstone, 2002; Henderson, 1996; Shapiro and Walker, 2017). My analysis
based on a limited sample of ﬁrm panel data in the ﬁrst part of Appendix also
conﬁrms this productivity reducing impact of APPCL. In addition, this eﬀect is
dis-proportionally stronger in prefecture a than in prefecture b. This is because
prefecture a has higher initial ambient SO2 level and under more stringent regulation.
As a result, (x˜a − x˜b)1 = 0 > (x˜a − x˜b)2.
While existing literature on the US and EU countries show that air pollution
regulations could largely improve air quality, it is less straightforward in the case of
China with APPCL implementation as discussed in details in section 3.2.2. Recall
that ﬁgure 3.9 shows that the most polluted group of prefectures in 1998 experience
a small 2% decline in ambient SO2 in the decade following APPCL implementation,
while the rest of prefectures have no signiﬁcant convergence trends. Furthermore,
ﬁgure 3.10 shows that the relative ranking of prefectures in terms of air quality
hardly changed during this time. In other words, the more polluted prefectures in
1998 remained relatively more polluted in 2010. When air quality enters people's
migration choices, a prefecture's relative rather than absolute pollution level is what
matters. This translates into (aka − akb )1 = (aka − akb )2.
Lastly, hukou reform relaxes mobility for both skill groups, causing the gap of
social beneﬁts one receives between two locations to narrow, dkc2 < d
k
c1. The gap
between high- and low-skilled workers persists, i.e., dhct < d
l
ct. These assumptions
are consistent with the actual reform policies documented in section 3.2.3. As a
result, hukou reform allows the relative diﬀerences in productivity and amenity
channels to manifest more in t = 2. However, census data show that a decade after
hukou reform, the average prefecture level internal migrants share of population is
only about 10% in 2010 (table 3.14).
Relative changes over time
The discussion above allows us to now write out relative population in prefecture










[−αg∆(na − nb) + ∆dha], (3.9)




[−sl∆(x˜a − x˜b)− αg∆(na − nb) + ∆dla]. (3.10)
The relative change that applies to populations of both skill types is the reduction
of migration cost by hukou reform, ∆dka < 0. It allows workers to sort between
prefectures based on the initial diﬀerences, which is sharply curtailed due to high
initial migration cost. The eﬀects of productivity and amenity diﬀerences between
the two prefectures manifest stronger, particularly the diﬀerence in air quality for
high-skilled workers because of ahc > a
l
c.
3.3.5 Eﬀects of air pollution regulations in light of hukou relaxation
I now consider predicted eﬀects of APPCL regulation during the period of hukou
reform  that is, a decrease in prefecture a's polluting sector productivity, when
migration costs also decline.
Eﬀects on low-skilled workers
As discussed in section 3.3.4, the implementation of APPCL means that ∆(x˜a−
x˜b) < 0 and has a direct negative impact on the productivity of polluting sector,
which reduces demand for low-skilled workers in this sector (equation 3.1). Air pol-
lution regulation decreases local employment of low-skilled workers in the polluting
sector.
How the negative productivity eﬀect of APPCL on polluting sector translates to
changes in local population of low-skilled workers further depends on local housing
prices and migration costs (equation 3.8). The signing of housing price change is a
direct result of overall population change, which in turn is determined by changes
in the populations of low- and high-skilled workers and more importantly their
respective share.
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The next component is the decrease in migration costs as a result of hukou reform.
∆dla < 0 means that potential migration in t = 1 curtailed by high migration costs
then, if any, will partially manifest through reduction of migration costs in t = 2.
Lastly, these three terms above are scaled by sl and γ.
Equation 3.10 complements the picture. Part of the workers whose jobs are
aﬀected by APPCL will adjust to the non-polluting sector.
In summary, APPCL implementation reduces polluting sector employment in
prefecture a. Its impact on local population of low-skilled workers is moderated by
potentially lower housing price and sector adjustment to the non-polluting sector,
but also intensiﬁed by lower migration costs. Its precise signing will be informed by
the empirical work.
Eﬀects on high-skilled workers
Local employment prospects for high-skilled workers are not aﬀected by air pol-
lution regulation by assumption. As explained in section 3.3.4, APPCL did not
improve the relative ranking of air quality across prefectures by t = 2. Therefore,
changes in population of high-skilled workers come through the decrease in migration
costs, and moderated by changes in housing prices.
Equations 3.9 and 3.6 jointly imply that reduction in migration costs will decrease
high-skilled population in prefecture a, mainly driven by its worse air quality. Hukou
reform allows this preference to manifest in t = 2.
Eﬀect on overall population
The eﬀect on overall population depends on how the population of high- and low-
skilled workers are aﬀected, as well as their respective shares. It is also relevant in the
interpretation of results because local housing price is a function of its population.
I revisit this matter in the results section.
3.3.6 Two- to many-prefectures
The discussion so far is based on the two-prefecture scenario, with two otherwise
identical prefectures diﬀer in air pollution levels. There are 286 Han Chinese pre-
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fectures in total. Hence to generalize the eﬀect of air pollution regulation in light of
mobility relaxation, I consider the expectations of prefectures with high versus low
pollution levels. Let Ac ∈ {1, 0} denote prefecture c's initial SO2 pollution levels,
with 1 for high pollution level and 0 for low. It captures the only diﬀerence between
prefectures a and b, which is a proxy for APPCL regulation stringency and a direct
measure of air quality. Let Yc denote outcomes of interest at the prefecture level
(e.g., population of high-skilled workers) . ∆Yc is then change in the outcome be-
tween t = 1 and t = 2, such as ∆nka − ∆nkb . The outcome variables in 3.8 and 3.9
in the many prefectures case are therefore generalized to the diﬀerence in average
change in outcomes between the high and low air pollution groups of prefectures.
E[∆Yc|Ac = 1]− E[∆Yc|Ac = 0] (3.11)
Extending assumptions for equations 3.8 to 3.10, equation 3.11 (i.e., observed dif-
ference in outcomes) gives the average treatment eﬀect of air pollution regulation if
the group of low air pollution prefectures are valid counterfactuals for the group of
high air pollution.
However in reality, these assumptions are easily violated. Equation 3.11 in fact
can be written as: E[∆Yc|Ac = 1]−E[∆Yc|Ac = 0] = E[∆Y1c|Ac = 1]−E[∆Y0c|Ac =
1] + E[∆Y0c|Ac = 1] − E[∆Y0c|Ac = 0], where E[∆Y0c|Ac = 1] − E[∆Y0c|Ac = 0] is
the selection bias that would arise if the group of high pollution cities is directly
compared with the group of low pollution prefectures.
In the following section, I discuss my empirical strategy to tackle this challenge
in detail.
3.4 Research design and data
To illustrate the empirical challenges of estimating equation 3.11, consider the fol-
lowing OLS speciﬁcation depicting prefecture-level impacts of APPCL enforcement
during mobility reform:
ln(yi,2010)− ln(yi,2000) = ξ + ρ ln(SO2)i,1998 + φZ−1i + i. (3.12)
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where i denotes a prefecture. y is the outcome of interest, for example population
sizes of high-skilled workers or low-skilled workers. Decadal diﬀerence in log of
outcome variables, consistent with the setup in equations 3.8 to 3.11, cares for
time-invariant prefecture characteristics. SO2 is the prefecture-level ambient SO2 in
1998, capturing pollution levels in the ﬁrst period and serving as a proxy for APPCL
regulatory intensity that a prefecture i faces as well as a proxy for its air quality8.
It is analogous to Ac in equation 3.11 but as a continuous variable.
To best control for observable diﬀerences across prefectures, I include a vector of
prefecture-level characteristics, Zi. I use contemporaneous changes where possible,
and time invariant measures as best proxies. This includes change in high-skilled
population between 1990 and 2000 (prior to APPCL regulation and hukou reform),
contemporaneous changes in transportation network (rail and road), regional dum-
mies and prefecture political status dummies (provincial city or provincial capital),
distances to coast and major rivers, and 1995 share of employment in polluting in-
dustries. These variables account for pre-existing and contemporaneous factors that
tend to lead to diﬀerences in prefecture level productivity. Z also includes climatic
characteristics that may aﬀect local air pollution levels: average temperature, wind
speed, and precipitation.
While Zi's allow prefectures of varying pollution levels to be as comparable as
possible in terms of observed diﬀerences, unobserved characteristics could still pose
challenges for identiﬁcation. Variation in ambient SO2 across prefectures is far from
randomly distributed. For example, places that are more economically active tend
to pollute more in aggregate (Chay and Greenstone, 2003), and thus are more likely
to face stricter environmental regulation. Prefectures under more stringent APPCL
regulation due to their high levels of SO2 pollution could diﬀer in characteristics
unknown to researchers, such as institution quality that inﬂuence both pollution
level and economic prospects of prefectures.
8See sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.4 for discussions on why level rather than log change of SO2 level is used.
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3.4.1 Power plant suitability as IV
To address these endogeneity concerns, my research design uses power plant suit-
ability to instrument for its hosting prefecture's level of SO2 pollution. The suit-
ability measure is based on the engineering literature and it measures how suitable
a given location is for hosting thermal power plants subject to construction cost,
safety, and feasibility considerations.
This instrumental variable works well in the Chinese context based on several
useful attributes of coal-ﬁred power plants. The ﬁrst is their paramount role in
China's energy generation and coal consumption. Currently, over 70% of China's
electricity production is still from coal sources, according to the International Energy
Agency9. Secondly, around 50% of China's coal consumption is used by coal-ﬁred
power plants, in 2000 and 2007 consistently. Meanwhile, industrial production ac-
counts for another 40% and the rest is in domestic use or transportation (Lu et al.,
2010). As the main contributor to SO2 emission, coal-ﬁred power plants are hence
the key target for China's SO2 regulatory policies since late 1990s. Lastly, China
has separated its power generation and supply networks in 2002. Electricity is since
then produced locally, but distributed centrally by regional oﬃces. Therefore, ﬁrms
do not have the incentive to locate near thermal power plants for accessing cheap
electricity10.
However, these attributes of thermal power plants are not suﬃcient as there
could still be unobservable factors correlated to actual plant locations and economic
prospects of their hosting cities. Actual power plant locations could be driven by
political favoritism. It is possible that a coal-ﬁred power plant was strategically
placed to favor the local politician for his or her future career or nepotism mo-
tivations. These places and their incumbent ﬁrms can both be aﬀected by such
unobserved factors. Therefore in this paper, I take a step back and consider the
selection process of power plant hosting sites. I consult the engineering literature to
construct an index of coal-ﬁred power plant suitability as the instrumental variable
9Data sources: IEA statistics: China, People's Republic of: Electricity and Heat. Data accessed on August 16,
2017. The percentage of electricity generated by coal in 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2014 are: 71%, 78%, 77%, and 73%
respectively.
10They may still locate near thermal power plants for indirect reasons like access to coal source or transportation
networks. I address this particular concern in section 3.4.2.
140
for a prefecture's ambient SO2 level in 1998.
3.4.2 Construction of the IV
Measuring a location's suitability for hosting power plants is both well-researched
in the engineering literature (Barda et al., 1990; Choudhary and Shankar, 2012;
Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004) and widely applied in practice (e.g., the state of
Wisconsin has its own Common Power Plant Siting Criteria set by its Public Service
Commission). The literature and practical guidelines generally agree on factors to
be considered in the suitability measure such as topography, land use, water bodies,





where suitability for hosting thermal power plant at location j is computed as
weighted sum of rescaled value of factor k. Both the scaling function f and weights
w are factor-speciﬁc.
The exact formula I employ comes from an Iranian government commissioned
site selection project by Zoej et al. (2005). Table 3.1 lists the detailed weights for
each factor and their rescaling categories. For example, elevation of the location has
a weight of 0.06. Its exact values are reclassiﬁed to four scores, the higher the more
suitable. When the location has elevation between 0-1km, it's given a reclassiﬁed
score of 10; between 1-1.4km it's an 8; 1.4-1.8km gets a 4; above 1.8 is a 0. So the
total contribution of elevation to the suitability index of this location is 0.06 times
its reclassiﬁed value. This suitability index is therefore an aggregate of all these
information, stipulating whether a given location is suitable for building coal-ﬁred
power plants and how costly it will be from an engineering perspective.
In order to compute this suitability index for China, I collected the ﬁnest and
publicly available remote sensing data for all factors listed in Table 3.1. Appendix
Table 3.17 details information on data sources. Since the suitability index is a
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weighted aggregate of all layers of satellite data, the spatial resolution of the ﬁnal
product is that of the coarsest layer  0.08◦ × 0.08◦ in this case. In other words,
suitability index is computed for every 9× 9 km2 of China.
To assess relationships between power plant suitability, actual location, and pol-
lution, further spatial data is collected. Prefecture ambient SO2 density data are
derived from NASA satellite imageries (details in Table 3.17). They provide better
and more consistent coverage than ground measures, while both measures are shown
to share consistent trends (Chen et al., 2017a). Actual power plant locations are
collected from non-proﬁt coal monitoring website SourceWatch Coal Issues11. These
are geo-located based on oﬃcial addresses and checked against Google Map Satellite
imageries.
Figure 3.5a maps spatial distribution of the suitability index across Han China
in blue, with gray lines tracing out prefecture boundaries. The darker the blue
indicates greater suitability for hosting coal-ﬁred power plants. Additionally, Figure
3.5b maps the distribution of ambient SO2 density across China, with darker pixel
indicating more severe SO2 pollution in its area. Both parts of Figure 3.5 show
the precise location of coal-ﬁred power plants built by 1998. Visually, there is
clear spatial overlapping patterns between power plant suitability and their actual
locations, as well as the latter and SO2 pollution.
3.4.3 Identifying assumptions and supporting evidence
The link between this suitability index and local ambient SO2 density is es-
tablished through that it predicts coal-ﬁred power plant locations, which are the
biggest contributor to SO2 emission in China throughout the study period. Because
the analysis is carried out at the prefecture level, I compute the prefecture-level
mean of suitability as the instrument. The rationale is that while the suitability of
an individual pixel might be diﬃcult to detect for engineers and planners back in
the 90s, prefecture-level comparison in terms of their respective average suitability
would have been more readily available.
As the suitability index captures a location's probability, rather than actuality, of
11Accessed in June 2017.
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hosting coal-ﬁred power plants, it is more likely to meet the exclusion restriction than
actual power plant locations. Furthermore, to address the concern over constituting
factors of suitability having direct impact on local economy, these factors are time
invariant and ﬁrst diﬀerencing should mitigate this concern. Nonetheless, I include
all factors of this index linearly in the regression. The channel through which this
instrumental variable works is eﬀectively the set of weights and rescaling function
from the engineering literature. It is a valid instrument under the assumption that
the non-linear functional form of this index is orthogonal to treatment.
In the rest of this section, I formalize the estimation equations and provide sup-
porting evidence for the above assumptions.
First stage linkages
The ﬁrst stage is formulated as follows:
ln SO2i,1998 = α + βSuitabilityi + γX
−1
i + εi, (3.14)
where suitability at the prefecture-level is used to predict 1998 variation in ambient
SO2 density level. Everything else follows from equation 3.12. The linear forms of
constituting components of suitability index are additionally included in Xi. They
are: log average elevation, log number of raw energy ﬁelds (gas, oil, and coal),
dummy if near volcanoes, air ﬁelds, or earthquake spots, and urban area gas supply
coverage.
The prefecture-level economic variables are kindly shared by Baum-Snow et al.
(2017) from their work. The climatic measures are prefecture-level zonal compu-
tations from various NASA projects as documented in Table 3.17. The geographic
covariates are constituting factors of suitability index and are hence from the same
sources and computed as prefecture-level zonal averages. The only exception is
urban area gas supply coverage. While a relatively coarse map is used for its com-
ponents in suitability computation, its non-geocoded prefecture level measure in the
1999 China Urban Yearbook provides better quality for the regression.
To show that it is indeed through the likelihood of hosting coal-ﬁred power plants
that the suitability index predicts local ambient SO2, tables 3.2 to 3.5 statistically
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establish the various linkages between power plant hosting, ambient SO2 levels,
suitability, and Two Control Zone status at the prefecture level. Firstly, table 3.2
shows that prefectures hosting thermal power plants by 1998 pollute more, with and
without controlling for prefecture economic and climatic characteristics. Prefectures
hosting thermal power plants and those with higher generating capacity by 1998 have
higher ambient SO2 in 1998 (columns 1-3), as well as higher extreme NO2 levels
in 200512 (columns 4-6). NO2 is another major pollutant from coal-ﬁred power
generation. Results of similar patterns between SO2 and NO2 further help show
that the variation in ambient pollution comes from hosting thermal power plants.
Next, Table 3.3 establishes the link between suitability index and thermal power
plant hosting status. Columns 1-4 show that the higher the mean or top 25%
suitability of a prefecture, the more likely it would have been hosting a thermal
power plant by 1998, as well as one with higher generating capacity13. Columns 5
and 6 show a lack of such relationship in prefectures that started to host thermal
power plants between 1998 and 2010. By 2010, 204 out of 286 prefectures in the
sample are hosting power plants. This lack of association is partially because the
suitability index in use is computed with information collected prior to 2000. New
information related to power plants' suitability afterward could aﬀect site selection
from then on. Suitability index computed with information prior to 2000 is mainly
relevant for power plants built by 1998.
Lastly, Table 3.4 provides support for using 1998 ambient SO2 levels as valid
proxy for regulation stringency. Prefectures with higher ambient SO2 levels in 1998
are more likely to be listed as TCZ prefectures, which received stricter regulation
under APPCL amendments. This relationship remains robust across speciﬁcations
where diﬀerent sets of covariates are included.
These linkages are summarized in Table 3.5, where the ﬁrst-stage results are
presented. Both the mean and top quartile of city-level suitability index are strongly
predictive of ambient SO2 in 1998, as well as for NO2 levels in 2005 as a robustness
check.
122005 is the earliest year that NO2 measures are available with NASA.




Next, predicted SO2 is used to estimate causal eﬀects on the dependent variable:
ln(yi,2010)− ln(yi,2000) = η + κ ln ŜO2i,1998 + λX−1i + ui (3.15)
where everything follows from the OLS setting (equation 3.12) except that the
prefecture-level ambient SO2 is predicted by the ﬁrst stage (equation 3.14). The
outcome variables are population and employment measures from the 2000 and
2010 censuses, as well as employment and ﬁrm counts by ownership and pollutant
types aggregated from the Annual Medium- and Large-Enterprise Surveys between
1999 and 2007.
From census data, I compute the following main outcome variables: prefecture
population, high-skilled population (college degree and above), total employment
and employment by sector (primary, secondary14, and tertiary).
From the ﬁrm surveys, I compute industrial employment numbers as well as total
number of ﬁrms aggregated at the prefecture level. Although the coverage of this
dataset emits small ﬁrms whose annual sales are less than 5 million RMB (Brandt
et al., 2014), its rich details allow me to compute variables for checking heterogeneous
eﬀects. I deﬁne heavy and light SO2-emitting ﬁrms by their intensity of coal usage
according to 1997 Input-Output Table of China. The input-output table covers
106 3-digit secondary industries. I deﬁne the top 12 industries in coal usage (in
monetary value) as heavy users. Together they consume 70% of coal in China, while
each consume 2% and above. Additionally, sources of paid-in capital allow me to
distinguish state- and privately owned ﬁrms. Thus, heterogeneous eﬀects can be
examined for light versus heavy coal users, state versus privately owned ﬁrms, and
combinations of coal usage and ownership types.
Before turning to the results, it is important to show that variations in the instru-
ment do not correlate to pre-existing growth trends of cities that may themselves
aﬀect outcomes of interest. Table 3.6 runs 2SLS on long diﬀerences of several pop-
ulation and employment measures between 1982-1990 or 1990-2000. The predicted
14Secondary sector is industry plus raw material extraction.
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ambient SO2 levels in 1998 have eﬀectively zero impact on prior trends in prefec-
ture size, high-skilled worker population, or total employment and manufacturing
employment15. This falsiﬁcation test further substantiates the validity of this in-
strumental variable, as prefectures across the instrumented variation in 1998 SO2
pollution levels do not diﬀer in terms of population, skill composition, and local
labor market characteristics predating pollution regulations and hukou reform.
3.5 Results
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 ﬁrstly presents prefecture results based on census data. Next,
table 3.9 focuses on results in the secondary sector for analyzing the direct impact of
APPCL on ﬁrms. Heterogeneous eﬀects by coal usage and ownership types are pre-
sented. Last but not least, tables 3.12 and 3.13 present sensitivity tests to showcase
IV validity and robustness of main baseline outcomes.
3.5.1 Population and employment eﬀects
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show how prefecture population and employment are aﬀected
by local SO2 pollution levels and APPCL. Tables 3.7 ﬁrstly examines how changes
in employment between 2000 and 2010 by sector are aﬀected by APPCL implemen-
tation. As it lowers productivity in high SO2prefectures, which mainly aﬀects local
secondary industry, column 2 shows that indeed there is a large negative employ-
ment eﬀect on this sector. While China's industrial sector has been growing rapidly
between 2000 and 2010, a 10% higher local SO2 and hence stricter regulation leads to
a 1.6% adverse employment eﬀect on a prefecture's secondary sector. Equivalently,
a one standard deviation increase in 1998 log SO2 level, which is approximately a
114% increase in ambient SO2 levels (see table 3.14), leads to a reduction in lo-
cal secondary employment of around 11%. This estimate has the same sign but
much smaller magnitude than ﬁndings on the US Clean Air Act (Greenstone, 2002;
Walker, 2011). Part of this could be linked to regulation enforcement, as discussed
in section 3.2.2.
15For column 3 only, I drop change in population of college degree and above as it is the dependent variable.
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Meanwhile, columns 1 and 3 show that employment in primary and tertiary
sectors do not diﬀer across prefectures with diﬀerent pollution regulatory intensity.
In terms of national sectoral composition, primary and tertiary sectors account
for 51% and 26% of total employment in 2010, while secondary accounts for 22%
(see table 3.14). This composition potentially contribute to the lack of eﬀect on the
change of total employment in column 4. Nonetheless, the eﬀect shown on secondary
sectors suggests a strong job displacement brought about by APPCL regulation. The
next table provides answer to where the displacement goes, if not to other sectors.
Table 3.8 present results of changes in low-, high-skilled, and total population.
Column 1 shows a slightly negative but not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for changes
in low-skilled population. So far for low-skilled workers in highly regulated prefec-
tures, we see their employment decline in the secondary sector but their population
changes little. In light of equation 3.8, this translates to reduction in local pro-
ductivity being potentially oﬀset by αg∆(na − nb) and/or ∆dla, and/or being scale
down by sl. We know from the estimation results that overall population does not
change, implying little change in local housing price. That leaves the likely case of
which hukou reform did not substantially lower migration costs for the low-skilled
(i.e., ∆dla < 0 but of small magnitude), or that low-skilled workers have very strong
attachment to their hukou location (i.e., sl very large), and possibly a combination
of both. Existing evidence in the literature, notably from Au and Henderson (2006b)
and Tombe and Zhu (2017), leans toward the high migration costs on low-skilled
workers stemming from the hukou system even after its 2000 reform.
Column 2 of table 3.8 shows that once hukou reform happens, a 10% higher
ambient SO2 causes a prefecture's high-skilled population (university degree and
above) to decline by around 1%. As informed by equation 3.9, prefectures with
higher levels of pollution could not retain high-skilled workers once migration costs
decline. This is driven by their stronger preference for air quality being reﬂected
once migration costs go down. This eﬀect is consistent with ﬁndings in existing
literature that high-skilled workers in developing countries respond sensitively to
amenity diﬀerences such as air quality (e.g., Chen et al., 2017a). It is largely working
through the amenity channel of air quality as opposed to the productivity channel
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in labor market, because high-skilled workers account for a very small proportion
of total employment in industries directly aﬀected by APPCL16. Comparing the
non-eﬀects in falsiﬁcation tests (table 3.6) for decades prior to 2000, this sorting of
high-skilled population is made possible because of hukou reform.
Column 3 shows changes in overall population. Since the high- versus low-skilled
composition in an average Chinese prefecture has a ratio of roughly 1:9 (see table
3.14), it is not surprisingly to ﬁnd no eﬀect statistically on the overall population
change.
Panel B of these two tables show OLS estimates for outcomes parallel to their
panel above. These estimates show the necessity of using the IV strategy, as OLS
estimates would lead to diﬀerent conclusions in both signing and magnitude. For
example, the OLS estimates would suggest no eﬀect of APPCL on secondary employ-
ment. This upward bias as discussed in section 3.4 is related to that high pollution
prefectures may be more developed prior to APPCL implementation.
3.5.2 APPCL eﬀects on the secondary sector
Next, I turn to results based on the industrial surveys to examine heterogeneous
eﬀects by SO2-polluting intensity and ownership type. Table 3.9 exhibits several in-
teresting patterns. Firstly, column 1 shows changes in total secondary employment.
The estimate of -0.10% between 1999 and 2007 on secondary employment change
oﬀers a similar story to that from census data. Their magnitudes diﬀer, potentially
because industrial surveys leave out small ﬁrms in their sampling. This is important
to note while interpreting results based on the industrial survey.
Secondly, employment in heavy coal users (and hence SO2 polluting ﬁrms) in
highly polluted prefectures declines while light coal users (non-polluting ﬁrms) does
not. When further breaking down by ownership, state-owned ﬁrms are shown to be
the ones bearing the regulatory costs. While the state sector is on a general decline
nation-wide due to privatization, prefectures with 10% higher existing pollution and
facing stricter regulation see employment decrease by almost 5% in high SO2 pollut-
ing, state-owned industries. This is moderated by a slight increase of employment
16Based on my calculation from Chinese Household Income Project data, share of high-skilled workers in the
secondary industry is less than 5% in around this period of study.
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in state-owned light SO2-polluting ﬁrms (3% with marginal statistical signiﬁcance).
On the other hand, no signiﬁcant patterns is shown for privately owned ﬁrms.
These patterns suggest that not all ﬁrms are regulated equally under APPCL.
While this large adverse impact concentrated on the state-owned ﬁrms may seem
surprising given vast evidence in the literature showing favoritism toward them in
factor markets (e.g., Chen et al., 2017b; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009), existing research
on environmental regulations shows no convincing evidence for any ownership ad-
vantages by SOE. For example, Wang and Jin Yanhong (2007) show that state- and
privately owned polluting ﬁrms behave similarly under regulation.
Two plausible explanations come from the enforcement side, rather than diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrm behaviors by ownership. The ﬁrst reason relates to limited resources
in environmental regulations. Becker and Henderson (2000) document non-uniform
enforcement of regulation across ﬁrm size in the US under the Clean Air Act. As a
result of limited regulatory resources, heavy polluters and hence large ﬁrms are usu-
ally the targets of regulation whereas small polluters are not monitored as closely.
This oﬀers a good explanation for the patterns shown here. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show
kernel density of ﬁrm size for state versus privately owned ﬁrms in heavy and light
SO2 polluting industries respectively. State owned ﬁrms in the heavy SO2 polluting
industries are much larger in size compared to privately owned ﬁrms, and this pat-
tern is consistent over time in 1999 and 2007. For non-polluting industries, however,
ﬁrm size distributions are much more similar across ownership types. Therefore, it is
likely that state-owned ﬁrms in heavy polluting industries attract greater regulatory
attention simply because they are large and conspicuous in polluting activities.
The second explanation relates to the Chinese contexts. There is evidence that
the State in fact targets state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under APPCL implementa-
tion during this time as China undergoes its national privatization process (section
3.2.4). Heavy polluting SOEs are deemed unproductive by the State and need to be
eliminated. For example, a State Council 1999 announcement declares, SOEs that
waste resources, pollute heavily, employ outdated technologies need to be force into
bankruptcy and shut down (China State Council, 1999). Therefore, it is likely that
environmental regulations accelerated the downward employment shock on polluting
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SOEs during the national privatization.
3.5.3 APPCL eﬃcacy
To further ensure that the adverse employment shock comes from APPCL reg-
ulation, I make use of the annual frequency of industrial survey data. As shown
in ﬁgures 3.1 and discussed in section 3.2.2, China's total SO2 emission is on the
decline between 1998 and 2003, followed by sharp increase from 2003 to 2007 before
declining again. Given the coverage of industrial ﬁrm survey data between 1999 to
2007, I divide the change in outcomes into two periods: 1999-2003 and 2003-2007
in tables 3.10 and 3.11.
In table 3.10, I repeat employment results from 3.9 in panel A, and show the
divided two periods in panels B and C. Comparing changes in employment between
99-03 versus 03-07, it is clear that the negative labor market shock occurs during the
ﬁrst period, when SO2 pollution levels is kept stable by APPCL. Next, table 3.11
follows table 3.10 with total prefecture ﬁrm count (in log) as the dependent variable.
Unfortunately, I do not have measures of ﬁrm births and exits. Results here again
shows that the negative APPCL eﬀect concentrates in state-owned polluting ﬁrms
(column 4), and in particularly during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of APPCL implementa-
tion. It is worth noting that many point estimates here are positive, showing a
general increase in stock of ﬁrms across the board as the Chinese industrial sector
grows rapidly. Therefore, it is more signiﬁcant that the regulatory costs imposed by
APPCL slows down ﬁrm growth in the polluting industries.
3.5.4 Robustness checks
In Tables 3.12 and 3.13, I present comprehensive tests to exhibit the robustness
of the identiﬁcation strategy and results.
Table 3.12 checks the validity of the instrumental variable. With all key results
laid out across the columns, panel A re-prints the IV baseline estimates for com-
parison. Panel B removes the set of covariates that are themselves factors in the
suitability construction. Results only deviate slightly in the magnitude of point es-
timates. Their similarity suggests that this instrumental variable works through the
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weights assigned by engineers for each factor, rather than the factor values.
Panel C uses an alternative instrumental variable where the suitability measure
is constructed with a limited subset of factors, printed in bold in Table 3.1. This
alternative IV is hence based on factors that are less likely to have economic impacts
themselves. For example, distance to small rivers is kept while that to large rivers
is dropped. Arriving at close estimates in this panel shows that the most eﬀective
parts of the baseline IV are contributed by non-economic factors.
Panel D addresses the concern over whether the prefecture level mean of suit-
ability measure is a sensible choice. Results presented here use the top quartile of
suitability measure at the prefecture level as IV. Using the top quartile rather than
the mean shows a slightly better ﬁrst-stage F-stat, while the point estimates are
very similar.
On the other hand, table 3.13 explore the sensitivity of estimates across various
alternative speciﬁcations and treatment variables, with baseline results again printed
in panel A. Panel B excludes 25% of the sample that are in the bottom quartile of
1998 SO2 pollution level. This address the concern that some prefectures are too
clean and undeveloped for comparison. Using the top 75% of the sample arrives
at the same results, although point estimates are slightly larger in magnitude as
expected. Panel C includes the initial level of the outcome variable as covariate.
While including the initial level deals with concern over regression toward the mean,
it does not change the conclusion. Panel D answers the question that whether or
not initial industrial composition aﬀect baseline results. Having included 1995 share
of employment in heavy coal-usage industries, results are consistent while point
estimates vary slightly.
Panels E and F present estimates based on alternative treatment variables: two
control zone status dummy, and SO2 level in 2010. In Panel E, the TCZ dummy is
set to 1 if the prefecture has been listed as the key target prefecture by the State
Council in 1998, and 0 otherwise. This is a more direct treatment variable proxying
for regulatory cost imposed on relevant industries and prefectures. However its
binary nature is unable to capture for as much variation as a continuous variable
such as the 1998 SO2 level. Moreover, the TCZ status is not measuring regulation
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versus no regulation. Rather, it switches on for being on the State Council's list,
potentially facing stricter enforcement and closer monitoring than the rest. Lastly,
using 2010 SO2 levels in panel F reiterates the fact that the spatial variation of
ambient SO2 levels had not changed much between 1998 and 2010, a point made
earlier in section 3.4.
3.6 Conclusion
In the past decades, China went through rapid economic growth while its air
quality worsened drastically. As per capital income rises, more people may demand
for cleaner air. At such a turning point of the environmental Kuznets curve, the gov-
ernment would be under greater pressure to tighten up environmental regulations.
This is a common pattern also seen in many fast growing developing countries in
the recent decades.
The descriptive time trends in this paper show that China's eﬀort in curbing air
pollution began in 1998 had sustained SO2 pollution at a constant level, but only
for about ﬁve years. Since 2003, ambient SO2 pollution levels began to go up. While
the eﬀectiveness of APPCL in improving air pollution levels is beyond the scope of
this paper, the overall impact of environmental regulation is assessed.
My ﬁndings show that China's APPCL caused local manufacturing employment
in heavily polluted prefectures to decline. This impact is concentrated on ﬁrms in the
polluting industries, and particularly state-owned ﬁrms that are of larger ﬁrm size.
Some unemployment is reallocated to ﬁrms not aﬀected by APPCL (non-polluting
industries). However, the overall net eﬀect is negative. Moreover, low-skilled workers
aﬀected by APPCL are not reallocating to other prefectures, implying migration
costs could still be high for them. On the other hand, high-skilled workers whose
job prospects are unlikely to be aﬀected by APPCL migrate out of highly polluted
prefectures as migration costs fall. They value clean air and this loss of human
capital has long term implications for highly polluted prefectures.
Produce and pollution ﬁrst, clean up later is a frequent choice made by policy
makers. Low eﬃciency fuels are the cheaper way to generate energy and increase
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economic output, but the later cost of cleaning up and losing human capital can be
substantial. Notably, these costs are in addition to health costs of heavy pollution.
Findings in this paper also shed light on the distributional impacts of environ-
mental regulations and migration reform by skill. Low-skilled workers are the group
bearing the regulatory costs. The high migration costs they face further worsens
the adverse shock. Migration reform is biased toward those with college degree and
above, giving them easier access to places where they are better oﬀ.
Lastly, this environmental regulation is not uniformly enforced across ﬁrm size
and ownership. As a result of limited regulatory resources, larger ﬁrms become the
main target. There is also evidence to suggest that the State used environmental
regulation as a mean to eliminate ﬁrms with outdated technology, which is largely
SOEs in this case.
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Figure 3.2: Kernel density of ambient SO2 levels in 1998 and 2010 by TCZ prefectures
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Figure 3.3: Ambient SO2 change between 1998 and 2010 by TCZ status
Figure 3.4: Relative ranking of ambient SO2 levels between 1998 and 2010 by TCZ status
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(a) Coal-ﬁred power plant suitability and actual locations for those built by 1998








(b) Ambient SO2 density and coal-ﬁred power plant locations for those built by 1998
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Figure 3.6: Kernel density plot of ﬁrm size by ownership types, heavy SO2 polluters
Figure 3.7: Kernel density plot of ﬁrm size by ownership types, light SO2 polluters
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Tables
Table 3.1: Detailed weights for suitability index construction
Factor Sub-factor value Reclassify values
Elevation 0-1000 m 10
0.06 1000-1400 m 8
1400- 1800 m 4
>1800 m 0
Slope 0-6 % 10
0.05 6-10 % 7
>10 % 0
Road 0-500 m 0




Rail 0 - 500 m 0














Gas pipe line 0-500 m 0





Large river 0- 500 m 0
0.08 0.5 - 10 Km 10
10 - 20 Km 5
>20 Km 0
Small river 0- 500 m 0
0.07 0.5 - 10 Km 10
10 - 20 Km 5
>20 Km 0
Distance to earthquake spots 0-1km 0
0.05 >1km 10
Distance to volcanoes 0-1km 0
0.02 >1km 10
Distance to airﬁelds 0-5km 0
0.05 >5km 10
Distance to coal mines 0-5km 10
0.1 5-50km 5
> 50km 0




Table 3.2: Prefectures hosting thermal power plants by 1998 pollute more
Dependent variable: SO2 in 1998 max NO2 in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if hosting thermal power plants by 1998 0.605*** 0.269** 0.386*** 0.190***
(0.130) (0.108) (0.061) (0.055)
ln(thermal power generating capacity by 1998) 0.044*** 0.030***
(0.017) (0.008)
N 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 0.06 0.43 0.43 0.13 0.43 0.43
economic and climatic characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The pollutants are measured in log terms. Since power generating capacity is 0 for
prefectures not hosting any thermal power plants, this variable is calculated as the log of 1 plus the actual generating
capacity. City-level NO2 measure in use is the max pixel value within the city boundary (mean value gives identical
relationship). 2005 is the earliest year that this data is available with NASA. All regressions controlled for prefecture
economic and climatic characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Suitability and likelihood to host thermal power plants
Dependent variable: hosting power plants higher power capacity new power plants, 98-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prefecture suitability: mean 0.559*** 1.048*** -0.163
(0.184) (0.357) (0.227)
Prefecture suitability: top quartile 0.459*** 0.861*** -0.085
(0.164) (0.320) (0.193)
N 286 286 286 286 185 185
R2 0.23 0.23
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Columns 3 & 4 are OLS regressions while the rest is probit regression with
raw coeﬃcients. Since power generating capacity is 0 for prefectures not hosting any thermal power plants, this
variable is calculated as the log of 1 plus the actual generating capacity. Columns 5 & 6 restrict the sample to
cities not hosting thermal power plants by 1998. All regressions controlled for prefecture economic characteristics,
climatic characteristics, and mean values of all factors in the suitability computation. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table 3.4: Likelihood of being on the list of Two Control Zone cities
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.281*** 0.234*** 0.410***
(0.066) (0.077) (0.109)
Prefecture economic characteristics No Yes Yes
Prefecture climatic characteristics No No Yes
Prefecture geographic characteristics No No Yes
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is a dummy
that equals to 1 if on the list and 0 otherwise. All regressions are pro-
bit regressions with raw coeﬃcients reported. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Predictive power of suitability index on levels of main coal-ﬁring power
plant pollutants (IV ﬁrst stage)
Dependent variable: SO2 in 1998 NO2 in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prefecture suitability: mean 0.962*** 0.789***
(0.085) (0.069)
Prefecture suitability: top quartile 0.830*** 0.683***
(0.072) (0.058)
N 286 286 286 286
R2 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The pollutants are measured in log terms. NO2
data is available only from 2005 onward. All regressions controlled for prefecture
economic and climatic characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.6: Balancing tests using outcomes prior to treatment period 2000
Dependent variable: population pop high skill pop college employment manu emp
changes between 1982-1990 1982-2000 1990-2000 1982-1990 1982-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.019 0.033 -0.010 0.025 0.000
(0.014) (0.040) (0.031) (0.016) (0.045)
N 286 286 286 286 286
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 129.14 127.44 127.44
Mean of dependent variable 0.13 0.71 1.14 0.24 0.48
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The pollutants are measured in log terms. NO2 data is available
only from 2005 onward. All regressions controlled for prefecture economic and climatic characteristics.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Impact of APPCL and air quality on employment, 2000-2010
Employment: Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IV results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.007 -0.160*** 0.005 0.020
(0.022) (0.039) (0.017) (0.015)
N 286 286 286 286
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44
Mean of dependent variable -0.25 0.46 0.40 0.05
Panel B: OLS results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.043*** -0.027 0.028** -0.004
(0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.009)
N 286 286 286 286
R2 0.45 0.44 0.25 0.28
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions controlled for prefecture economic and climatic
characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.8: Impact of APPCL and air quality on population, 2000-2010
Population: Low-skilled High-skilled Total
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: IV results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.001 -0.102*** 0.010
(0.013) (0.021) (0.013)
N 286 286 286
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44
Mean of dependent variable 0.01 0.99 0.05
Panel B: OLS results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.013* -0.038*** -0.011*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006)
N 286 286 286
R2 0.24 0.39 0.38
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions controlled for pre-
fecture economic and climatic characteristics. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 3.9: Impact of SO2 regulation on industrial employment, 1999-2007
ownership type: all ﬁrms state-owned ﬁrms privately owned ﬁrms
coal usage intensity: all heavy light heavy light heavy light
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: IV results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.098** -0.188** 0.058 -0.478*** 0.308** 0.046 -0.102
(0.042) (0.079) (0.080) (0.159) (0.144) (0.119) (0.091)
N 286 286 286 283 286 281 285
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34 127.44 124.97 127.51
Mean of dependent variable 0.19 -0.05 0.22 -1.04 -1.51 1.45 1.55
Panel B: OLS results
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.039 -0.085** 0.009 -0.192** 0.139** -0.016 -0.106**
(0.030) (0.041) (0.029) (0.077) (0.065) (0.073) (0.048)
N 286 286 286 283 286 281 285
R2 0.38 0.14 0.41 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.11
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Industrial total employment and wage by SO2 polluting industry are derived
from the annual ﬁrm surveys. All regressions controlled for prefecture economic and climatic characteristics.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.10: Long changes in employment based on industrial surveys
ownership type: all state-owned ﬁrms privately owned ﬁrms
coal usage intensity: all heavy light heavy light heavy light
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 1999-2007
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.098** -0.188** 0.058 -0.478*** 0.308** 0.046 -0.102
(0.042) (0.079) (0.080) (0.159) (0.144) (0.119) (0.091)
N 286 286 286 283 286 281 285
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34 127.44 124.97 127.51
Mean of dependent variable 0.19 -0.05 0.22 -1.04 -1.51 1.45 1.55
Panel B: 1999-2003
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.038 -0.200** 0.102 -0.481*** 0.131 0.009 -0.038
(0.025) (0.080) (0.074) (0.134) (0.123) (0.120) (0.076)
N 286 286 286 285 286 281 285
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 126.39 127.44 124.97 127.51
Mean of dependent variable -0.05 -0.16 -0.03 -0.58 -0.76 0.85 0.95
Panel C: 2003-2007
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.060** 0.012 -0.044 -0.022 0.177** 0.030 -0.072
(0.029) (0.040) (0.029) (0.112) (0.089) (0.083) (0.058)
N 286 286 286 283 286 285 286
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34 127.44 127.51 127.44
Mean of dependent variable 0.24 0.11 0.25 -0.47 -0.74 0.61 0.61
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Long changes in net ﬁrm count based on industrial surveys
ownership type: all state-owned ﬁrms privately owned ﬁrms
coal usage intensity: all heavy light heavy light heavy light
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 1999-2007
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.177*** 0.139** 0.225*** -0.109 0.246*** 0.055 0.099
(0.049) (0.065) (0.051) (0.090) (0.065) (0.092) (0.070)
N 286 286 286 283 286 281 285
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34 127.44 124.97 127.51
Mean of dependent variable 0.62 0.42 0.61 -1.08 -1.65 1.72 1.85
Panel B: 1999-2003
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.054* 0.013 0.090*** -0.163*** 0.045 -0.014 0.045
(0.029) (0.042) (0.031) (0.058) (0.046) (0.084) (0.061)
N 286 286 286 285 286 281 285
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 126.39 127.44 124.97 127.51
Mean of dependent variable 0.13 0.04 0.13 -0.54 -0.77 0.92 1.03
Panel C: 2003-2007
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.123*** 0.126** 0.134*** 0.054 0.200*** 0.062 0.050
(0.039) (0.053) (0.039) (0.072) (0.057) (0.080) (0.047)
N 286 286 286 283 286 285 286
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34 127.44 127.51 127.44
Mean of dependent variable 0.49 0.39 0.49 -0.54 -0.88 0.81 0.82
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.12: IV validity checks
college edu total pop secondary emp employment coal emp coal emp state
00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 99-07 99-07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV baseline
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.102*** 0.010 -0.160*** 0.020 -0.188** -0.478***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.039) (0.015) (0.079) (0.159)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34
Panel B: excluding IV components as covariates
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.127*** -0.003 -0.143*** 0.006 -0.170** -0.416***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.037) (0.014) (0.075) (0.140)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 154.46 154.46 154.46 154.46 154.46 152.46
Panel C: IV constructed with limited geographic factors
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.103*** 0.010 -0.159*** 0.022 -0.183** -0.467***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.038) (0.015) (0.077) (0.154)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 139.00 128.14
Panel D: using top quartile suitability as instrument
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.115*** 0.012 -0.173*** 0.021 -0.178** -0.453***
(0.022) (0.013) (0.042) (0.015) (0.077) (0.149)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283




Table 3.13: Sensitivity tests
college edu total pop secondary emp employment coal emp coal emp state
00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 99-07 99-07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV baseline
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.102*** 0.010 -0.160*** 0.020 -0.188** -0.478***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.039) (0.015) (0.079) (0.159)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34
Panel B: excluding bottom quartile in 1998 SO2
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.093** 0.040* -0.322*** 0.052** -0.206* -0.582**
(0.039) (0.020) (0.067) (0.024) (0.114) (0.268)
N 214 214 214 214 214 211
First-stage F stat 87.49 87.49 87.49 87.49 87.49 78.54
Panel C: conditional on initial levels
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.095*** 0.003 -0.150*** 0.014 -0.111 -0.474***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.038) (0.014) (0.078) (0.177)
N 286 286 286 286 286 278
First-stage F stat 116.88 133.47 117.96 134.68 102.34 92.66
Panel D: exclude share of heavy polluting employment in 1995
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.094*** 0.009 -0.159*** 0.008 -0.152** -0.390***
(0.020) (0.013) (0.037) (0.014) (0.077) (0.151)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 132.64 132.64 132.64 132.64 132.64 124.16
Panel E: treatment variable is Two-Control Zone status
Two-control zone -0.464*** 0.047 -0.722*** 0.092 -0.851** -2.156**
(0.147) (0.062) (0.232) (0.072) (0.427) (0.875)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283




Table 3.13  Continued from previous page
college edu total pop secondary emp employment coal emp coal emp state
00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 99-07 99-07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First-stage F stat 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 11.91 10.95
Panel F: treatment variable is 2010 SO2 levels
ln(SO2 in 2010) -0.105*** 0.011 -0.164*** 0.021 -0.193** -0.490***
(0.022) (0.014) (0.040) (0.015) (0.083) (0.165)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283






Table 3.14: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max
ln(SO2 density in 1998, city average) 0.13 1.14 -4.84 0.26 2.91
ln(NO2 density in 2005, city max) 13.65 0.51 12.60 13.55 14.71
1 if hosting thermal power plant by 1998 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
ln(thermal power generating capacity) 2.25 3.10 0.00 0.00 8.29
1 if hosting thermal power plants after 1998 & before 2010 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
suitability index, city average 4.52 0.61 2.53 4.52 5.96
suitability index, city 75th percentile 5.18 0.67 2.90 5.23 6.75
two-control zone city: SO2 zone 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
two-control zone city: acid rain zone 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
provincial capital or provincial-level city 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00
total road and rail rays in 1999 4.40 2.50 0.00 4.00 13.00
share of agriculture employment in 2000 0.65 0.19 0.02 0.69 0.91
ln(distance to nearest coast in km) 5.34 1.84 -5.38 5.97 7.40
ln(distance to nearest river in km) 4.05 1.88 -1.26 4.66 6.47
mean city temperature in 2005 286.60 5.18 273.49 287.99 297.02
mean city wind speed in 2005 3.17 0.76 1.75 3.00 6.09
ln(average elevation) 5.45 1.53 0.12 5.55 8.34
ln(min distance to energy sources) 0.69 0.84 0.00 0.69 3.78
1 if near volcanoes, airﬁelds, or earthquake spots 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00
percentage of gas coverage 71.84 29.79 0.00 82.45 100.00
ln(population in 1982) 14.80 0.70 11.30 14.90 17.11
ln(population in 1990) 14.93 0.68 11.61 15.00 17.18
ln(population in 2000) 15.02 0.67 11.98 15.08 17.23




Table 3.14  Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max
ln(population in 2010) 15.07 0.68 12.35 15.10 17.18
share of population with below college education, 2000 0.90 0.03 0.56 0.90 0.94
share of population with below college education, 2010 0.86 0.04 0.64 0.87 1.06
share of population with college edu and above, 2000 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.17
share of population with college edu and above, 2010 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.31
Birth rate, 2000 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.25
Birth rate, 2010 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.20
Crude death rate, 2000 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09
Crude death rate, 2010 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09
share of migrants, 2000 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.83
share of migrants, 2010 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.80
share of migrants (from other provinces), 2000 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.64
share of migrants (from other provinces), 2010 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.65
share of manufacturing employment in 2000 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.76
share of manufacturing employment, 2010 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.74
share of primary employment, 2000 0.65 0.19 0.02 0.69 0.91
share of primary employment, 2010 0.51 0.20 0.00 0.55 0.84
share of secondary employment, 2000 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.79
share of secondary employment, 2010 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.76
share of tertiary employment, 2000 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.56
share of tertiary employment, 2010 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.71
share of employmnet by heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.28 0.19 0.02 0.23 0.97
share of employmnet by heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 2007 0.25 0.21 0.01 0.18 0.98
share of industrial employment by private ﬁrms, 1999 0.20 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.73
share of industrial employment by private ﬁrms, 2007 0.65 0.18 0.04 0.68 0.97
share of industrial employment by state ﬁrms, 1999 0.58 0.21 0.03 0.63 0.97
share of industrial employment by state ﬁrms, 2007 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.15 0.96




Table 3.14  Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max
share of employmnet by private heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.21
share of employmnet by private heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 2007 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.62
share of employmnet by state heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.95
share of employmnet by state heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 2007 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.96
share of value added by heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.26 0.20 -0.50 0.20 0.98
share of value added by heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 2007 0.24 0.20 0.01 0.17 0.93
share of industrial value added by private ﬁrms, 1999 0.24 0.15 -0.26 0.22 0.84
share of industrial value added by private ﬁrms, 2007 0.65 0.19 0.03 0.69 0.98
share of industrial value added by state ﬁrms, 1999 0.53 0.24 -0.03 0.53 1.14
share of industrial value added by state ﬁrms, 2007 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.15 0.97
share of value added by private heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.05 0.08 -0.64 0.03 0.56
share of value added by private heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 2007 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.76
share of value added by state heavy coal-using ﬁrms, 1999 0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.12 0.97




3.6.2 Additional robustness checks
The following table presents robustness checks using alternative pollutant measures as the treatment variable. The 2005 SO2 and NO2
variables are data from much ﬁner satellite images (NASA OMI mission) providing greater precision. But this mission only dates back to late
2003. Their point estimates are very similar to those using coarser 1998 measures, showing spatial resolution is not of concern in the baseline
results. Lastly, I check the estimation consistency using 1998 PM2.5 measures. Their point estimates are much larger in magnitude and the
ﬁrst-stage is weaker, presumably because PM2.5 comes from many sources and therefore power plant contribution is much less important.
Table 3.15: Additional sensitivity tests
college edu total pop secondary emp employment coal emp coal emp state
00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 99-07 99-07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV baseline
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.102*** 0.010 -0.160*** 0.020 -0.188** -0.478***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.039) (0.015) (0.079) (0.159)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 127.44 118.34
Panel B: treatment variable is 2005 SO2 levels
ln(SO2 density in 2005) -0.091*** 0.009 -0.141*** 0.018 -0.166** -0.425***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.033) (0.013) (0.070) (0.146)
N 285 285 285 285 285 282
First-stage F stat 93.63 93.63 93.63 93.63 93.63 94.09
Panel C: treatment variable is 2005 NO2 levels
ln(NO2 density in 2005) -0.125*** 0.013 -0.195*** 0.025 -0.229** -0.583***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.045) (0.017) (0.092) (0.188)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283
First-stage F stat 131.05 131.05 131.05 131.05 131.05 133.15
Panel D: treatment variable is 1998 PM2.5




Table 3.15  Continued from previous page
college edu total pop secondary emp employment coal emp coal emp state
00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 99-07 99-07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PM2.5 in 1998) -0.413*** 0.042 -0.643*** 0.082 -0.757** -1.958***
(0.100) (0.054) (0.179) (0.062) (0.306) (0.691)
N 286 286 286 286 286 283




3.6.3 SO2 trends by power plant hosting status
The following ﬁgures are analogues to ﬁgures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Instead of grouping
by TCZ status, the grouping here is by their thermal power plant hosting status.
They convey the same messages as those in section 3.2.2.
Figure 3.8: Kernel density of ambient SO2 levels in 1998 and 2010
Figure 3.9: Ambient SO2 change and power plant hosting
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Figure 3.10: Relative ranking of ambient SO2 levels between 1998 and 2010 by power plant hosting
status
Productivity on surviving ﬁrms
As the ﬁrm survey dataset is of cross-sectional nature and repeated annually, I
uncover a small subset of identical ﬁrms over time based on ﬁrm ID, county name,
and open year and month. This forms a sample of surviving ﬁrms, with low match
rate. Between 1999-2007, 9% of 1999 ﬁrms and 4% of 2007 ﬁrms are matched. For
shorter time periods 1999-2003 and 2003-2007, the shares of matching improve to
the range of 16-27%. One the one hand, this sample allows for the inclusion of ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀect to tune down potential bias. On the other hand, this small sample is far
from representative, and prone to noise.
In keeping with the literature, I deﬁne ﬁrm-level employment (value added)
growth as the diﬀerence in employment (value added) between two time periods,
divided by the average employment (value added) of the two. I estimate the follow-
ing ﬁrm-level regression:




i + ufi, (3.16)
which is at the ﬁrm level, f . Firm-level characteristics such as ownership type is
included for pooled samples. Error term is clustered at the prefecture level. The
rest follows exactly the baseline regression.
Table 3.16 presents results on employment and value added growth by SO2 pol-
luting and ownership types. Most results are not statistically signiﬁcant due to
noisy small samples. Despite this, column 4 results show that surviving heavy SO2
polluting ﬁrms in the state sector declined faster between 1999 and 2003 in both
employment and value added growth. This conﬁrms that the labor market impact
of APPCL works through the productivity channel.
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Table 3.16: How did the regulation aﬀect the surviving ﬁrms
ownership type: all state-owned ﬁrms privately owned ﬁrms
coal usage intensity: all heavy light heavy light heavy light
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1999-2007:
Employment
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.037 -0.025 -0.037 -0.025 -0.040 -0.028 -0.033
(0.035) (0.036) (0.043) (0.050) (0.037) (0.059) (0.045)
N 12888 1868 11020 806 2199 527 3251
First-stage F stat 55.27 148.60 45.90 141.40 97.48 82.95 59.79
Value-added
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.197 0.011 -0.235 0.218 -0.946 0.165 -0.057
(0.326) (0.228) (0.434) (0.452) (1.108) (0.308) (0.143)
N 12888 1868 11020 806 2199 527 3251
First-stage F stat 55.27 148.60 45.90 141.40 97.48 82.95 59.79
1999-2003:
Employment
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.006 -0.003 0.010 -0.032* -0.018 0.021 -0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030)
N 30176 4519 25657 2114 7141 1103 7387
First-stage F stat 75.19 172.93 63.66 197.25 128.62 88.99 64.32
Value-added
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.040 -0.161 -0.036 -0.276* -0.076 -0.161 0.099
(0.168) (0.190) (0.219) (0.163) (0.417) (0.384) (0.184)
N 30175 4519 25656 2114 7140 1103 7387
First-stage F stat 75.21 172.93 63.68 197.25 128.72 88.99 64.32
2003-2007:
Employment
ln(SO2 density in 1998) -0.028 0.003 -0.030 -0.026 -0.032 0.039* -0.010
(0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)
N 50590 5442 45148 1286 3456 3105 27582
First-stage F stat 86.92 189.63 77.17 167.34 113.96 166.74 100.24
Value-added
ln(SO2 density in 1998) 0.155 0.345 0.135 2.001 -0.006 -0.058 0.034
(0.128) (0.393) (0.136) (1.828) (1.039) (0.355) (0.077)
N 50590 5442 45148 1286 3456 3105 27582
First-stage F stat 86.92 189.63 77.17 167.34 113.96 166.74 100.24
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Data sources
Table 3.17: Sources of data for the computation of suitability index
Name: Source: Details:
SO2 column density NASA Global Modeling and Assimilation Oﬃce Time span: 1998-2010, annual means
Scale: 0.5◦ × 0.625◦; unit: kg m−2
Infrastructure & United States Geological Survey: Coal Geology, List of shapeﬁles compiled by 2001
land use Land Use, and Human Health in China Key variables: roads, railroads, airﬁelds, small/large rivers,
Compiled by Alex W. Karlsen et al earthquake spots, volcanoes, coal bearing ﬁelds, etc.
Coal mines, oil & gas ﬁelds USGS Compilation of GIS Data Representing Surveyed by 2001 but ﬁrst fully published in Jan 2015
Coal Mines and Coal-Bearing Areas in China Key info: coal mines, oil and gas ﬁelds
Gas pipelines China Natural Gas Pipelines Dataset, Harvard ChinaMap Gas pipelines and nodes
Elevation Harvard China Historical GIS V5 DEM 1km pixel resolution based on GTOPO-30 data from USGS
Land cover Global Land Cover Facility, MODIS Land Cover 5′ × 5′ ≈ 0.083◦ resolution, yearly 2001-2012
Soil type ISRIC/World Soil Information soil information is compiled in 2004
Soil and Terrain Database for China18
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Chapter 4
Cholera in Times of Floods: Weather
Shocks & Health in Dar es Salaam
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4.1 Introduction
Climate change will have a signiﬁcant impact on the lives of the poor in the years
ahead as extreme weather events such as ﬂoods, heavy precipitation and droughts
are expected to become more frequent (Harrington et al. 2016). Populations at dif-
ferent stages of development are aﬀected diﬀerently by the same weather variations
(Dasgupta, 2010; Burgess et al. 2017). As cities in developing countries continue to
urbanize at an unprecedented pace, the question of how their urban dwellers are im-
pacted by weather shocks is becoming increasingly relevant. On the one hand, urban
residents may seem better prepared than their rural counterparts against weather
extremes; their livelihoods are for instance less dependent on weather phenomena.
Yet, rapid urbanization has often led to unplanned cities with poor infrastructure,
limited public service provision, and with large segments of the population living in
informal settlements.
Empirical evidence is scant concerning the impact of weather shocks in developing
country cities. This paper tries to make progress on this issue by looking at the
eﬀect of rainfall and ﬂooding on cholera incidence in Dar es Salaam. Looking at
health outcomes is important. Contagion is one “downside of density” (Glaeser &
Sims 2015). Throughout history, cities with low-quality infrastructure and poor
sanitation have been pockets of epidemics (for instance 19th century London or
Paris, Kesztenbaum & Rosenthal 2016). Poor health and disease not only lower
productivity in the short-term, they also hinder long-term economic growth (Well
2007).
We examine this question in the context of a cholera outbreak in Dar es Salaam
in 2015 and 2016, during which almost ﬁve thousand cases were recorded. Cholera
is a water and food-borne disease and its transmission is closely linked to inadequate
access to clean water and sanitation facilities. Weather shocks such as rainfall can
aﬀect health through two main channels. The ﬁrst one is related to direct mecha-
nisms operating via human physiology and disease. In this case, heavy rainfall and
ﬂoods can increase exposure to vibrio cholera bacteria, which survives better in wet
environments (Lipp et al. 2002, Osei et al. 2010). Droughts have also been linked to
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cholera outbreaks, as population use unﬁt water for their needs (Sasaki et al. 2008,
Taylor et al. 2015). The second sets of mechanisms are indirect ones, through the
eﬀect weather shocks may have on real incomes. In the case considered here, there
are many ways through which ﬂoods and rainfall can reduce accessibility to work.
The resulting lower income may in turn lower the consumption of health-improving
goods (i.e. safe drinking water, medicines), increasing the exposure to the bacteria.
Our empirical analysis uses ﬁnely disaggregated ward-level panel data containing
weekly recorded cholera cases and weekly accumulated precipitation for all the mu-
nicipalities in the city. We are therefore testing whether exogenous weekly rainfall
variation at the ward-level aﬀects cholera occurrence. Sorting between neighbor-
hoods is taken care of with ward-ﬁxed eﬀects. The short time frame considered ex-
cludes any concern related to changes in sorting patterns. The use of high-frequency
data and the ﬁne geographical detail thus allow us to estimate with precision our
relationship of interest. We focus on reduced-form speciﬁcations; diﬀerent spatial
and time-lag models support our choice. We complement our data with ward-level
infrastructure characteristics (i.e. roads, foot-ways, drains, water wells and housing
informality) to understand the relationship between infrastructure quality, precipi-
tation, and cholera. Dar es Salaam is a city of more than 4 million people where
close to 70% of its residents live in informal settlements. Access to improved sanita-
tion is very low and only 37% of the city has regular refuse collection (World Bank
2017).
We ﬁnd robust evidence that weekly accumulated rainfall and ﬂooding leads to
higher ward-level cholera occurrence. On average, a 10 mm increase in weekly ac-
cumulated precipitation leads to an increase of between 1.5% to 3.5% of weekly
recorded cholera cases, signiﬁcant at 1% level. The eﬀect is found to be much
larger when considering a more ﬂexible quartile speciﬁcation. On average, a sin-
gle additional week of rainfall falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall
distribution (extreme rainfall), increases the number of eﬀective cholera cases by
up to 20.3% relative to a week with very light rain (<0.30 mm). Further, we ﬁnd
that the impact of heavy rainfall (>75th percentile) is close to 20 percentage points
higher in wards at greater risk of ﬂooding (i.e. higher ﬂood-prone area), all else
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equal. A dry week (0 mm rainfall) is also positively related to cholera incidence,
but the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings are consistent with
the direct and indirect mechanisms put forward earlier. Particularly, the inundation
of drains, water systems, and pit latrines greatly enhances the risk of exposure to
contaminated water and food. These results are robust to alternative estimators
and speciﬁcations, including an instrumental variable strategy and controlling for
the spatial autocorrelation of standard-errors.
Remarkably, we ﬁnd little to no spatial spillovers from precipitation in neigh-
boring wards. Only when considering the relative elevation of contiguous wards
there is a small signiﬁcant eﬀect from precipitation in downhill wards. That is, a 10
mm increase in weekly accumulated rainfall in downhill neighboring wards increases
cholera cases in the ward by 0.01% to 0.03% . This ﬁnding is consistent with water
source contamination. In contrast, our results reveal moderate time-dynamic eﬀects.
Using a distributed lag model, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of past rainfall on
cholera incidence to up to ﬁve preceding weeks. Contemporaneous rainfall remains
the largest determinant, with a stable size close to 3% and statistical signiﬁcance at
or above 5% level. All lags decrease in size the farther in time.
We explore the non-linear relationship of rainfall and cholera incidence with re-
spect to various ward-level infrastructure characteristics as well. We ﬁnd the eﬀect of
weekly rainfall on cholera cases to be consistently higher for wards with larger shares
of informal housing and a higher density of foot-ways (i.e. informal roads). These
results are consistent with the two possible mechanisms outlined earlier. Neighbor-
hoods with limited access to sanitation and low-quality infrastructure are likely to
be more exposed to the cholera bacteria when surfaces are washed and drains are
overﬂown by severe precipitation. Vulnerable populations in these wards are also
more likely to suﬀer from negative income shocks during extreme weather events.
Our ﬁndings relate to three diﬀerent bodies of research. The ﬁrst one is a large
economics literature looking at weather shocks and economic events mostly in ad-
vanced economies (Munshi 2003; Miguel et al. 2004; Barrios et al. 2010), and
including health outcomes of human populations (Deschenes & Greenstone 2007;
Deschenes & Moretti 2009; Burgess et al. 2011; Deschenes 2011). Our paper follows
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their empirical methods (for a review see Dell et al. 2014). The second is the large
literature in development economics and public health studying policy interventions,
mechanism of transmission and health outcomes in developing countries (Banerjee
et al. 2004; Miguel & Kremer 2004; Dunkle et al. 2010; Penrose et al. 2010; Devoto
et al. 2012). Here, we contribute to that literature by focusing on urban areas and
by studying general mechanisms beyond speciﬁc policy interventions. Our ﬁndings
use robust econometrics techniques to discern the relationship between disease, in-
frastructure and weather shocks. Finally, we particularly contribute to the nascent
literature in urban economics studying the eﬀects of weather phenomena on urban
areas in developing country cities (Kocornik-Mina et al. 2015; Glaeser & Henderson
2017; Henderson et al. 2017). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst
to empirically study the eﬀect of weather shocks on disease transmission within a
city of a developing country. Our ﬁndings have important policy implications as
extreme weather events become more frequent in the next decades. Cities in devel-
oping countries need to address infrastructure gaps to contain the risk of recurrent
epidemic outbreaks in vulnerable populations and neighborhoods. Investing in re-
silient infrastructure, with the proper servicing of informal settlements or related
measures such a regulating waste dumping may prove to be more beneﬁcial in the
long-term than the use of short-term palliative measures during outbreaks. Evidence
on large-scale policy interventions in urban areas is still limited and more is needed
to understand how to prevent contagion of treatable diseases in developing cities.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section formalizes the relationship
between health and weather shocks, speciﬁcally here cholera and rainfall in cities.
Section 3 describes the context of Dar es Salaam, the cholera disease and the data.
In section 4 we present our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the estimates of
the eﬀect of rainfall and ﬂooding on cholera incidence and diﬀerent extensions and
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
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4.2 Theoretical framework: Weather & Health
In this section, we describe a simple theoretical framework to examine the various
channels through which weather shocks (i.e. here, heavy precipitation) can aﬀect
cholera incidence in an urban setting. It relies on endogenous health models in a
simpliﬁed fashion (for more details see Becker 2007; Deschenes 2012; Burgess et al.
2017).
Cholera is an acute diarrheal infection caused by ingestion of food or water con-
taminated with the bacterium vibrio cholera. It can aﬀect both children and adults
and can kill within hours if left untreated. The main reservoirs of the cholera bac-
terium are people and warm salt water bodies such as estuaries and coastal areas.
Cholera transmission is closely linked to inadequate access to clean water and sanita-
tion facilities (WHO 2017)1. Here we assume that weather shocks such as extreme
rainfall, droughts and ﬂooding can aﬀect human health (i.e. cholera prevalence)
both directly (through higher exposure to the bacteria, for instance), and indirectly
(due to the negative income-shocks that may arise through the weather shock).
Consider a city with a large number of agents indexed by i. Agents seek to
maximize their lifetime utility ui depending on consumption cit and health status
hit . These two are complements. This city is partitioned into several neighborhoods
and each agent lives in a given neighborhood (or ward) indexed by n. We assume
that agents are exogenously allocated to neighborhoods with diﬀerent characteristics
such as better infrastructure, and the latter are exogenously determined. It follows
that agents have limited scope for aﬀecting local infrastructure, as well as other
public goods and services, and take these as given (mobility is limited in the short-
term scenario considered here).
Agent i 's health status, resident of neighborhood n at time t, (hint) is thus de-
termined by her consumption cit and random health shocks zint. We do not specify
a precise relationship between health outcomes and consumption, but it is assumed
that an individual can improve her health by increasing her consumption, particu-
larly by purchasing health-improving goods. All told, the agent's health status is
thus given by:
1 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/, accessed on 28 June 2017.
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hint = hi(cit, zint) (4.1)
where hi(·) is increasing in cit and decreasing in zint (adverse health shocks).
The function hi is unrestricted and can diﬀer across heterogeneous individuals. The
vector zint includes weather-shocks wt such as ﬂooding, droughts, and heavy rainfall
or temperature extremes. We assume further that the eﬀect of the weather shock is
conditional on the quality of local neighborhood infrastructures ( qn such as access
to drinking water and waste water systems, or road and pavement material. The
adverse health shock is thus a function of the weather shock that varies with local
infrastructure, zint(wt(qn))
Consumption2 cit is ﬁnanced through labor income in period t, which depends
on the agent's productivity ait . Productivity is agent-speciﬁc but also depends on
weather shocks wt :
ait = ai(wt) (4.2)
Here the eﬀect on productivity can stem from the weather shock's impact on zint
, hampering the agent's ability to work eﬃciently, or deter accessibility to jobs or
other factors of production (i.e. machinery, location)3. A given weather shock wt
thus aﬀects an agent's health status through both consumption (via productivity)
and health idiosyncratic shocks (via zint ). In other words, there are two fundamental
mechanisms through which weather shocks (extreme precipitation for the purpose
of our empirical analysis) can potentially harm an agent's health status here.
First, through direct health eﬀects: random shocks zint , enter the agent's health
status directly as in equation (4.1). That is, holding constant the agent's income,
2 We assume the consumption good is produced using an aggregate production function that requires capital
and labor inputs; it exhibits decreasing return to scale. Goods can be bought and sold at the market price, which
is exogenously determined. Agents are subject to budget constraints in each period which are a function of the
labor income (in turn dependent on productivity and adverse weather shocks), as well as prices and quantities of
goods consumed. We assume imperfect credit and savings markets which prevents agents from smoothing their
consumption in time.
3 We assume, where refers to complements to work such as accessibility to jobs, machinery or location, that can
be aﬀected by weather shocks.
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location and consumption decisions, we expect a negative weather shock to impact
this agent's health adversely ( wt impacts zint in the language of our model). In the
case considered here, heavy rainfall and ﬂooding can directly impact one's health
status through greater exposure to and contact with contaminated water and food.
An extensive public health literature discusses the potential for cholera prevalence in
wet environments and in cases of heavy precipitation and ﬂooding (see for example,
Osei et al. 2012). Further, the magnitude of the eﬀect can be expected to depend on
the relationship the weather phenomena and the disease pathogens have with local
infrastructure characteristics. Cholera strives in stagnant water and poor hygiene
conditions as explained earlier.
The second, more indirect mechanism through which weather can aﬀect health in
this model is through the agents' productivity in equation (4.2). This term depends
on weather shocks that may aﬀect the agent's ability to work via zint . Flooding
and heavy rainfall may also signiﬁcantly aﬀect work-places and accessibility in con-
texts where poor roads and infrastructure is widespread (see footnote 4). Reduced
productivity can translate in lower earnings and reduced consumption of healthier
quality goods such as clean water or medicines. The dependency of productivity
and hence, labor income, on this type of shocks is extremely likely in low-income
countries where informal jobs dominate employment. It is estimated that close to
80% of jobs in the services sector are informal in Tanzania (UNDP 2015). Note that
this assumes imperfect credit and savings markets preventing agents from smoothing
their consumption when hit by economic hardship. Given the Tanzanian context,
this assumption does not seem unrealistic.
The main implication of this exercise is to expect an increase in cholera cases due
to a weather shock such as extreme precipitation and ﬂooding. The increase should
be larger in neighborhoods with poorer infrastructure. Conversely, the impact of
heavy rainfall should be mitigated in areas with a supply of higher-quality local
public goods. Linking this section with our empirical analysis, we expect to see
non-linear eﬀects of rainfall on cholera occurrence.
Finally, one additional implication of this simple formalization concerns policy
interventions. In the face of potential weather shocks, any agent i would seek to
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minimize the damage that the negative shock has on their utility, ui (cit, hit)
by consuming health-improving goods or potentially by reallocating resources
between periods. This latter option here is limited due to credit and savings con-
straints. These potential shock-minimizing strategies have strong implications for
policy. In the theoretical framework considered here, governments can reduce the
adverse eﬀect of weather on health outcomes by directly increasing the quality of
infrastructure that is related to the pathogens' transmission (i.e. pavement, sani-
tation, water drainage, sewage), and thus directly limit the potential eﬀect of an
adverse health shock, zitn . But they can also intervene by supporting the agent's
shock minimization strategies through subsidized health goods or direct transfers.
4.3 Background & Data
This section provides further details on cholera-speciﬁc characteristics as well as
Dar es Salaam's context. It also describes the data in detail and provides basic
summary statistics.
4.3.1 Cholera
Cholera is an acute diarrheal infection of fecal-oral transmission. It is caused
by the ingestion of food or water contaminated with the bacterium vibrio cholera.
It takes between twelve hours and ﬁve days for a person to show symptoms after
ingesting contaminated food or water. It can aﬀect both children and adults and
can kill within hours if left untreated; there is a 50% death rate if untreated, but
all deaths are avoidable otherwise. Main treatments include antibiotics and Oral
Re-hydration Salts (ORS). Roughly 1.3 to 4.0 million cases are recorded worldwide
every year, and the disease is endemic to many parts of sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia (WHO 2017).
There are multiple pathways for cholera transmission (Clasen et al. 2007). The
disease is closely linked to inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities.
Risk factors are also considered to be high population density and crowding, all of
which are often common in urban slum areas (Penrose et al. 2010).
Cholera incidence has been found to be highest in highly urbanized areas (Osei
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& Duker 2008; Sur et al. 2005). The main reservoirs of the cholera bacterium are
people and warm salty water bodies such as estuaries and coastal areas. Global
warming and rising sea levels are believed to create a favorable environment for
cholera bacterium growth (WHO 2017). Heavy rainfall and ﬂooding have all been
associated with a higher likelihood of cholera outbreak. Surface runoﬀ from point
sources (pit-latrines, waste dump site, water wastes) may cause increased contam-
ination of water sources, while stagnation and slow ﬂowing of waterways may lead
to increased exposure to cholera vibrios (Osei et al. 2010).
4.3.2 Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam is one of the largest cities in eastern Africa. It is located in the east
of Tanzania by the Indian Ocean. Its urban population grew at 6.5% yearly between
2002 and 2012 (Wenban-Smith 2014), and today the city counts with more than 4.4
million people. Since 2016, it is divided in ﬁve municipal districts: Ilala, Temeke,
Kinondoni, Kigamboni and Ubungo4. These municipalities are further divided up
into 90 wards.
The rapid pace of urbanization has led to large infrastructure deﬁcits. Close
to 70% of Dar es Salaam's residents live in informal settlements without adequate
access to clean water, proper drainage system and waste collection (UN-HABITAT
2010; Natty 2013). Only 13% of the city's residents have adequate sewage systems
and 37% of the solid waste is properly collected. The World Bank (2015) estimates
that only 50% of residents have access to improved sanitation. The most common
form of improved sanitation is improved pit-latrines (other forms are rare). About
two-thirds of households in the city share their toilet facilities. Access to piped water
is also very limited, with only 17% of city-centre dwellers having piped-water.
Dar es Salaam's geography and coastal location makes it vulnerable to climatic
hazards, particularly ﬂoods, sea level rise and coastal erosion (Kebede and Nicholls
2010). There are two rainy seasons every year, the short (October to December) and
long (March to May) seasons, and average annual precipitation is above 1,000 mm.
4 In the analysis, we only use 3 municipal districts as these were the ones that existed at the time cholera cases
were recorded during the last outbreak. Ubungo and Kigamboni were created in 2016 from dividing Kinondoni and
Ilala further so this does not impact our ﬁndings in any way.
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The combination of high informality and climatic vulnerability makes ﬂood risk one
of the main challenges for sustainability, exposing infrastructure and residents to
safety and health hazards from vector-borne diseases such as malaria and cholera
(World Bank 2017).
Cholera has been endemic in Tanzania since the 1970s and Dar es Salaam has
historically been the most aﬀected region5. During the 2015-2016 outbreak, there
were over 24,000 cases recorded nationally, with more than one ﬁfth in Dar es Salaam
(Figure A1 in appendix). Previous outbreaks occurring between 2002 and 2006
reported over 30,000 cases nationally, with nearly 18,000 in the capital city (WHO
2008). Given the city's poor sanitary conditions, high population density, lack of
access to safe drinking water, and limited drainage, continuous heavy rainfall makes
stagnant and unsanitary water a widespread health risk for common water borne
diseases. The lack of storm water drains, frequently blocked by unregulated waste
dumping, means that heavy rainfall quickly leads to ﬂooding and contaminates water
wells (Pan-African START 2011).
4.3.3 Data
To examine the relationship between weather variation and cholera incidence
outlined in our theoretical framework, we collect data from several sources and put
together a comprehensive ward-level panel dataset for each week between the ﬁrst
week of March 2015 and the ﬁrst week of September 2016. The choice of the time
frame is data constrained - that is, we use the ﬁrst week for which precipitation
data is available and the last week for which cholera cases were recorded to avoid
measurement error from unrecorded cases. We cover all the 90 wards of the city6.
The use of high-frequency data and the ﬁne geographical detail allow us to estimate
with precision our relationship of interest. The basic panel thus consists of weekly
cholera cases registered according to the ward of residence. We combine this data
with weekly accumulated precipitation and weekly air-temperature in these wards.
5 The largest cholera epidemic in Tanzania to date took place in 1997 where 40,000 cases were reported. The
epidemic is said to have started in Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam has had the most cholera cases since 2002 of all
regions of the country (Penrose et al. 2010).
6 Since mid-2016 there are 5 municipalities in Dar es Salaam as two municipalities were further sub-divided.
We use the original administrative units at the time of the outbreak in our regression analysis for simplicity and
coherence with the recorded cholera dataset. This should not aﬀect any of the results.
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Further, we add data on ward-level infrastructure, geographical characteristics (i.e.,
elevation, ﬂood-prone surface) and population (census). We outline below the dif-
ferent data sources. Main summary statistics are in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Cholera cases
The key data in this analysis are the new ward-level cholera cases collected from
the Regional Medical Oﬃce and Municipal Health Oﬃcers for all the wards of Dar
es Salaam and covering the entire 2015-2016 outbreak. The data was registered
daily for each individual presenting symptoms of severe diarrhea in a medical facil-
ity. It includes basic socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex) of the individual,
the ward and sub-ward of residence, as well as the date of the ﬁrst symptom and
registration at the hospital. Cases were tested for the vibrio cholera bacteria, and
the dataset also includes lab results. We exclude all cases tested negative and focus
on eﬀective cholera cases only7. No positive case is reported earlier than mid-August
2015 (epidemic week zero). The outbreak oﬃcially lasted from August 2015 until
May 2016. We aggregate the daily cases by week to account for the fact that the
incubation period is between 12 hours to 5 days.
Measurement error is a potential problem. The biggest threat concerns the pos-
sibility that not all cholera cases are reported in the non-outbreak period. It is
also possible that not all registered cases during the peak of the epidemic are ef-
fective cholera cases (see footnote 8). There are mitigating factors against both
these risks. First, cholera is one of the few diseases that require reporting to the
World Health Organization (WHO) by the International Health Regulations as it
can quickly spread if left untreated and result in explosive outbreaks. This implies
careful monitoring of the disease as well as frequent laboratory testing. Further,
we focus our analysis during an outbreak where monitoring is more likely to be en-
forced. Finally, our baseline estimates are weighted by the population of the ward, to
account for the diﬀerence in precision concerning cholera measurement from larger
and smaller populated wards. While bias from measurement error in our dependent
7 We include both positive and untested cases. Most untested cases are at the peak of the outbreak when all
patients presenting symptoms are treated as cholera patients. Measurement error is possible but should be limited
as tests are frequently carried, particularly at the beginning and end of the outbreak period.
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variable is still possible, it should not be large.
Overall, close to 5 thousand cases of cholera were reported positive in Dar es
Salaam in the period analyzed (4964 of total 5698 tested), with the bulk taking
place during the ﬁrst 10 weeks of the outbreak (Figures 4.1 & 4.2). On average,
during the period covered there were 0.72 eﬀective cases weekly per ward. The
number is larger during the ﬁrst 10 weeks of the epidemic (3.16) as well as the ﬁrst
20 weeks of the epidemic (2.54) (Table 4.2). Cholera cases were more pronounced
in Kinondoni and Ilala, reporting totals of 2428 and 1796, respectively. Temeke was
the least aﬀected (Figure A2). Most cases took place within 15 km from the Dar
es Salaam CBD (Figure 4.3); only 2 of the 90 wards reported zero positive cases
throughout the period.
Weather & Geography
Rainfall - The weather datasets in this paper are from NASA. The daily precip-
itation measures by ward are derived from the Integrated Multi-satellite Retrievals
(IMERG) for Global Precipitation Mission (GPM), where rainfall is comprehen-
sively measured at the highest accuracy and ﬁnest spatial resolution to date (Huﬀ-
man, 2016). We use the near-real-time total daily rainfall deﬁned as precipitation
accumulated in the past 24 hours by 23:59pm (Coordinated Universal Time) of each
day. We calculate weekly accumulated precipitation from the daily data. In terms of
the spatial resolution, rainfall is measured at squared pixels of 0.1 ◦× 0.1◦ (roughly
120km2).
As ward boundaries are irregularly shaped, we compute ward-level daily rainfall
accumulation by weighting recorded rainfall with the ward overlay with satellite pix-
els. We ﬁrst union these two layers to create polygons at the ward-pixel level. These
ward-pixel polygons all have consistent rainfall measurement, and their respective
area is computed. We then sum up the ward-pixel rainfall measures for each ward
by weighting by their ward area share. This gives us the area-weighted weekly rain-
fall accumulation at the ward level (Figure A3). The choice of focusing on rainfall
accumulation (i.e. total weekly rainfall) stems from the fact that precipitation is
`readily stored' in the soil, tanks, or water wells. It is stagnant water that might
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breed cholera and thus, measuring average rainfall instead would fail to take this
important dimension into account.
Because satellite data are subject to error (Dell et al. 2014), we also use an ad-
ditional and independent gridded data set to address potential measurement issues
and obtain instrumental variables (IV) estimates. We use precipitation obtained
from IMERG's predecessor technology, the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
(TRMM) (Goddard Earth Sciences Data and Information Services Center 2016).
Despite the fact that TRMM is less accurate (Shari et al. 2016; Chen and Li. 2016;
Wang et al. 2017) and its resolution coarser, it has been widely used since 1997.
Its algorithm inter-calibrates all existing satellite microwave precipitation measures,
microwave-calibrated infrared satellite estimates, and precipitation gauge analysis.
The near-real-time data is chosen over the production data as it is recommended
for ﬂood and crop forecasting (NASA Precipitation Measurement Missions 2016).
The instrumental variables approach is motivated by the fact that both satellite
measures assign weather variables to grid points and contain measurement error in
their `true' representation of rainfall. In that case, the IV estimates can correct
for measurement error bias under the assumption that errors in both variables are
uncorrelated (Burgess et al. 2017).
Temperature - The daily temperature data also comes from NASA. We obtained
near-surface air temperature (i.e., temperature at the height of most human ac-
tivities) from the FLDAS Noah Land Surface Model (McNally 2016). The spatial
resolution of this dataset is also 0.1 ◦ × 0.1 ◦, so ward-level daily temperature is
computed similarly to rainfall above. Average weekly temperature is later computed
at the weekly level.
Elevation - The elevation calculation is based on the Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency (JAXA) global digital surface model. The measurement is at 30-meter
spatial resolution, based on the most precise global-scale elevation data at this time
acquired by the Advanced Land Observing Satellite. Mean ward-level elevation is
computed across all grids that fall inside each ward.
Flood-prone surface - To estimate the surface of a ward that is prone to ﬂood-
ing, we use data collected by the NGO Dar Ramani Huria (RH) in OpenStreetMap
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(OSM) format. Using community-based mapping RH is able to create highly accu-
rate maps of infrastructure and ﬂood-prone areas in Dar es Salaam. We complement
their detailed mapping of drainage, waterways, and wetlands with GeoFabrik's OSM
data for missing wards. The data is less accurate but allows us to have a larger cover-
age. We then use InaSAFE8 to model build-areas prone to inundation and calculate
the total share of the ward area that is ﬂood-prone. We compare our estimates to
the more precise-ones of RH for available wards. The pairwise correlation is 0.81.
Basic summary statistics of weather and geographical variables are displayed in
Table 4.2. The average weekly rainfall in Dar es Salaam according to the meteoro-
logical agency amounts to 20.6 mm. This is consistent with our weekly accumulation
from both TRMM and GPM's measures. On average, in the period covered there
were 20.1 mm of accumulated rainfall weekly, with a median of 2.9 mm. The raini-
est month is usually April, which is seconded by our dataset. There is little spatial
variation of temperature across the city's' wards, the average recorded weekly is
26.7o C with a standard deviation of 0.37o C. On average 10% of the area of a ward
is prone to ﬂooding, but there are signiﬁcant disparities across wards (the standard
deviation being 16% ).
Infrastructure & Population
Infrastructure - Infrastructure data at the ward-level is also obtained from data
collected by RH's in OSM format, and complemented with GeoFabrik's for missing
wards. We focus on the following characteristics which are likely to be correlated
with cholera incidence: drains, roads, foot-ways (i.e. unpaved roads) and water
wells. For the ﬁrst four variables, we use their density, calculated as the number of
km per square km. Aside from roads where we can distinguish between roads and
foot-ways, we have no speciﬁc measure of quality of the infrastructure. A general
assumption is to think that a higher density of roads and drains reﬂect higher-
quality infrastructure, while a higher density of foot-ways reﬂects lower-quality. The
distinction in practice is hard to make, particularly for drains. Anecdotal evidence
8 InaSAFE is a free software that produces realistic natural hazard impact scenarios. It was developed by the
government of Indonesia, the Australian government and the World Bank. For more details see http://inasafe.org/
(last accessed on July 21st 2017).
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suggests drains often get clogged by unregulated waste dumping due to heavy rainfall
and quickly contaminate surfaces. We are thus agnostic concerning the expected
signs of these coeﬃcients. We have unfortunately no data on sewerages9.
We obtained a dataset of formal and informal plots from the municipalities'
database of surveyed plots, and are then able to estimate the share of the ward's
area that houses informal settlements. Not all municipalities have mapped their
informal plots fully10 which explains the smaller sample when using this data. For
the wards for which we have information, 34% of the total areas are on average
informal. The large number reﬂects the fact that 70% of the population of Dar es
Salaam lives in informal settlements.
Population- We make use of the population data from the Census 2012 to weight
our regressions by ward population size. The interest in this is twofold. First, cholera
incidence in wards with large populations is likely to be more precise, so weighting
corrects for heteroskedasticity associated with these diﬀerences in precision (Burgess
et al. 2017). Second, rather than on the average ward, the results reveal the impact
on the average person, which is more meaningful here. We also use this data to
calculate ward-level population density. The average ward of Dar es Salaam was
populated with 48.5 thousand people in 2012; population density was 11.53 per
square km (Table 4.1).
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe the econometric methods we use to estimate the eﬀect
of precipitation on cholera occurrence. As the relationship between rainfall and new
cholera cases is expected to be non-linear, we adopt both parametric and ﬂexible
semi-parametric speciﬁcations. We begin by presenting speciﬁcations measuring
the contemporaneous eﬀect of precipitation. We then consider models allowing for
the eﬀect of rainfall to be associated with local public goods provision and other
ward characteristics. We also assess the importance of the spatial spillovers of
precipitation. Lastly, the last sub-section details a more general dynamic model
9 Basic sanitation data in Table 4.1 is obtained from the 10% sample of the Census 2012. Unfortunately, these
are only used in the descriptive section because of the lack of consistency in the sample.
10 Only the Municipality of Kinondoni has.
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including various precipitation time lags.
4.4.1 Contemporaneous Eﬀects
To quantify the contemporaneous eﬀect of rainfall on cholera incidence in any
given ward and week, we begin by estimating a baseline panel log-linear model
relating the logarithm of cholera cases11 to weekly rainfall accumulation for this
ward:
Cwmt = α.Rwt + γ.Twt + µw + δt + θm.t+ εwmt (4.3)
where Cwmt is the outcome variable (log of total cholera cases) in ward w in week
t. The key explanatory variable of interest is Rwt , measuring weekly accumulated
rainfall. We also control for ward daily temperatures measured as weekly averages (
Twt ) as temperature variation is likely to be correlated with rainfall variation. Since
our focus is on precipitation and spatial variation in temperature in Dar es Salaam
is limited, we model a linear temperature eﬀect. The speciﬁcation in equation (4.3)
also includes a full set of ward ﬁxed eﬀects, µw , absorbing unobserved time-ﬁxed
ward idiosyncratic characteristics. Permanent diﬀerences in access to health care for
instance will therefore not confound the estimates. Their inclusion also addresses the
potential issue of sorting across neighborhoods. We also include week ﬁxed eﬀects,
δt , to control for time-varying inﬂuences common across wards. The equation
also includes municipality linear time trends to account for time-varying factors
that diﬀer across administrative boundaries and aﬀect health. We also estimate
equation (4.3) with municipality-week ﬁxed eﬀects to ﬂexibly control for unobserved
municipality-wide time shocks. We use only three municipalities in the analysis
as these were the administrative divisions existing at the time of data collection.
Further, the main three hospitals are located in these municipalities. As shown
later, our estimations across these speciﬁcations are consistent and robust. εwmt is
11 Since no cholera cases are recorded in several wards and weeks in our sample, we add one to all cholera cases
and take the logarithm of that expression. In mathematical terms: . We test the results to linear regressions
where the dependent variable is the ratio of cholera cases for every ten thousand people of the ward. Results are
unchanged (see Appendix) and we prefer the speciﬁcation that considers the non-linear relationship between rainfall
and cholera.
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an error term clustered at the ward level. Finally, we weight our regressions by ward
population as explained earlier. Unweighted regressions are in Appendix. Results
are unchanged.
To take into account non-linear relationships more rigorously, we also estimate




βk.1{Rwtinquartilek}+ φ.Twt + µw + δt + θm.t+ ηwmt (4.4)
where the independent variables we are mainly interested in capturing are the
distribution of weekly rainfall in Dar es Salaam. The regressors 1{ Rwt in quartile
k} calculate whether the total amount of rainfall Rwt in week t and ward w was in
the ﬁrst, second, third, or fourth quartile of the rainfall distribution of our study
period. We estimate a separate coeﬃcient on each of these quartile variables and
treat the second quartile as the omitted reference category. The other regressors
are as deﬁned in equation (4.3). This approach has two beneﬁts. The ﬁrst one is to
allow for more ﬂexibility in the response function. The second one, more relevant
here, is that it also allows us to speciﬁcally distinguish the eﬀect of intense and light
rain. The upper quartile (>75th percentile) is generally used as a proxy for ﬂooding
(Chen et al. 2017).
The parameters in equations (4.3) and (4.4) are thus identiﬁed from ward-speciﬁc
deviations in rainfall from the ward average remaining after controlling for week
ﬁxed eﬀects and municipality linear trends. Given the relatively short time period
of analysis we argue that this variation is as good as exogenous and uncorrelated
with other unobserved determinants of cholera incidence.
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) make several important assumptions about the eﬀect
of rainfall on cholera. First, they assume that the impact depends on weekly accu-
mulation alone. It ignores the possibility of within week variation in rainfall having
an eﬀect on health. In addition, equation (4.4) assumes that the impact of rainfall
is constant within a given quartile. While this might be restrictive, we estimate
separate quartile coeﬃcients to improve on equation (4.3) and its parametric as-
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sumptions. Third, by estimating contemporaneous eﬀects, we assume that past
weekly rainfall does not aﬀect health outcomes. We also ignore the possibility of
neighboring wards' rainfall inﬂuencing a given ward's cholera outcomes. We relax
some of these assumptions in what follows.
A ﬁnal concern is spatial dependence. In this case, within-cluster correlations in
the speciﬁcation of the error covariance matrix (i.e., standard-errors clustered at the
ward level) may not be enough (Barrios et al. 2012). To account for this issue, we
also compute equations (4.3) and (4.4) using Conley (1999) spatial standard-errors12.
The implicit assumption is that spatial dependence is linearly decreasing in the
distance from the wards centroids up to a cutoﬀ distance, for which we chose 50 km
based on Dar es Salaam's extent. This technique ensures that uncertainty in α and
β is adjusted to account for heteroscedasticity, ward-speciﬁc serial correlation, and
cross-sectional spatial correlation. Statistical signiﬁcance is generally unchanged.
We consider these results as robustness checks in Appendix.
We are interested in reduced-forms here. However, we are conscious that the
true (unknown) relationship may include some time dependency in the dependent
variable. That is, past cholera may determine contemporaneous cholera. To test the
validity of our ﬁxed-eﬀects model, we compute a dependent-lagged model instead in
Table A15 in Appendix. While we ﬁnd the eﬀect of lagged cholera cases signiﬁcant,
and positive up to 5 weeks, the size of the coeﬃcient for contemporaneous precipita-
tion always remain stable and statistically signiﬁcant. Further, as mentioned, there
is strong reason to believe contemporaneous rainfall is orthogonal to past cholera. In
that case, including the lags would only increase the precision of our point estimates
but should not alter the identifying assumptions.
4.4.2 Non-linear Eﬀects and Spatial Spillovers
Ward characteristics, such as population density or the number of water wells,
may aﬀect the impact of rainfall on health as outlined in our theoretical framework.
To account for this possibility, we estimate variations of equation (4.3) that include
interactions between rainfall and ward features. While local public goods are not
12 We use the Stata code developed by Fetzer (2010) and Hsiang (2010).
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exogenously allocated to wards, there are several reasons to believe this is not a
problem here. First, the use of ward ﬁxed-eﬀects should deal with neighborhood
sorting. Further, the lack of proper infrastructure is widespread in Dar es Salaam
and public health evidence suggests households from all income-levels may be af-
fected by cholera. Using the 2015-16 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey and
Malaria Indicator Survey (DHS) we test the relationship between income, wealth,
and incidence of diarrheal diseases in the city (Appendix). We ﬁnd no evidence in
favor of a wealth bias regarding the risk of contracting a diarrheal disease.
We also measure whether contemporaneous precipitation in neighboring wards
aﬀect cholera cases in a given ward. We focus on ﬁrst contiguity wards and consider
total neighboring accumulated rainfall to begin with. We then distinguish between
rainfall recorded in uphill and downhill neighboring wards. We calculate the average
elevation of each unit and classify as uphill the neighboring wards with a relatively
higher elevation. Downhill neighboring wards have a lower or equal average eleva-
tion. Formally the model we estimate is as follows:
Cwt = ρ1.Rwt + ρ2.URwt + ρ3.DRwt + pi.Twt + µw + δt + ςwt (4.5)
where URwt and DRwt measure weekly accumulated rainfall in uphill and down-
hill neighbors, respectively. The other regressors are deﬁned as in equations (4.3)
and (4.4).
4.4.3 Dynamic eﬀects
The empirical approaches discussed so far do not address the possibility of a
dynamic relationship between precipitation and new cholera cases. Rainfall in one
week might result in increased cholera incidence in the following weeks due its incu-
bation period and the manner in which the disease spreads. This delayed response
would imply that the contemporaneous estimates from equation (4.3) underestimate
the true impact of rainfall. We investigate this possibility by including a distributed





λj.Rwt−j + ρ.Twt + µw + δt + ζwt (4.6)
This model allows the eﬀect of rainfall up to J weeks in the past to aﬀect cholera
incidence in a given week. In equation (4.6), the total dynamic eﬀect of rainfall
on cholera cases is obtained by summing the coeﬃcients on the contemporaneous
and lagged rainfall variables. Diﬀerent lag structures potentially generate diﬀerent
estimates of the dynamic causal eﬀect. As a consequence, we experiment with several
time lags and use up to 5 lagged weekly accumulated precipitation in our regressions.
4.5 Main Results
This section presents our empirical results on the relationship between precipi-
tation and cholera incidence. We begin with discussing baseline contemporaneous
estimates of both rainfall and ﬂooding. We then assess the importance of non-linear
eﬀects, spatial spillovers and measure dynamic eﬀects last.
4.5.1 Baseline Eﬀects
Our baseline results concern the eﬀect of rainfall and precipitation on weekly-ward
cholera occurrence. Tables 4.3-4.6 report baseline estimates of population-weighted
regressions. Appendix additionally report unweighted regressions and results with
Conley HAC standard-errors. Conclusions remain unchanged irrespective of the
speciﬁcation.
Table 4.3 reports estimates based on equation (4.3). The ﬁrst column shows
coeﬃcients obtained with ward and week ﬁxed eﬀects only. Precipitation is found
to have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on cholera. The point estimate
suggests that a 10 mm increase in weekly accumulated rainfall causes a 2% increase in
recorded cholera cases in a given ward. Including municipality linear trends does not
aﬀect the results much (column 2). Municipality-week ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled
for instead in column 3. While the impact of precipitation remains statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, its magnitude increases; that is, there are 3.4% additional
201
cholera cases per ward every 10 mm increases in rainfall. Overall, these reduced form
estimates consistently show a positive impact of precipitation on cholera incidence.
All subsequent tables are organized in the same fashion, with municipality trends
added in column 2 and municipality-week ﬁxed eﬀects added in column 3. To test
the sensitivity of our results to measurement error in the recorded rainfall data, we
instrument our main precipitation variable with rainfall recorded by the TRMM
satellite as explained in section 3.2.2. The potential sources of measurement error in
these two datasets are likely to be unrelated, and therefore uncorrelated. Results are
displayed in Table 4.4. The two satellite-based precipitation variables are strongly
correlated, and ﬁrst stage F statistics range between 24 and 37 across speciﬁcations
(see fourth row). Our two-stages least squares coeﬃcient estimates remain positive
but become larger as attenuation bias theory would predict. Including municipality-
week ﬁxed eﬀects results in a loss of statistical signiﬁcance (column 3). The ﬁrst
stage F-statistic is also lower however, inﬂating standard errors to some degree. On
the whole, our ﬁndings are supported by the IV results. There is a strong positive
relationship between cholera occurrence in a given ward and precipitation. In the
interest of proceeding conservatively we continue to stress the OLS results hereafter,
but Table 4.4 suggests that the true impact of precipitation on cholera may be even
larger.
Table 4.5 explores the impact of rainfall using the more ﬂexible quartile speci-
ﬁcation detailed in equation (4.4). The second rainfall quartile (light rain or pre-
cipitation between 0 to 2.9 mm weekly) is used as omitted category. Notably, the
semi-parametric relationship between weekly accumulated rainfall and cholera oc-
currence show particularly large eﬀects at the upper-end of the rainfall distribution.
Indeed, the estimated coeﬃcients in the three columns consistently indicate that
extreme precipitation has a strong impact on cholera incidence. For instance, a
single additional week with recorded rainfall falling in the fourth quartile (>75th
percentile, between 26.9 mm and 408.6 mm weekly), relative to a week with light
rain, increases the number of new cholera cases by 20.3% (column 2). The ﬁrst quar-
tile coeﬃcients, measuring loosely speaking the eﬀect of a dry week relative to little
rainfall, are positive but not statistically signiﬁcant. These results are key ﬁndings
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in our paper. Clearly, extreme rainfall has a higher incidence on ward-level cholera
occurrence than light rain, suggesting not all ranges of precipitation are necessarily
related to cholera occurrence. Moreover, upper-quartile rain has been consistently
used in the literature as a proxy for ﬂooding (Chen et al. 2017), and implies water
stagnation may be a likely mechanism.
To explore further the role of extreme precipitation, Table 4.6 puts the emphasis
on ﬂooding and attempts to measure its impact in various ways. We begin with
assessing whether the impact of rainfall is non-linear and depends on the extent
to which a ward is prone to ﬂooding. We use our measure of the share of the
ward that is subject to ﬂooding and interact it with weekly accumulated rainfall.
Our results presented in panel A show a positive interaction term as theory would
predict. The interaction is non-statistically signiﬁcant however. The coeﬃcient of
the uninteracted precipitation measure remains in the same order of magnitude as
the coeﬃcients of Table 4.3. In panel B we measure the eﬀect of the fourth quartile
precipitation relative to the rest of the precipitation distribution. Here ﬂooded is
a dummy variable for weekly accumulated rainfall falling on the upper-quartile of
the overall rainfall distribution. Our estimates are positive, signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, and stable across alternative speciﬁcations. In panel C we interact the ﬂooded
dummy with our ﬂood-prone area share deﬁned as above. The interaction term is
now positive and signiﬁcant at 5% level, implying that the impact of heavy rainfall
is much higher in wards at greater risk of ﬂooding all else equal.
Overall, the results of this section support the theoretical mechanisms described
in section 2 and the channels put forward in the public health literature. There are
various reasons why heavy rainfall and ﬂooding could lead to an increase in cholera,
as mentioned earlier. Not only the bacterium survives longer in wet humid surfaces,
but the risk of increased contamination is higher. The inundation of drains, water
systems, and pit latrines, greatly enhances the probability of exposure to contami-
nated water and food. Further, behavioral changes during periods of weather shocks
may also increase the probability of contagion (WHO). Finally, indirect mechanisms
through income-shocks due to the inundation of job locations or inaccessibility to
the work-place may further contribute to the adoption of risky behavior.
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4.5.2 Non-Linear Eﬀects: A Story of Infrastructure Quality?
We now explore further the relationship between rainfall and cholera incidence
and assess potential non-linearities related to ward-level characteristics. As ex-
plained above, the size of the weather shock in a given ward is likely to depend on
the quality of the infrastructure such as the availability of well-functioning drains,
paved roads and improved sanitation. This section concentrates on the correlation
that rainfall and several indicators of ward infrastructure and `neighborhood quality'
has with cholera incidence. Our choice of ward characteristics is in part dictated
by data availability. We focus on population density, road density, as well as the
density of drains and foot-ways, and the number of water wells. We also include the
percentage of the ward's area that hosts informal and formal housing.
As mentioned earlier, we are constrained when it comes to measuring the quality
of infrastructure and focus on quantity when no distinction is possible. Because
of this, while we expect higher population density to increase the measured eﬀect
of rainfall on cholera through a heightened risk of contagion, we are agnostic with
respect to the inﬂuence of road and water infrastructure measures. On the one hand,
greater physical supply of water wells and drains could be negatively associated with
cholera by eﬃciently evacuating used-water and rain. On the other hand, it could
magnify the impact of heavy precipitation on cholera when the quality is low, for
instance if because of unregulated dumping, drains and evacuation canals are clogged
in times of heavy rain.
Table 4.7 reports baseline estimates of population-weighted regressions. Esti-
mates of unweighted regressions are in Appendix Table 5, and results with Conley
HAC standard-errors are in Appendix Tables 10. The size of the coeﬃcients is stable
across our diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Further, contemporaneous precipitation remains
consistently positive and statistically signiﬁcant at between 1 to 5% levels.
The ﬁrst seven columns of the tables separately estimate each interaction term,
while in the last three columns we estimate all interactions jointly. Since we lose
a large number of observations when we include certain interactions, we report
results using three alternative samples. Overall, almost all characteristics considered
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individually are positive and signiﬁcant at various levels of signiﬁcance. Yet, only
foot-way densities and housing informality are consistently so across the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. The mechanisms here are intuitive. Foot-ways are unpaved roads.
Contaminated water might stagnate easier in muddy surfaces. At the same time,
foot-ways could just reﬂect informality. Indeed, informality displays the larger size,
with on average weekly accumulated rainfall increasing cholera incidence by 2.3%
to 4.5% more in wards with higher shares of informal housing.
Once we introduce all interaction terms together in columns (8) to (10) signif-
icance and signs are considerably changed suggesting individual interactions may
be suﬀering from omitted variable bias. Nonetheless, some important patterns re-
main. First, the only consistently positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (at
5% level) across the various speciﬁcations is the non-linear informal housing corre-
lation. While, the sample size is much smaller, results suggest living on informal
housing increases cholera incidence due to weekly accumulated rainfall by between
2.3% and 2.7% . This ﬁnding is far from surprising. Informal settlements are usu-
ally located in ﬂood-prone areas. They suﬀer from poor quality infrastructure and
deprived water and sanitation conditions. Penrose et al. (2010) ﬁnd similar pat-
terns when investigating a previous cholera episode in Dar es Salaam. Two other
infrastructure interactions display stable sizes and signs. The non-linear water wells
correlation is negative but almost never statistically signiﬁcant. Related to infor-
mality, wards with a higher density of foot-ways have again a higher likelihood of
accumulated rainfall aﬀecting weekly cholera incidence. The size is small (between
0.2% to 2% ) and fails to be statistically signiﬁcant.
These results support the theoretical mechanisms outlined earlier. First, informal
housing and unpaved roads increase the eﬀect of the weather shock. They are thus
likely to aﬀect individuals directly and indirectly through health and productivity
shocks. Our results so far, despite being imperfectly measured, suggest the quality
of infrastructure is highly correlated with the detrimental eﬀect accumulated rainfall
and ﬂooding have on cholera prevalence.
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4.5.3 Spatial Spillovers: Neighbors Contagion.
Next, we focus on spatial precipitation spillovers as in equation (4.5). Precipita-
tion recorded in adjacent wards might exacerbate pressure on water infrastructures.
They might also contaminate common water sources, particularly if wards are at
diﬀerent levels of elevation. In this case, uphill rainfall may also wash down contam-
inated waste or soil material, harming wards below. Table 4.8 contains our baseline
results, while Appendix Tables 6 and 13 contain the usual alternative speciﬁcations.
We ﬁrst estimate the average eﬀect of weekly accumulated rain in neighboring
wards on the cholera incidence of a given ward. We do not ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect
here. The estimated coeﬃcients are almost no diﬀerent from zero and insigniﬁcant
across econometric speciﬁcations. In Appendix Table 11 we further look at the
eﬀect of one and two-weeks lags of neighboring rainfall. None of these spatial lagged
variables seem to matter.
We then diﬀerentiate between rainfall accumulation in uphill and downhill neigh-
boring wards. Results here are more nuanced. We register a small but signiﬁcant
eﬀect from accumulated weekly precipitation in adjacent downhill wards. That is,
a 10 mm increase in weekly accumulated rainfall in downhill neighboring wards in-
creases cholera cases in the ward by 0.01% to 0.03% . This ﬁnding is consistent
with water source contamination from relatively lower wards. The size is negligible
suggesting almost no spatial spillovers from rainfall in contiguous areas. Further,
precipitation in one's own ward is almost always signiﬁcant at 1% level, retaining
the size of baseline estimates. Again allowing for time lags yields no signiﬁcant eﬀect
(Table A12).
Failing to detect any spatial spillovers of precipitation in contiguous wards is
unexpected. It suggests only local contamination prevails. This is consistent with
ﬁndings in Ambrus et al. (2015) on the 1854 cholera epidemic in London's Soho
neighborhood. Their identiﬁcation strategy and results suggest cholera is contained
within a very speciﬁc area. Implications concerning channels of transmission are
many but go beyond the scope of this paper.
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4.5.4 Time Dynamic Eﬀects.
So far, we have not taken into account the possibility of a dynamic relationship
between rainfall and cholera incidence. If cholera responds to precipitation with a
delay, that is, if precipitation in previous weeks or days also impacts cholera in the
current week, the estimates of Table 4.3 could underestimate the true eﬀect. While
cholera symptoms can manifest 12 hours after an individual being in contact with
the bacteria, they can also take up to 5 days. These might not coincide with our
weekly deﬁnition. Further, rainfall is easily stored and stagnation from previous
weeks may contribute heavily to contagion.
To test for dynamic eﬀects we estimate distributed lag models (equation 4.6) and
allow rainfall to aﬀect health up to ﬁve weeks later. The sixth lag of rain (not shown)
is not statistically signiﬁcant. We also report the contemporaneous coeﬃcient and
the sum of the six week period. Table 4.9 displays our point estimates. We gradually
introduce additional rainfall lags in our model, which includes municipality-week
ﬁxed eﬀects.
First, this exercise allows us to conﬁrm that including time-lags does not change
our conclusions. The contemporaneous rainfall eﬀect on cholera remains in the same
order of magnitude as in Table 4.3, close to 3% and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%
level. Second, the results in the table clearly show that past rainfall up to ﬁve
preceding weeks impact cholera incidence in the current week. All lags decrease
in size the farther in time, suggesting the contemporaneous eﬀect matters most.
The total eﬀect of precipitation is obtained by summing the coeﬃcients on the
contemporaneous and lagged precipitation variables. The total cumulated impact
amounts to 0.12 points (last row). That is, six-week cumulated rainfall increases
current cholera incidence in a ward by up to 12% . The key message of this table is
that weekly cumulated rainfall promotes cholera occurrence immediately and with
a lag of up to 5 weeks.
We repeat the exercise with our more ﬂexible semi-parametric speciﬁcation in
Table 4.10 (quartiles). The table is as Table 4.9 except that we only include lags
up to two weeks later. The third lags (not shown) are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Again, the predominant eﬀect is that of extreme rainfall or ﬂooding captured in
the upper-quartile, and up to two prior weeks. As before, all lags decrease in size
the farther in time, suggesting the contemporaneous eﬀect matters most. Further,
we conﬁrm that the inclusion of the lags does not aﬀect our conclusions as the size
and statistical signiﬁcance are unchanged for contemporaneous coeﬃcients. The
total cumulative eﬀect of each quartile is also computed in the last row. The total
cumulated impact amounts to 0.37 points for the upper-quartile. It is interesting
to highlight that the size of the two-week lag of the ﬁrst quartile (no rain) remains
positive but increases in size. It is even statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level for one
speciﬁcation. This supports theories according to which dryness also matters for
cholera incidence by increasing the risk of drinking unsafe water. The time lag is
consistent with this type of behavioral changes.
4.6 Conclusion
Rapid urbanization in developing countries has often led to unplanned cities, par-
ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa, with large shares of the urban population living in
informal settlements, with poor transport infrastructure and limited access to wa-
ter and sanitation. Under these conditions, developing countries' city dwellers have
become more vulnerable to disease transmission and epidemics. Global warming is
expected to exacerbate these health-related risks. The World Bank (2016) estimates
that climate change may push up to 77 million more urban residents into poverty
by 2030. As extreme weather events become more frequent, understanding the re-
lationship between disease transmission, infrastructure quality and weather shocks
in urban areas is important. We make signiﬁcant advances on this issue.
The key contribution of this paper has been to show that heavy rainfall has a
strong positive eﬀect on weekly cholera incidence within wards. We assemble a panel
dataset deﬁned at the ward level containing weekly information on cholera incidence,
precipitation, and infrastructure quality from various sources. On average, we ﬁnd
that a 10 mm increase in weekly accumulated precipitation leads to an increase of
up to 3.5% of weekly recorded cholera cases. Extreme rainfall has a larger impact: a
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single additional week of rainfall falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall
distribution increases the number of eﬀective cholera cases by up to 20.3% relative
to a week with very light rain. The impact is even higher in wards at greater risk
of ﬂooding.
Results in the paper also emphasize the key role of local infrastructure. We ﬁnd
the eﬀect of weekly rainfall on cholera cases to be consistently higher in wards with
larger shares of informal housing and a higher density of foot-ways (i.e. informal
roads). These results are in line with the mechanisms outlined. Neighborhoods with
low-quality infrastructure are likely to be more exposed to the cholera bacteria when
surfaces are washed and drains are overﬂown by severe precipitation. Vulnerable
populations in these wards are also more likely to suﬀer from negative income shocks
during extreme weather events.
Findings here have important policy implications. Cities in developing coun-
tries need to address infrastructure gaps to contain the risk of recurrent epidemic
outbreaks in fragile environments. Policies that improve the quality of local infras-
tructures and housing conditions should mitigate the negative impact of rainfall on
health. Given the transmission channels of cholera, the proper servicing of informal
areas, including sewerages connections and the pavement of informal roads, as well
as the regulation of waste-dumping, may prove to be more beneﬁcial in the long-
term than the use of short-term palliative measures during outbreaks. Interventions
improving access to drinking water as well as access to sanitation should also greatly
reduce cholera risk. In the theoretical framework considered, governments can also
reduce the adverse eﬀect of weather on health outcomes by supporting households in
periods of health-shocks through subsidized health goods or direct transfers. These
policies also need to be taken into account given the large room for increasing social
safety nets in urban areas. Evidence on large-scale policy interventions in urban ar-
eas are limited and more is needed to understand priority-investments that increase
resilience and prevent contagion of treatable diseases in developing cities if these are
to become engines of growth (Glaeser 2011).
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Figures
Figure 4.1: Distribution of cholera eﬀective cholera cases (epidemic weeks)
Figure 4.2: Distribution of eﬀective cholera cases, by age (epidemic weeks)
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Figure 4.3: Spatial distribution of cholera incidence, total outbreak
(cases per 10,000 inhabitants)
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Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics: Ward characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Area (km2) 18.12 31.15 0.414 209.55 90
Pop (c2012) 48,495 26,064 6,411 106,946 90
HH size (c2012) 4.00 0.21 3.60 4.40 90
Density (km2) 11.53 11.12 0.05 46.74 90
Improved sanitation 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.48 90
Electricity 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.37 90
Drinking water 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.42 90
Hospital per 10tho. 0.19 0.43 0.00 2.97 90
Density of roads* 4.00 3.84 0.00 18 88
Density of foot-ways* 8.83 15.76 0.01 75.99 63
Density of waterways* 5.00 5.61 0.00 24.81 78
Density of drains* 3.28 2.66 0.02 11.04 45
# water wells 1.25 2.99 0.00 21 76
% area informal 34 28 0.00 88 23
Notes: c2012 refers to data from census 2012, all of the infrastructure density mea-
sures (*) are measured in km per square km
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: Weather and Cholera
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Weather:
% ﬂooded area 10.00 16.00 0.00 73.00 90
Average temperature (C) 26.73 0.37 25.43 27.17 90
Total rainfall (10mm) 162.36 18.15 134.27 216.42 90
Average weekly temperature (C) 26.73 1.57 22.92 29.99 6930
Weekly rainfall accumulation (10mm), GPM 2.11 4.05 0.00 40.86 6930
Weekly rainfall accumulation (10mm), TRMM 2.67 5.53 0.00 44.62 6930
Cholera:
Total cases 2015-2016 63.32 94.01 0.00 588 90
Total weekly cases per ward (excl. neg) 0.72 3.84 0.00 192 6930
Total weekly cases female 0.36 1.85 0.00 90 6930
Total weekly cases below 5 yrs 0.08 0.49 0.00 14 6930
Total weekly cases tested neg 0.11 0.56 0.00 20 6930
Total eﬀective cases epiweek10 3.16 9.40 0.00 192 890
Total eﬀective cases epiweek20 2.54 7.25 0.00 192 1780
Total eﬀective cases epiweek30 1.77 6.03 0.00 192 2670
Notes: Temperature are degrees Celsius; all measures of rainfall are accumulated rainfall (units: 10mm),
cholera cases are total numbers. 88 of 90 wards where aﬀected throughout the outbreak.
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Table 4.3: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0198*** 0.0208*** 0.0344***
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0077)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4491 0.4502 0.5254
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in paren-
thesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall
in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the
population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the
ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p ≤
0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
Table 4.4: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (Instrumental Variable Estimates)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0689** 0.0779** 0.0451
(0.0341) (0.0356) (0.0476)
N 6930 6930 6930
First Stage F-test 36.812 35.354 24.202
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Precipitation is mea-
sured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm
units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly
cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward
air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March
2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016; they are weighted by the
population of the ward (census 2012). Nasa GPM v3 precipitation
measurement is instrumented with NASA TRMM measurement. *p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 4.5: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Quartile 1 0.0010 0.0040 0.0049
(0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0177)
Quartile 3 -0.0360 -0.0286 -0.0536*
(0.0324) (0.0329) (0.0317)
Quartile 4 0.1867*** 0.2032*** 0.1525**
(0.0594) (0.0610) (0.0611)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4510 0.4522 0.5254
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in paren-
thesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall
in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the
population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the
ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. The
quartiles of the rainfall distribution are deﬁned as follows: Q1 (0mm),
Q2(0-0.29mm), Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm). *p ≤ 0.10 **
p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Precipitation 0.0192*** 0.0204*** 0.0340***
(0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0077)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0091* 0.0076 0.0043
(0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.2189*** 0.2280*** 0.2029***
(0.0485) (0.0487) (0.0498)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.2007*** 0.2103*** 0.1970***
(0.0470) (0.0472) (0.0517)
Flooded × % Flood-prone area 0.2262** 0.2176** 0.2076**
(0.1019) (0.1007) (0.1028)
N 6930 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All panels
are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated
rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. Flooded is a dummy variable for
weekly precipitation falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution.
Flood-prone area is the total area of the ward that is prone to ﬂooding. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature;they are weighted by the population of the
ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the
ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 4.7: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Infrastructure & Ward Characteristics
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Precipitation 0.0364*** 0.0355*** 0.0439*** 0.0354*** 0.0668** 0.0023 0.0525*** 0.0518*** 0.0696** 0.0058
(0.0087) (0.0080) (0.0116) (0.0079) (0.0296) (0.0135) (0.0179) (0.0126) (0.0314) (0.0244)
Precipitation × Pop. density 0.0002** 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Precipitation × Roads density 0.0017* 0.0007 0.0019 -0.0054
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0066)
Precipitation × Footways density 0.0020* 0.0023 0.0033 0.0054
(0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0054)
Precipitation × # Water wells 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0014
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0023)
Precipitation × Drains density 0.0018 0.0002 0.0039
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0032)
Precipitation × % Informal housing 0.0168* 0.0264**
(0.0083) (0.0092)
Precipitation × % Formal housing 0.0032
(0.0038)
N 6930 6776 4851 5852 3465 1771 2618 4004 2926 1463
R2 0.5229 0.5335 0.5703 0.5370 0.6182 0.6606 0.5383 0.5860 0.6398 0.6768
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Separate regressions in columns (1-7). Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated
rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature; they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016.
Population density is the number of inhabitants per square km (census 2012), Roads density, foot-way density, and drains density are the meters of roads, foot-ways and




Table 4.8: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Spatial Spillovers
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0183** 0.0192*** 0.0196*** 0.0204*** 0.0316*** 0.0320***
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0076)
Neighbours precipitation 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Downhill neighbours precipitation 0.0011 0.0010 0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4491 0.4494 0.4502 0.4505 0.5255 0.5256
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accu-
mulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases
in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the population of the ward
(census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Neighbors'
precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighboring ward. Uphill and downhill measures are for neighboring
wards at a higher or lower elevation than the given ward. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 4.9: Dynamic Eﬀects: Lags of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Precipitation 0.0337*** 0.0313*** 0.0300*** 0.0305*** 0.0298**
(0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072)
Precipitation (w−1) 0.0249*** 0.0243*** 0.0214*** 0.0200** 0.0205**
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0083)
Precipitation (w−2) 0.0222*** 0.0215*** 0.0195*** 0.0185**
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0070)
Precipitation (w−3) 0.0256*** 0.0252*** 0.0240***
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073)




Cumulative (6 weeks) 0.1221***
(0.0288)
N 6840 6750 6660 6570 6480
R2 0.5263 0.5267 0.5274 0.5275 0.5270
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the
weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature;
they are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst
week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Precipitation w−n are the lags of weekly
precipitation up to n weeks. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table 4.10: Dynamic Eﬀects: Lags of Quartiles of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q1 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0039 0.0005 0.0061 0.0058
(0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0171)
Q3 -0.0335 -0.0372 -0.0262 -0.0301 -0.0519* -0.0551*
(0.0309) (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0300) (0.0296)
Q4 0.1825*** 0.1753*** 0.1982*** 0.1908*** 0.1504** 0.1442**
(0.0559) (0.0538) (0.0578) (0.0556) (0.0574) (0.0554)
Q1w−1 -0.0034 -0.0066 0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0049 -0.0071
(0.0218) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0198) (0.0202)
Q3w−1 -0.0198 -0.0215 -0.0137 -0.0154 -0.0227 -0.0271
(0.0352) (0.0346) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0314) (0.0302)
Q4w−1 0.1212** 0.1139** 0.1355** 0.1277** 0.1368** 0.1256**
(0.0590) (0.0565) (0.0592) (0.0569) (0.0605) (0.0566)
Q1w−2 0.0312 0.0347* 0.0158
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0206)
Q3w−2 0.0320 0.0372 0.0495
(0.0356) (0.0357) (0.0352)
Q4w−2 0.0903* 0.1029* 0.1052*
(0.0543) (0.0549) (0.0568)
Q1 (Cumulative 3 weeks) 0.0145
(0.350)
Q3 (Cumulative 3 weeks) -0.0327
(-0.490)
Q4 (Cumulative 3 weeks) 0.3750***
(0.1348)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4522 0.4526 0.4535 0.4540 0.5267 0.5271
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the
weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they
are weighted by the population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March
2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. The quartiles are deﬁned as in Table 4. Quartilew−n are the lags




Figure A1. Cholera cases during 2015-2016 outbreak, by region
Notes: Data obtained from the Red Cross. Total cases (vs. eﬀective in analysis) up until April 2016.
Notes: There are currently 5 municipal districts in Dar es Salaam. Here we use the three that existed when the
cholera outbreak started and at the levels at which the data was collected.
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Figure A2. Distribution of eﬀective cholera cases (epidemic week), by district municipality




Table A1: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0157** 0.0165*** 0.0231***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0063)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4049 0.4057 0.4638
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in paren-
thesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall
in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is from
the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
Table A2: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (IV Estimates, unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0431** 0.0477** 0.0394
(0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0266)
N 6930 6930 6930
First Stage F-test 40.822 40.21 27.985
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Precipitation is mea-
sured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm
units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly
cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward
air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March
2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Nasa GPM v3 precipitation
measurement is instrumented with NASA TRMM measurement. *p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
225
Table A3: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Q1 -0.0089 -0.0058 -0.0030
(0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0155)
Q3 -0.0301 -0.0250 -0.0359
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0269)
Q4 0.1592*** 0.1706*** 0.1521***
(0.0521) (0.0528) (0.0565)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4065 0.4074 0.4645
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthe-
sis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a
given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control
for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst
week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. The quartiles
of the rainfall distribution are deﬁned as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-
0.29mm), Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm)*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05
*** p≤0.01
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Precipitation 0.0154** 0.0162*** 0.0227***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0062)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0079 0.0066 0.0059
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0052)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1865*** 0.1930*** 0.1856***
(0.0424) (0.0425) (0.0456)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1688*** 0.1757*** 0.1658***
(0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0451)
Flooded × %Flood-prone area 0.2181*** 0.2113*** 0.2136**
(0.0795) (0.0786) (0.0879)
N 6930 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All panels
are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated
rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested
positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. Flooded is a dummy variable for
weekly precipitation falling above the 75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution.
Flood-prone area is the total area of the ward that is prone to ﬂooding. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week
of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016.*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A5: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Infrastructure & Ward Characteristics (unweighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Precipitation 0.0238*** 0.0243*** 0.0246** 0.0221*** 0.0245 -0.0008 0.0509*** 0.0242* 0.0258 0.0063
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0121) (0.0064) (0.0225) (0.0128) (0.0173) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0221)
Precipitation × Pop. density 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Precipitation × Roads density 0.0014 0.0007 0.0024 -0.0055
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0064)
Precipitation × Footways density 0.0027** 0.0023 0.0024 0.0063
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0055)
Precipitation × # Water wells 0.0013* -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0015
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0023)
Precipitation × Drains density 0.0029* 0.0006 0.0046
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0038)
Precipitation × % Informal housing 0.0178** 0.0233**
(0.0072) (0.0083)
Precipitation × % Formal housing 0.0023
(0.0038)
N 6930 6776 4851 5852 3465 1771 2618 4004 2926 1463
R2 0.4633 0.4728 0.5160 0.4668 0.5534 0.6435 0.5398 0.5303 0.5858 0.6693
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Separate regressions in columns (1-7). Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated
rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward
air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Population density is the number of inhabitants per square
km (census 2012), Roads density, foot-way density, and drains density are the meters of roads, foot-ways and drains per km (OSM), % informal and formal houses in the




Table A6: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Spillovers (un-
weighted)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0158** 0.0162*** 0.0166*** 0.0170*** 0.0226*** 0.0227***
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062)
Neighbours' precipitation -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Uphill neighbours' precipitation -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0007
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Downhill neighbours' precipitation 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.4049 0.4052 0.4057 0.4061 0.4638 0.4640
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumu-
lated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in
a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March
2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Neighbors' precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighboring
ward. Uphill and downhill measures are for neighboring wards at a higher or lower elevation than the given ward. *p ≤
0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Main Regressions, Spatial Auto-correlation of Standard Errors
(Conley HAC SE)







Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999,
2008). Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall
in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective
(tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions
control for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is from
the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01











Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999,
2008). Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rain-
fall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of
eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward.
All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The pe-
riod covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week
of September 2016. The quartiles of the rainfall distribution are
deﬁned as follows: Q1 (0mm), Q2(0-0.29mm), Q3(0.29-2.69mm),
Q4(2.69-40.86mm). *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0079 0.0059
(0.0223) (0.0169)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1865*** 0.1856***
(0.0455) (0.0541)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1688*** 0.1658***
(0.0430) (0.0495)
Flooded × % Flood-prone area 0.2181 0.2136
(0.2266) (0.2035)
N 6930 6930
Ward FE Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). All
panels are independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log
of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. Flooded is
a dummy variable for weekly precipitation falling above the 75th percentile
of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-prone area is the total area of the
ward that is prone to ﬂooding. All regressions control for weekly ward air
temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the
ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A10: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Infrastructure & Ward Characteristics (HAC SE)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Precipitation 0.0222*** 0.0243*** 0.0246** 0.0221*** 0.0245 -0.0008 0.0509*** 0.0242* 0.0258 0.0063
(0.0070) (0.0085) (0.0102) (0.0083) (0.0249) (0.0200) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0266) (0.0281)
Precipitation × Pop. density 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0011)
Precipitation × Roads density 0.0014 0.0007 0.0024 -0.0055
(0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0074)
Precipitation × Footways density 0.0027 0.0023 0.0024 0.0063
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0033) (0.0103)
Precipitation × # Water wells 0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0015
(0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Precipitation × drains density 0.0029 0.0006 0.0046
(0.0064) (0.0040) (0.0086)
Precipitation × % Informal housing 0.0178 0.0233
(0.0202) (0.0202)
Precipitation × % Formal housing 0.0023
(0.0058)
N 6930 6776 4851 5852 3465 1771 2618 4004 2926 1463
R2 0.0056 0.0053 0.0026 0.0059 0.0022 0.0062 0.0157 0.0037 0.0025 0.0069
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). Separate regressions in columns (1-7). Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in
a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature.
The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. Roads density, foot-way density, and drains density are the meters of roads,






Table A11: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Lagged Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (1)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0285** 0.0288** 0.0292** 0.0293** 0.0346*** 0.0335***
(0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Neighbours precipitation -0.0046 -0.0049 -0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0008
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0047)
Neighbours precipitation w−1 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0013)
Neighbours precipitation w−2 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.4493 0.4493 0.4504 0.4504 0.5255 0.5256
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly
cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by
the population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst
week of September 2016. Neighbors' precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighboring ward.
Neighbor's Precipitationw−n are the lags of weekly accumulated rainfall in neighboring wards up to n weeks.
*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A12: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Lagged Precipitation by Elevation on Cholera Incidence
(2)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0218** 0.0214** 0.0233** 0.0230** 0.0355*** 0.0354***
(0.0097) (0.0105) (0.0100) (0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0105)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0052 -0.0049
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0050)
Downhill neighbours precipitation -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0045
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Uphill N's precipitation w−1 0.0037 0.0042 0.0040 0.0044 0.0055 0.0046
(0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0055) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0070)
Downhill N's precipitationw−1 0.0043 0.0062 0.0047 0.0063 0.0062 0.0070
(0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0054) (0.0072) (0.0052) (0.0073)
Uphill N's precipitationw−2 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0007
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Downhill N's precipitationw−2 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0012
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.4494 0.4495 0.4505 0.4506 0.5257 0.5258
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly
cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the
population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of
September 2016. Neighbors' precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a neighboring ward. Uphill and
downhill measures are for neighboring wards at a higher or lower elevation than the given ward. N's Precipitation
Uphill/Downhill w−n are the lags of weekly accumulated rainfall in neighboring wards up to n weeks according to
their elevation with respect to the given ward. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A13: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Spillovers
(HAC SE) (1)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Precipitation 0.0158*** 0.0162*** 0.0226*** 0.0227***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0075) (0.0076)
Neighbours precipitation -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0011 -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Downhill neighbours precipitation 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0009) (0.0008)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.0015 0.0021 0.0049 0.0053
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes:Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). Precipitation is measured
as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of
eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly
ward air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst
week of September 2016. Neighbors' precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a
neighboring ward. Uphill and downhill measures are for neighboring wards at a higher or lower
elevation than the given ward. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A14: Impact of Neighbors' Weekly Lagged Precipitation on Cholera Incidence: Spillovers
(HAC SE) (2)
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Precipitation 0.0189*** 0.0187*** 0.0259*** 0.0257***
(0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0078) (0.0083)
Uphill neighbours precipitation -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0050 -0.0050
(0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0051)
Downhill neighbours precipitation -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0044
(0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0062)
Uphill N's precipitation w−1 0.0033 0.0033 0.0044 0.0046
(0.0036) (0.0108) (0.0034) (0.0115)
Downhill N's precipitation w−1 0.0041 0.0052 0.0052 0.0067
(0.0031) (0.0117) (0.0043) (0.0124)
Uphill N's precipitation w−2 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0079) (0.0071)
Downhill N's precipitation w−2 -0.0010 -0.0015
(0.0076) (0.0069)
N 6929 6924 6929 6924
R2 0.0022 0.0023 0.0056 0.0057
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes
Notes:Conley HAC standard errors in parenthesis (Conley 1999, 2008). Precipitation is measured
as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of
eﬀective (tested positive) weekly cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly
ward air temperature. The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst
week of September 2016. Neighbors' precipitation measures weekly accumulated rainfall in a
neighboring ward. Uphill and downhill measures are for neighboring wards at a higher or lower
elevation than the given ward. N's Precipitation Uphill/Downhill w−n are the lags of weekly
accumulated rainfall in neighboring wards up to n weeks according to their elevation with respect
to the given ward. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Table A15: Lagged Dependent Variable Model
Cholera cases (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Precipitation 0.0199*** 0.0155*** 0.0119** 0.0111** 0.0103** 0.0103**
(0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Cholera cases w−1 0.6111*** 0.4430*** 0.4037*** 0.3943*** 0.3913*** 0.3914***
(0.0457) (0.0336) (0.0348) (0.0360) (0.0368) (0.0371)
Cholera cases w−2 0.2747*** 0.2112*** 0.1975*** 0.1922*** 0.1923***
(0.0230) (0.0285) (0.0268) (0.0281) (0.0283)
Cholera cases w−3 0.1435*** 0.1172*** 0.1085*** 0.1087***
(0.0206) (0.0245) (0.0255) (0.0257)
Cholera cases w−4 0.0652*** 0.0476** 0.0479**
(0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0197)
Cholera cases w−5 0.0447** 0.0455**
(0.0214) (0.0217)
Cholera cases w−6 -0.0019
(0.0185)
N 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.6837 0.7076 0.7136 0.7148 0.7153 0.7153
Ward FE
Municipality × week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipitation is measured as the weekly
accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the log of eﬀective (tested positive) weekly
cholera cases in a given ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature; they are weighted by the
population of the ward (census 2012). The period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of
September 2016. Cholera casesw−n are lagged eﬀective cholera cases up week n. *p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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Robustness check: Linear-Linear Regressions
Table A16: Impact of Weekly Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 10,000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Precipitation 0.0272*** 0.0280*** 0.0359***
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0099)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1908 0.1915 0.2367
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Precipita-
tion is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm units),
cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera cases (tested positive) divided by the
population of the ward (10,000s), i.e. cholera cases every 10 thousand people in a
ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The period covered is
from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016. *p ≤ 0.10 **
p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
Table A17: Impact of Weekly Quartiles of Precipitation on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 10,000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Q1 0.0196 0.0235 0.0152
(0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0163)
Q3 -0.0215 -0.0158 -0.0216
(0.0250) (0.0248) (0.0276)
Q4 0.0946** 0.1069** 0.0862*
(0.0462) (0.0473) (0.0509)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1899 0.1905 0.2349
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. Pre-
cipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in a given ward (10mm
units), cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera cases (tested positive) di-
vided by the population of the ward (10,000s), i.e. cholera cases every 10 thousand
people in a ward. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The
period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September
2016. The quartiles of the rainfall distribution are deﬁned as follows: Q1 (0mm),
Q2(0-0.29mm), Q3(0.29-2.69mm), Q4(2.69-40.86mm)*p ≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 ***
p≤0.01
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Table A18: Impact of Flooding on Cholera Incidence (per 10,000s people)
Cholera Ward Incidence Rate (per 1000s)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Precipitation 0.0268*** 0.0276*** 0.0354***
(0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0097)
Precipitation × % Flood-prone area 0.0094 0.0080 0.0078
(0.0141) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Panel B:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1164*** 0.1231*** 0.1077***
(0.0344) (0.0351) (0.0395)
Panel C:
Flooded (precipitation ≥75th p) 0.1004*** 0.1074*** 0.0877**
(0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0389)
Flooded × %Flood-prone area 0.1981 0.1910 0.2162
(0.1471) (0.1451) (0.1480)
N 6930 6930 6930
R2 0.1901 0.1908 0.2352
Ward FE Yes Yes Yes
Week FE Yes Yes
Municipal time trend Yes
Municipality × week FE Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ward level in parenthesis. All panels are
independent regressions. Precipitation is measured as the weekly accumulated rainfall in
a given ward (10mm units), cholera cases are the number of weekly cholera cases (tested
positive) divided by the population of the ward (10,000s), i.e. cholera cases every 10 thousand
people in a ward. Flooded is a dummy variable for weekly precipitation falling above the
75th percentile of the total rainfall distribution. Flood-prone area is the total area of the
ward that is prone to ﬂooding. All regressions control for weekly ward air temperature. The
period covered is from the ﬁrst week of March 2015 to the ﬁrst week of September 2016.*p
≤ 0.10 ** p≤0.05 *** p≤0.01
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